

PERSONALITY
AND THE
SOCIAL GROUP

ERNEST W. BURGESS



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
SOCIOLOGICAL SERIES

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PERSONALITY AND THE
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Edited by
ERNEST W. BURGESS



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PREFACE

This volume represents a new approach to the study of personality. The individual has been systematically investigated in the past, but mainly from the standpoint of biometric measurements, psychological tests, and emotional conditionings. In this volume are brought together the research of men in social psychology and sociology who are now studying personality from a new point of view, as a product of group life.

That the individual and society are two aspects of human nature has been recognized by sociologists since Charles H. Cooley analyzed their interrelationships in his works *Human Nature and the Social Order* and *Social Organization*. But the conceptions which he set forth of human nature as sympathy and of one aspect of the social self as a "looking-glass" self were not immediately utilized in research on personality.

The publication of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* definitely set forth an exhibit of findings and of methods of how the individual might be studied in his group relationships and how a culture might be analyzed through the medium of personal documents.

It was therefore quite natural and fitting that the subject "The Individual in Relation to Society" should be the central topic of the twenty-second annual meeting of the American Sociological Society during the presidency of Dr. William I. Thomas, the senior author of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*. Because of the wide interest in the papers presented at that meeting, as evidenced in part by the exhaustion of the *Proceedings* and of the issues of the *American Journal of Sociology* in which they originally appeared, the Society has authorized their reprinting in book form.

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The different articles in this volume may be taken, then, as representative of the present interest and status of research upon personality among sociologists and social psychologists.

Professor Thomas has outlined in the introductory chapter the scope of the studies in human behavior now being carried on from the standpoint of the social situation. Is it not significant that this research work in progress includes as many or more who would not be primarily classified as sociologists as those who have received standardized sociological training? This is a natural consequence of the way in which the research interest in personality will lead persons approaching the problem from different points of view to somewhat the same destination. The following pithy explanation was given recently by a psychiatrist: "The sociologist began with the study of society and discovered personality; the psychiatrist started with research upon the individual and found himself face to face with the family and the community."

This growing common interest in the interrelations of personality and society on the part of biologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, and sociologists, gives added point to the publication of this volume at this time. The points of view, methods of research, and the findings of the biological, psychiatric, and psychological studies of personality are widely known. But the group, or the cultural approach to personality research developed in recent years by sociologists and social psychologists has not as yet had an adequate presentation. This little book, without claiming to realize that objective, does present an exhibit of present points of view and methods of study employed by sociologists. It includes three or four papers upon recent research findings on the organic basis of personality, which suggest more than prove the valuable results to be obtained from the integration of the constitutional and cultural approaches. The time has now been reached when it will be profitable for biology, psychology, psychiatry, and sociology to collaborate in

the setting up of laboratories for personality study utilizing all these different specialized techniques.

In the writer's opinion the publication of these papers in a volume should at least stimulate still farther the development of the group or cultural approach to the study of personality. For they reveal clearly how in the community, with its institutions, and in the interaction of members of social groups the development and the organization of personality are conditioned.

Moreover, this volume contains materials upon the methods and technique of the cultural approach to personality study. The life-history record and the personal document are new devices of sociological research. While they require further refinement as research instruments, they have already proved their value for the study of personality. Incidentally, they promise to be of equal service in the description and explanation of the behavior of social groups.

ERNEST W. BURGESS

March 11, 1929

$$\frac{200}{120} = 80$$

$$\frac{120}{50} = 170$$

$$\frac{9}{13} \frac{22}{21} \frac{7}{3} \frac{9}{1} \frac{5}{50}$$

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THE BEHAVIOR PATTERN AND THE SITUATION

The lines of social research have largely converged on the question of behavior reactions and the processes involved in their formation and modification. It appears that the particular behavior patterns and the total personality are overwhelmingly conditioned by the types of situations and trains of experience encountered by the individual in the course of his life. The question of heredity remains a factor, but this is also being studied in terms of behavior; it is, in fact, defined as the phylogenetic memory of experience—memory organically incorporated.

In approaching problems of behavior it is possible to emphasize—to have in the focus of attention for working purposes—either the attitude, the value, or the situation. The attitude is the tendency to act, representing the drive, the affective states, the wishes. The value represents the object or goal desired, and the situation represents the configuration of the factors conditioning the behavior reaction. It is also possible to work from the standpoint of adaptation—that is, how are attitudes and values modified according to the demands of given situations.

Any one of these standpoints will involve all the others, since they together constitute a process. But I wish to speak at present of the situational procedure as having certain experimental, objective, and comparative possibilities and as deserving of further attention and elaboration. As I have said, the emphasis of this standpoint by no means obscures the other factors; on the contrary, it reveals them. The situations which the individual encounters, into which he is forced, or which he creates, disclose the character of his adaptive strivings, positive or negative, progressive or regressive, his claims, attainments, renunciations, and compro-

mises. For the human personality also the most important content of situations is the attitudes and values of other persons with which his own come into conflict and co-operation, and I have thus in mind the study of types of situation which reveal the rôle of attitudes and values in the process of behavior adaptation.

The situational method is the one in use by the experimental physiologist and psychologist who prepare situations, introduce the subject into the situation, observe the behavior reactions, change the situation, and observe the changes in the reactions. Child rendered one point in the situation more stimulating than others by applying an electric needle or other stimulus and made heads grow where tails would otherwise have grown. The situational character of the animal experimentation of the psychologists is well known. The rat, for example, in order to open a door, must not only stand on a platform placed in a certain position, but at the same time pull a string. A complete study of situations would give a complete account of the rat's attitudes, values, and intelligence.

The study of behavior with reference to situations which was begun by Vervorn, Pfeffer, Loeb, Jennings, and other physiologists and was concerned with the so-called "tropisms," or the reaction of the small organism to light, electricity, heat, gravity, hard substances, etc., was continued, or paralleled, by the experiments of Thorndike, Yerkes, Pavlov, Watson, Köhler, and others with rats, dogs, monkeys, and babies as subjects, but until quite recently no systematic work from this standpoint has involved the reactions of the individual to other persons or groups of persons. That is to say, the work has not been sociological, but physiological or psychological.

Recently, however, there have developed certain directly sociological studies of behavior based on the situation. These are either experimental in the sense that the situations are planned and

the behavior reactions observed, or advantage is taken of existing situations to study the reactions of individuals comparatively.

We may notice first the significant work of Bühler, Hetzer, and Tudor-Hart¹ upon the earliest social reactions of the child. Working in the Vienna clinics they divided 126 children into 9 groups of 14 each, the first group containing children 3 days old and under, and the last group containing those 4-5 months old, and experimenting with sound-stimuli they observed the rate at which the child learns to separate out and give attention to the human voice among other sounds. All the children noticed all the sounds (striking a porcelain plate with a spoon, rattling a piece of paper, and the human voice) sometimes, but the reaction of the newborn to noises in the first weeks is far more positive than the reaction to the voice, even to loud and noisy conversation: 92 per cent of frequency to the noises and 25 per cent to the voice. But in the third week the proportion is about the same, and in the fourth week the reaction is more frequent to the voice. The first positive reaction to the voice, other than listening, is a puckering of the lips, a sucking movement. The quality of the voice or the person speaking is at first of no significance. A child of three months when scolded angrily laughed gleefully. As yet angry tones had not been associated with punishment. A voice of any kind meant feeding.

Working with another group of 114 children, not newborn but borrowed from nursing mothers at a milk depot, placing them together in groups of two or more, and giving them toys, the most various reactions were disclosed in the unfamiliar situation. Some were embarrassed and inactive; others were openly delighted; some pounced upon the toys and paid no attention to the children; others explored the general environment; some robbed their companions of all the toys; others proffered, exchanged, or exhibited

¹ Charlotte Bühler, Hildegard Hetzer, and Beatrix Tudor-Hart, *Sociologische und psychologische Studien über das erste Lebensjahr* (Quellen und Studien zur Jugendkunde), Jena, 1927.

them; some were furious in the new situation, already, in the first year, positively negativistic. It is impossible to say to what degree these children had been conditioned by association with their mothers and how far the reactions were dispositional. But it is plain that by the end of the first year the most positive personality trends had been established. At this early age the experimenters think they distinguish three main personality types: the dominant, the amiable or humanitarian, and the exhibitionist, or producer.

Situational work of this type is now being carried on in several child-study institutes in the United States, and is foundational for the work in which we are more directly interested. Anderson and Goodenough, for example, and their associates, working in Minneapolis and observing the reactions of children among themselves in spontaneous play, found that a given child participating in play actively with all the other members of the group successively might be found leading or dominating in 95 per cent of the situations, whereas another child, under the same conditions, was found to be in the leading position only 5 per cent of the time. That is, within a constant period one child is getting twenty times as much practice in meeting social situations in a given way as a second child. We have here a type of organization of behavior where not only the lack of practice but the habit of subordination will have the most far-reaching consequences in the development of efficiency and personality. Observations will now be undertaken by the same observers on the effect of the alteration of the composition of groups with the object of giving the less dominant children opportunity to assume more important rôles.²

Another item in the program of this institute is the study of habit formation in connection with games of skill. It has appeared that the children develop idiosyncrasies in their technique of throw-

² John E. Anderson, "The Genesis of Social Reactions in the Young Child," *The Unconscious; A Symposium*, pp. 69-90.

ing a ring at a peg. If an effort, however awkward, happens to be successful, the child tends to adopt and persevere in this method, regardless of his later insuccesses.³ Evidently the fixation of many undesirable social habits has this origin. Whimpering, crying, lying, vomiting, bed-wetting have had an initial success in dominating the mother, and may become a part of the child's behavior repertory. It is to be remembered also that the initiation of one mode of reaction to a situation tends to block the emergence of other types of reaction. Moreover, it appears from other sources that children are capable of developing dual and contrasting behavior reactions in different types of situations. Miss Caldwell, in Boston, working mainly with Italian children, has astonishing records showing consistently defiant, destructive, negativistic behavior in the home and relatively orderly behavior in the nursery school. And this duality of behavior is carried on for years—bad in one situation, good in another.

Freeman and his associates in Chicago are now publishing a situational study of the greatest importance based on the placing of about six hundred children in foster homes, in response, apparently, to the following challenge by Terman: "A crucial experiment," Terman says, "would be to take a large number of very young children from the lower classes and after placing them in the most favorable environment obtainable compare their later mental development with that of the children born into the best homes." In this experiment comparisons were made between results on intelligence tests which had been given before adoption, in the case of one group, and the results after they had been in the foster home a number of years. Another comparison was made between children of the same family who had been placed in different homes, the home being rated on a scheme which took into consideration the material environment, evidence of culture, occu-

³ *Ibid.*

pation of foster father, education and social activity of foster parents. Both of these comparisons had held heredity constant, letting the situation vary. A third comparison held environment constant, letting heredity vary, that is, concerning itself with a comparison of the intelligence of the own children of the foster parents and of the foster children. The results, stated in a word, show that when two unrelated children are reared in the same home, differences in their intelligences tend to decrease, and that residence in different homes tends to make siblings differ from one another in intelligence. This study is limited to the question of intelligence, but it is obvious that a fundamental study of behavior could be made by the same method.

Esther Richards, of the Phipps Psychiatric Clinic in Baltimore, has been experimenting with psychopathic children by placing them in homes and on farms and moving them about until a place is found in which they are adjusted. She discovered that there were whole families of hypochondriacs showing no symptoms of organic deficiency. To be "ailing, and never so well" had become a sort of fashion in families, owing, perhaps, to the hysterical manifestations of the mother. These attempts are rather uniformly successful as long as the parents remain away from the child. One boy had been manifesting perfect health and robust activity on a farm, but conceived a stomach ache on the appearance of his mother, which disappeared with her departure. And it is the prevailing psychiatric standpoint that the psychoneuroses—the hysterias, hypochondrias, schizophrenias, war neuroses, etc., are forms of adaptations to situations.

Dr. Harry Stack Sullivan and his associates, working at the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital, Baltimore, are experimenting with a small group of persons now or recently actively disordered, from the situational standpoint, and among other results this study

reveals the fact that these persons tend to make successful adjustments in groupwise association between themselves.

The sociologist has found the behavior document, the life-record, a very useful aid in exploring the situation and determining the sources of maladjustment. It is true that this introspective method has the disadvantages encountered in the taking of legal testimony. It has been shown by students of testimony that in case of false testimony the witness frequently brings a preconception, a behavior schema, to the situation, that he testifies egocentrically, overweighting certain aspects and adding perceptual elements and interpretations as a result of his own memories and experiences; his perceptions of the events of which he testifies are thus anticipatory and reminiscent. And he has also excluded from perception factors which he did not anticipate. The same holds in varying degrees of the human document. Shaw, working with the Juvenile Research Institute in Chicago, has pointed out that some of his subjects prepare dry and objective chronicles while others are mainly self-justificatory and exculpatory. A document prepared by one compensating for a feeling of inferiority or elaborating a delusion of persecution is certainly as far as possible from objective reality. On the other hand, this definition of the situation is from one standpoint quite as good as if it were true. It is a representation of the situation as appreciated by the subject, "as if" it were so, and this is for behavior study a most important phase of reality.

The psychologists and social workers connected with the juvenile courts and child clinics, the visiting teachers, and other organizations are now preparing extensive records tending to take the behavior of the child in connection with all the contacts and experiences which may have influenced the particular delinquency or maladjustment. And finally the regional and ecological behavior surveys with which Park, Burgess, Thrasher, Shaw, Zorbaugh, and

others are identified attempt to measure the totality of influence in a community, the configuration and disposition of social stimuli, as represented by institutions, localities, social groups, and individual personalities, as these contribute to the formation of behavior patterns.

The merit of all these exploratory approaches is that they tend to bring out causative factors previously neglected and to change the character of the problem. Thrasher's study of 1,313 gangs in Chicago changes the character of the crime problem, and this study merely opens up a new situation. Other researches, not yet published, will show that, recruited from the gangs, criminal life is as definitely organized in Chicago as the public school system or any other department of life, the criminals working behind an organization of "irreproachable" citizens. Shaw has studied the cases of boys brought before the juvenile court in Chicago for stealing with reference to the number of boys participating, and finds that in 90 per cent of the cases two or more boys were involved. It is certain that many of the boys concerned were not caught, and that the percentage of groupwise stealing is therefore greater than 90 per cent. This again throws a new light on the nature of the problem of crime. Again, Burgess and Shaw have studied the incidence of delinquency for different neighborhoods and find that in the so-called "interstitial zones," lying along the railroad tracks and between the better neighborhoods, the boys are almost 100 per cent delinquent, while in other neighborhoods there is almost no delinquency. Burgess found one ward in a city of 12,000 population with about eight times as many cases of juvenile delinquency as in any of the other wards.⁴

These are examples of factors of delinquency which turn up or come to the front in the course of the exploration of situations.

⁴ E. W. Burgess, "Juvenile Delinquency in a Small City," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, VI, 726-28.

But with reference to the relationship of the factors, their distribution in the ratio of delinquency, or even the certitude that we are aware of all the factors, we are in one respect in the position of the person who gives false testimony in court. We overweight the standpoint acquired by our particular experience and our preconceived line of approach. In the literature of delinquency we find under the heading "causative factors" such items as the following: Early sex experience, 18 per cent for boys and 25 per cent for girls; bad companionship, 62 per cent for both sexes; school dissatisfaction, 9 per cent for boys and 2 per cent for girls; mental defect, 14 per cent; premature puberty, 3 per cent; psychopathic personality, 14 per cent; mental conflict, 6.5 per cent; motion pictures, 1 per cent, etc. Now it is evident that many young persons have had some of these experiences without becoming delinquent, and that many mentally defective persons and psychopathic personalities are living at large somewhat successfully without any record of delinquency; some of them are keeping small shops; others are producing literature and art. How can we call certain experiences "causative factors" in a delinquent group when we do not know the frequency of the same factors in a non-delinquent group? In order to determine the relation of a given experience to delinquency it would be necessary to compare the frequency of the same experience in the delinquent group and in a group representing the general non-delinquent population. It is now well known that the findings of Lombroso in his search for a criminal type went completely to pieces when Goring and others compared a series of criminals with a series taken from otherwise comparable non-delinquents. Lombroso's "criminal stigmata" are simply physical marks of the human species distributed pretty uniformly through the general population. Similarly, it is obviously absurd to claim that feeble-mindedness or psychopathic disposition is the *cause* of crime so long as we have no idea of the prevalence of these

traits in the general population. No subject is perhaps in so naïve and grotesque a position in this respect as psychoanalysis. The "Oedipus complex" and the "Electra complex"—the "fixation" of son on mother and daughter on father—are discovered and weighted by Freudians and made prominent sources of the psychoneuroses and of delinquency, whereas the clinical records show a multitude of cases where children with behavior disturbances are either indifferent to the parents or directly hate them. Again, with regard to economic factors as cause of crime, we find, for example, in the records of the White-Williams Foundation of Philadelphia (an organization dealing primarily with non-delinquent children) the same unfavorable economic conditions, broken homes, etc., which are usually assigned as "causative factors" in the studies of delinquency, but in this case without delinquency.

The psychiatrist Kempf, speaking of the diagnosis and classification of nervous diseases, has given the opinion that if twenty cases were given to twenty psychiatrists separately for diagnosis and their findings were sealed and given to a committee for a comparison of the results the whole system of diagnosis would blow up. And something of this kind would happen if students of delinquency, under the same conditions, attempted to name the causative factors in a crime wave or in the heavy incidence of delinquency in a given locality. The answers would certainly be weighted on the side of bad heredity, gang life, poverty, commercialized pleasure, decline of the church, post-encephalitic behavior disturbances, etc., according to the different standpoints represented.

Since the establishment of the first juvenile court in 1899 there has been a very careful elaboration of procedure with reference to the treatment of the young delinquent—systematic study of the case, oversight in the home or in a detention home, placing in good families, psychiatric social workers, visiting teachers, attempts to

improve the attitudes of parents toward children, recreation facilities, children's villages and farm schools—and there is, I think, a general impression that there is a steady improvement, an evolution of method, and a gradual approach to a solution of the problem of delinquency. But there is no evidence that juvenile-court procedure or any procedure tends to reduce the large volume of juvenile delinquency. This is not surprising in view of the present rapid unstabilization of society connected with the urbanization of the population, the breakdown of kinship groups, the circulation of news, the commercialization of pleasure, etc. But it is more significant that the methods of the juvenile courts, when applied by their best representatives and in the most painstaking way, cannot be called successful in arresting the career of children who once appear in court, that so many first offenders become recidivists and eventually criminals. Healy and Bronner, who were the first court psychologists, and whose work commands the highest respect in the world, have recently reviewed this point on the basis of the records of their cases during the past twenty years in Chicago and Boston. They say:

Tracing the lives of several hundred youthful repeated offenders studied long ago by us and treated by ordinary so-called correctional methods reveals much repetition of offense. This is represented by the astonishing figures of 61 per cent failure for males (15 per cent being professional criminals and 5 per cent having committed homicide), and 46 per cent failure for girls (19 per cent being prostitutes). Thus in over one-half the cases in this particular series juvenile delinquency has continued into careers of vice and crime. . . . This is an immense proportion to be coming from any series of consecutive cases studied merely because they were repeated offenders in a juvenile court. It represents a most disconcerting measure of failure.⁵

They mention that no less than 209 of the 420 boys whom they knew when they appeared in the Chicago juvenile court had later

⁵ Healy and Bronner, *Delinquents and Criminals: Their Making and Unmaking*, pp. 201-2.

appeared in adult courts, and of these 157 had received commitment to adult correctional institutions 272 times. The first court appearance is thus not to be regarded as the initiation of a reform, but in many youthful offenders it appears as a sort of confirmation or commencement ceremony initiating a criminal way of life. There are, indeed, many records of positive successes under juvenile court treatment, especially among the cases of Healy and Bronner, but the most successful workers confess that they do not know how they obtained their successes, whether through their own efforts or through spontaneous changes in the child.

Now there is reason to believe that we are deluded or not properly informed as to the efficiency of other behavior-forming situations and agencies on which we are confidently relying for the control of behavior and the development of normal personality. We assume that good families produce good children, but certain of the experimental nursery schools, selecting their children carefully in order to avoid material already spoiled, find nevertheless that they have drawn from the best families a large percentage of problem children. Our school curricula, based on reading ability and lesson-transfer, drive many children gifted along perceptual-motor lines into truancy and delinquency. It would be possible to show by cases that the home and the school are hardly less unsuccessful behavior-forming situations than the juvenile court.

Naturally the greatest amount of attention, up to the present, has been given to the study of abnormal behavior in the forms which come to public attention, become a nuisance; but behavior difficulties are widespread in the whole population, and it is certain that we can understand the abnormal only in connection with the normal, in relation to the whole social process to which they are both reactions. The same situation or experience in the case of one person may lead this person to another type of adjustment; in another it may lead to crime; in another, to insanity, the result de-

pending on whether previous experiences have formed this or that constellation of attitudes.

The answer is, we must have more thoroughgoing explorations of situations. In our planning we should include studies and surveys of behavior-forming situations, measurements of social influences which will enable us to observe the operation of these situations in the formation of delinquent, emotionally maladjusted, and stable personalities and determine the ratios. A plan of this kind, which has been discussed by some of the sociologists present, proposes to take selected localities or neighborhoods in given cities, including, for example, the interstitial zones where delinquency is highest and the good neighborhoods where delinquency is lowest, and study all the factors containing social influence.

A survey of this kind would involve a study of all the institutions—family, gang, social agencies, recreations, juvenile courts, the daily press, commercialized pleasure, etc.—by all the available techniques, including life-records of all the delinquent children and an equal number of non-delinquent children, for the purpose of tracing the effects of the behavior-forming situations on the particular personalities.

It is known also that cities and other localities differ greatly as total behavior-forming situations. Healy and Bronner estimated, for example, that their failures in Chicago were 50 per cent and in Boston only 21 per cent. The difference is certainly not due in the main to differences in juvenile-court procedure, but to differences in the attitudes of the population, and this in turn to differences in the configurations of social influence. The juvenile court of Cincinnati has excited interest by the fact that it institutionalizes very few children, uses foster homes rarely, has only a nominal probation system, and is thought nevertheless to have greater success than other cities. The court procedure in Cincinnati is not elaborate; the co-operative agencies are not well organized. Nearly all

the youthful offenders are simply turned back into the community. Is the relative success in this situation due to lack of too much zeal, to a refusal to treat and classify the child too promptly as delinquent? Is the large and stable element of German and German-Jewish population a factor in the situation? Rochester, New York, is the only city in the country where the visiting-teacher organization is incorporated in the public school system. What is the efficiency of this effort to treat the child in the predelinquent stages of his behavior difficulties? An inventory and measure of the social influences of selected cultural centers taken comparatively is thus very desirable.

There is a type of behavior reaction going on every day before our eyes which has to do with the participation of masses of the population, often whole populations, in common sentiments and actions. It is represented by fashions of dress, mob action, war hysteria, the gang spirit, mafia, omertà, fascism, popularity of this or that cigarette or tooth paste, the quick fame and quick infamy of political personalities. It uses language—spoken, written, and gesture. It is emotional, imitative, largely irrational and unconscious, weighted with symbols, and sometimes violent. It is capable of manipulation and propagation by leading personalities and the public print. Its result is commonly and publicly accepted definitions of situations. Its historical residuum constitutes the distinctive character of races, nationalities, and communities. This is the psychology of the evolution of public opinion and of social norms. As long as the definitions of situations remain constant and common we may anticipate orderly behavior reactions. When rival definitions arise (as between the wets and drys at the present moment) we may anticipate social disorganization and personal demoralization. There are always constitutional inferiors and divergent personalities in any society who do not adjust, but the mass of delinquency, crime, and emotional instability is the result of

conflicting definitions. When, as Justice McAdoo says, a large number of young men in New York City have made up their minds that they will live without working, this is a new definition of the situation and the formation of a criminal policy.

Now these expressions of public opinion, the rise of common attitudes, the establishment of a group morale, the culmination of emotional outbursts, and the formulation of more deliberate policies have also a situational origin—one in which the situation is weighted with pre-established attitudes, with conflicts arising over definitions of situations and influenced by the propaganda of word, print, and gesture, and it is desirable that selected types of behavior-forming situations should be studied along these lines.

And, finally, I will not here emphasize the point which I have attempted to exemplify in a particular study, that it is desirable to extend our studies of this situational character to the large cultural areas, to the races and nationalities, in order to understand the formation of behavior patterns comparatively, in their most general and particular expressions.

W. I. THOMAS

BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION

Before proceeding to consideration of my subject let me make it clear that I speak as a biologist. It would be an unwarranted venture for me to attempt to do otherwise. As I understand it, the invitation to take part in the program of this society came to me simply because my field of investigation has had to do with some of the problems concerned in the integration of living units into orderly wholes, and because the physiological processes of integration have seemed to me to be suggestive in their relations to the processes of integration among human beings. I shall attempt to tell you something of what the biologist has learned or thinks he has learned about the physiological processes of integration which make organisms orderly wholes, and to indicate very briefly how certain aspects of social integration appear to him in the light of what he has learned in his biological investigations. Social integrations represent the highest development of integrative processes among living units, and a consideration of the question whether they have any relation to the simpler physiological integrative processes may be of some interest to the sociologist. It will be convenient at times to use sociological terms for biological phenomena; in fact, it is sometimes difficult to avoid using them; but I shall attempt to restrict their use to those cases in which it seems to be justified biologically, whatever the sociologist may think about it.

Physiological correlation.—In the rather recent past biology was so largely concerned with learning about the structure of living things and the functions of their different organs that it gave little attention to the problem of the unity and order which makes the organism what it is. The unity and order were ignored, taken for

granted, or sometimes translated into some sort of pre-established harmony. Some biologists wrote of the "organism as a whole," or of the influence of the whole upon its parts without knowing very clearly what they meant, beyond the fact that a wholeness of some sort was evident, and that a unity and order, a harmony of some sort, existed among the parts. With the development of the experimental method, however, it became possible to throw some light on the nature of this order and wholeness. In the simpler organisms it is possible to separate parts from each other without killing or seriously injuring them, and so to determine their reactions when separated. It is also possible to put parts together in arrangements different from those in the ordinary individual and to determine how they behave under such conditions. And since the susceptibility of different regions and organs to external agents differs, it is possible to inhibit the activity of certain parts without much affecting others, and to observe the changes which follow. On the other hand, we can stimulate certain parts and observe results and we can isolate certain substances produced by particular organs, for example, thyroidin, adrenalin, etc., and determine their action. These and various other lines of investigation have established the fundamental importance of what is commonly called physiological correlation for the unity and wholeness of the organism. Physiological correlation consists in the physiological influences and actions of parts on each other, in short, of all the physiological relations between parts.

The factors in physiological correlation fall into two great groups: the transmissive and the transportative relations. The transmissive relations consist in the transmission of energy changes from one part to another. For example, mechanical effects are transmitted in every movement of the body. Transmission of heat, of chemical and electric energy also occurs, but more important than any of these is the transmission of the complex physicochemi-

cal process called excitation. All nervous control, all mental activity, is associated with such transmission. This transmissive group of correlative factors represents what we may call the processes of communication between parts. Transportative correlation consists in the transport in mass of substances from the part producing them to other parts. These transportative factors represent the barter and exchange, the commercial relations between the various parts. The organism is then not a mosaic of independent parts, but consists of the parts plus all the relations between them, and the wholeness, the unity consists rather in the relations than in the parts themselves. It is not enough to demonstrate the existence of these physiological relations between parts. We must investigate their origin and the changes which they undergo in the course of individual development and of evolution.

The simplest organisms.—The simplest organisms, certain bacteria and some other forms, appear to have no definite parts other than the surface and the interior. Because of its exposure to an external medium, the surface differs from the interior. Since the surface is the medium of relation and exchange with the external world, it exercises a certain control over what happens in the interior. But we find that surface and interior in such organisms are interchangeable, that is, the interior is capable of transforming into surface if it is exposed to the external medium, and parts of the surface buried in the interior soon become like other internal parts. In other words, the pattern of such organisms is directly dependent on relation to environment, and changes as the relation changes. Evidently then the integration of surface and interior into an orderly whole does not occur autonomously in the protoplasms of such organisms, but results from the reaction of the protoplasm to its environment. The pattern of such an organism is a behavior pattern: it represents in each case the behavior of a particular kind of protoplasm under certain environmental conditions.

Axiate organisms.—All organisms except the simplest show, in addition to this surface-interior pattern, another integrative pattern which we call axiate, that is, they possess physiological polarity and symmetry. Polarity and symmetry are expressions in the mass of protoplasm or cells which constitute the organism of orderly arrangements and relations which are referable to certain so-called axes passing in certain directions in the body. The polar axis is the chief or major axis, that is, the direction along which the primary or major order arises. Ordinarily it is the longitudinal axis, the anteroposterior direction in the body. The axes of symmetry represent secondary orders in other directions.

Since polarity and some sort of symmetry are fundamental features of the structure and the functional relations of parts of the organism, the problem of their nature has engaged the attention of many biologists. In the past they have often been regarded as inherent in the molecular structure of the different protoplasms, and as perhaps analogous to the polarity and symmetry of crystals. The experimental investigation of recent years not only affords no support to this view, but indicates that polarity and symmetry are not expressions of static molecular structure in the substratum of life, but rather of the dynamics of life itself. All the evidence indicates that polarity and symmetry in their simplest terms consist in a quantitative differential in physiological activity and in protoplasmic condition associated with it, that is, the processes of living, or certain of them, are going on most rapidly at one end of such an axis, and from this end their rate decreases along the axis. These differences in rate of living at different levels determine the formation of different organs. For example, the head, and primarily the brain, develops from the most active region of the polar axis and the regions of the central nervous system posterior to the head from the most active regions of the axis of symmetry. Other organs arise in definite order along the axes. The order and arrangement of or-

gans depend on the quantitative differences along the axes, but the kinds of organs which develop in a particular case depend upon the hereditary constitution of the protoplasm concerned.

Moreover, many different lines of evidence indicate that such a differential or gradient does not arise autonomously in the protoplasm, but rather as a reaction of the protoplasm to a differential in its environment. In the protoplasms of many of the simpler animals it is possible on the one hand to obliterate previously existing polarity or symmetry by decreasing the differences in activity at different levels of the axis and, on the other hand, to determine new axes of polarity and symmetry by establishing new regions of high activity through the action of external energies on the protoplasm. In this way we can obliterate previously existing axiate patterns and determine new ones in other directions and literally make the individual over. So far as our observations go, it appears that in nature also polarity and symmetry do not arise autonomously in protoplasms, but originate in reaction to environmental differentials, for example, in the differential relations of the different regions of the egg to the parent body or to other environmental factors.

If these conclusions are correct, the patterns of living things, that is, the structural and functional orders and relations, originate in the last analysis in the reactions of protoplasms to environment. They are, in short, behavior patterns. According to this view organisms represent the most general and fundamental behavior-patterns of protoplasms, and these patterns become the foundations of the more specialized forms of behavior. The establishment of a new persistent axis of polarity or symmetry in a cell or a cell mass represents a record in the protoplasm of reaction to environment. This record of past behavior becomes a fundamental factor in determining the character of all later behavior and may even persist through cell division and various reproductive processes and so

become hereditary, but such inheritance is obviously not Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characters. Is not such a record of past reaction, together with its effect on all later behavior, the most general biological form of learning by experience?

Physiological control or dominance.—Granting that organismic pattern originates as a behavior pattern, a record of experience, the question at once arises, How does a quantitative differential in physiological condition bring about integration, How does it determine the wholeness of the organism? We find that when we establish a region of high activity in a cell or a cell mass by the local action of external energies such a region influences adjoining regions within a certain distance, that is, the activity locally induced does not remain sharply localized, but spreads to adjoining regions, the effect decreasing with increasing distance from the point of origin. The active region then becomes the dominant factor in determining a gradient in activity. It exercises a control over regions within a certain distance from it because it is the chief factor in determining the degree of their activity. This influence of an active region on adjoining regions is apparently due primarily to the transmission of energy changes from it and it is probable that electric currents resulting from the differences in condition between it and the adjoining regions are factors in such transmission. This relation between a more active and a less active region appears to be the foundation of physiological dominance or control. Such dominance and subordination of parts in one form or another is a characteristic feature of physiological axes. Experiment shows that it is an essential factor in determining the positions and proportions of parts along the axis. It represents the first step in physiological integration beyond the surface-interior pattern. From it develops in plants the control which the growing tip exercises over other parts in preventing their development into new growing tips like itself or in determining their growth in certain ways as subordinate

parts, e.g., as lateral branches. That the growing tip does actually control in such cases is shown by the changes which occur when the tip is removed or inhibited. Buds which were previously inhibited now grow out, lateral branches transform into main stems, etc. The growing tip of the plant represents the most active region of the axis and its dominance depends on its activity. In animals the head, that is, the region of the brain and the chief sense organs, arises from the most active region of the polar gradient, and out of the primitive dominance of the active region in the earlier stages develops nervous control.

In its more primitive protoplasmic forms and in the nervous system physiological control depends on the transmission of energy changes rather than on the transportation of substance, that is, it represents communication rather than commerce between the parts concerned. But as the different organs become increasingly different in constitution the chemical reactions in them become different in character and give rise to different substances. These differences which take place both in individual development and in evolution provide a basis for transportative relations between various parts. A product of the activity of one may be transported to, and influence the activity of, another. In short, with the progress of differentiation commercial relations become possible within the organism and increase in variety and complexity. Such relations, however, are not fundamental factors in physiological integration, for they are not possible until a certain degree of integration and differentiation is present.

The dominant region represents a real physiological leadership, a government. It is the pacemaker in development and the primary factor in physiological integration wherever it persists long enough to be effective. The reality of this leadership cannot be too strongly emphasized. This conception of dominance is in no sense speculative, but represents a physiological fact established by many

different lines of experimental evidence. By means of experimental methods we can depose existing leaders and establish new ones with effects on the organism similar to those which occur in any integration dependent on leadership or government.

According to this conception of the organism, the unity and order are not pre-established in the protoplasmic constitution, but develop out of protoplasmic behavior. Only the simplest sort of integration is possible without definite and more or less persistent dominance, that is, leadership. In the surface-interior organism where there is no such leadership differentiation is of the same simple and primitive character as in a herd of animals surrounded by other animals that seek to attack, or an old-time wagon train surrounded by Indians. In organisms of this sort temporary leadership sometimes develops, e.g., an amoeba may send out a pseudopod and begin to move in one direction, and in the herd or the wagon train something may start a break in a certain direction and an axiate pattern arises temporarily.

In the axiate organism the dominance or leadership of the most active region becomes more definite and more permanent. This dominance initiates an orderly course of development and differentiation, the relations of different regions to the dominant region determining what part each shall play in the organism. In many of the lower organisms the persistence even of the structural pattern depends throughout life on the control exerted by the dominant region. In such forms it is possible to demonstrate, by cutting the animal into pieces, that the parts possess other capacities than those which have been realized in their development as parts. For example, every level of the body may be capable of forming a head, but as long as it is subordinated to the dominant region, the head, it has no opportunity to develop as a head, but is forced to develop into something else. The capacity for leadership is there, but the opportunity is lacking as long as the original leadership persists.

In many other forms this is true only in the earlier stages of development. In the more advanced stages the structural pattern becomes relatively fixed and physiological control is concerned primarily with function of the various parts.

In many of the simpler organisms, and particularly in the earlier stages of development, dominance may be limited in range by the primitive character of the processes of transmission, that is, with primitive means of communication, physiological leadership is effective only over a relatively short distance. This means that the size of the mass which can be integrated into an individual is also limited. The limit of integration cannot exceed the range of effective communication. This limitation of the range of dominance makes possible what we call physiological isolation of parts. For example, if growth in length continues beyond a certain limit the body becomes too long for complete control by the dominant region, and the part farthest away from that region loses its characteristics as a part and begins to develop into a new individual. That is, it develops a new leadership either from that part of the mechanism of government already present or directly from its own relations to environment.

If, on the other hand, the activity of the dominant region, that is, the effectiveness of the leadership, the government, decreases, the range and effectiveness of control decrease and parts of the individual may become sufficiently isolated, even without growth, to give rise to new individuals. If the original dominance disappears completely, the organism may separate into its constituent cells, and each of these may begin a new course of development if it is able to develop a dominant region from the part of the original mechanism of control which it contains or if it acquires a new dominant region through its relations to environment. If the dominant region is removed, its functions may be taken over by the parts most closely associated with it, but before they are able to attain

full control isolation of some part and reproduction of a new individual from it may begin. In social integrations of various sorts, particularly among the more primitive, similar situations arise. The personal leader may be weakened by age or disease or may die, or institutional dominance may change from an actively integrating force to a mere formal control. It is a familiar fact that such conditions favor the appearance of new groups from parts of the old, or the complete disintegration of the group into its constituent units.

In the organism we can block the process of control on its way from the dominant to the subordinate region; we can, so to speak, cut the wires. As a matter of fact, we do not need to cut them, for it is possible in certain cases to block physiological control by merely cooling a short portion of its path and so decreasing the activity of the protoplasm there to such an extent that it does not pass on the message. This procedure also isolates physiologically the subordinate part concerned and may bring about the development of a new individual from it. I scarcely need point out that isolation of parts in this way is the physiological prototype of certain social processes of reproduction. The blocking in one way or another of communications from the leader or the government may bring about reorganization through revolt or otherwise.

And finally, by increasing the activity of a subordinate part it is often possible to develop within it a new leadership which is effective in determining a new integration in spite of the original dominance. In plants, for example, buds which happen to be exposed to particularly favorable external conditions may develop as new axes in spite of the dominance of the growing tip. In other words, environment favors the development of local government in such a part, and we see similar situations arising in social groups.

Cancer consists of cells of the body which have undergone change in some way not yet understood so that they do not react to

physiological control. Such cells have become complete anarchists. They live as individual cells and do not integrate into orderly wholes. They are extremely active cells, and have for some reason run wild. It is of interest to note that conditions are particularly favorable for the appearance of such cells in the old individual in which physiological control is not as effective as in the young. Investigation concerning the cancer problem is directed primarily toward discovering first what makes these cells run wild, and second, how to get rid of them or make them behave normally again, after they have run wild. Investigations into certain political situations have objectives very similar to those of cancer research, though the method of procedure may differ widely.

This account of the processes of physiological isolation is not speculative, but a statement of physiological fact. The various processes of physiological isolation of parts determine the forms of asexual reproduction, budding, fission, etc., which occur in the plants and the simpler animals, and physiological isolation and reproduction can be induced experimentally by all four of the methods described previously. The art of pruning and trimming plants is based entirely on the relations of leadership or dominance and subordination, and many of the lower animals which resemble plants in their branching form can be similarly pruned and trimmed with essentially similar results.

The development of integration.—The axiate organism, at least in its simpler forms, begins as an autocracy, or, if we speak in terms of individual cells, the multicellular organism usually represents government by a ruling class. I mean by this statement that the dominant region determines the behavior of other parts, but is itself independent of them, at least as regards the development of its general structural pattern. The dominant region in such forms develops in advance of other parts and is able to develop even though other parts are entirely absent. For example, small pieces

of such organisms may develop into nothing but heads. They are leaders with nothing to lead. In many of the lower forms we find by cutting the body into pieces that every level is capable of developing into a head when it is isolated from the parts anterior to it. In such cases every level has the capacity for leadership, but under the usual conditions only one level has the opportunity to become the actual leader.

In the simpler organisms and in early stages of development the control is usually limited in range because of the primitive character of the means of communication, but with the development of special organs of communication, e.g., the conducting tissues in plants, the nervous system in animals, the range of control and the size of individual which can be integrated increase greatly and become indefinite, that is, the nerves can conduct impulses to indefinite distances and the actual size is limited by other factors. With this improvement in the means of communication in the course of individual development and of evolution, the primitive autocratic character of leadership in the organism undergoes change. The range of dominance is not only increased, but it also becomes possible for the subordinate parts to communicate with the dominant region and to influence its behavior. The head is no longer independent of other parts, but the further development of its structure and its function is determined in part by the other organs of the body.

With still further advance in development and evolution integration becomes still more complex. Leaders of various organs arise, but are still subordinate to the leader in chief, the brain. There is in the heart, for example, a leader, a pacemaker, which determines the rhythm of the beat. This pacemaker arises from the most active region of the embryonic heart. If we remove it or inhibit its activity another region becomes the pacemaker, but is not, at least when it first becomes the leader, as effective as the original

leader. We find similar pacemakers controlling the muscular activities of the alimentary tract and other axiate organs of the body.

In the higher animals there develops in the central nervous system an almost inconceivably complex mechanism of communication and control with a hierarchy of centers, or bureaus, each with a limited dominance and subordinate to those of higher rank, and all subordinate to the cerebral cortex. Physiological integration in the higher vertebrates can be compared only to a highly developed representative government with an elaborate system of bureaus for attending to the needs and demands of the various parts of the body.

Although we know little as yet concerning the differences in different nerve impulses, we can see that different nervous communications are handled differently in the central nervous system. For example, a local stimulation, a tickling of the skin or a slight prick, gives rise to an impulse which goes into the spinal cord and is handled there as a routine matter by one of the subordinate bureaus and the order is sent out for the contraction of certain muscles to remove the part from the source of irritation. This is what we call a reflex, and does not involve consciousness. A more important or more urgent communication from some organ may be passed on to a higher bureau and the return communication may have reference not merely to this particular communication but to others which have reached the bureau at about the same time or which have left records in the nervous structure to serve as precedents. If the communication is sufficiently important, or if the action of the lower bureaus does not meet the situation, it may be relayed to successively higher bureaus and may finally reach the cerebral cortex. Even when the communication is handled by a lower bureau, information concerning it is often sent to the cortex. The cortex has often been likened by neurologists to a parliamentary assembly combining the functions of deliberation, legislation, and the judiciary. The communications from the cortex

have reference, not only to the state of the body as a whole at the moment, but to the records of past states. That is to say, their character is influenced, not only by the communications which are coming in at the time, but by the records in the nervous system of past communications. In short, the nervous system of man and the higher animals represents an almost inconceivably complex mechanism of government, representative to a high degree and remarkably efficient. The organism as a whole is comparable to a great nation-state, but with relatively rigid class distinctions. Between the different classes complex commercial relations have also arisen in the form of transport of nutrition, oxygen, and waste products, of internal secretions, so-called hormones, etc., and these also play a part in the further differentiation of the various organs. Such organisms have progressed a long way toward democracy from the primitive autocracy or government by a ruling class.

In these higher forms of physiological integration the size of the individual is not limited by the means of communication, as it often is in the lower forms, for in the higher forms communication is possible over indefinite distances. In man and higher animals size is limited by the decrease in capacity for growth with the progress of differentiation. In a young developing organism the additions to body substance exceed the losses through breakdown; the protoplasmic birth-rate exceeds the death-rate; but as the organism ages its metabolic activity decreases and it merely maintains its size instead of growing, and finally in extreme old age the protoplasmic death-rate may exceed the birth-rate. In the lower forms parts which are physiologically or physically isolated and reorganize into new individuals undergo more or less rejuvenescence. Their metabolic activity increases; they resume growth; and the new individual formed is in all respects younger than the organism of which it originally formed a part. Increased vigor in consequence of social reorganization is a common phenomenon.

Physiological integration of higher orders.—In the plants and in many of the simpler animals individuals arising as buds in consequence of partial escape from the control of the original dominant region do not entirely separate, but form a complex of individuals. The stems and branches of plants and the branching plantlike forms of certain animals are complexes of this sort. In these complexes of individuals various degrees of integration similar in character to those already considered appear. In some such complexes the component individuals are all alike and the whole is a mere aggregation of individuals without dominance or appreciable integration, except perhaps temporarily. Very commonly, however, dominance and subordination among the component individuals develop, and the whole, or various parts of it, may be integrated into an individuality of higher order than that of the members which compose it. In some cases the original individual gives rise to the others by budding and retains its leadership throughout the life of the complex; in others each new individual becomes dominant for a time and then gives place to another. The relations between the component individuals of such a complex are concerned in determining its growth form and other aspects of its behavior. Among the plants, for example, the fir and the spruce and related forms are cases of continued dominance of a single leader, the growing tip of the main stem. This growing tip determines the growth of all buds as lateral branches which are more or less bilaterally symmetrical while the branches are radially arranged on the main stem. If the growing tip of the main stem be cut off or inhibited the uppermost lateral branches or some of them change their form of growth and become new main stems and assume dominance over the whole. In such trees as the elm, on the other hand, various leaders of approximately equal influence arise sooner or later and a spreading crown consisting of more or less similar axes results. Physiological integrations of this spreading sort are better

adapted to a sessile life rather than to an actively motile habit and have developed most extensively among plants, but various sessile animals, for example the corals and some of their relatives, as well as some other animal forms, have developed complexes of this kind. For actively motile organisms which progress through their environment instead of spreading out in it a more compact and efficient integration than this is necessary.

Social integration among animals.—Various degrees of truly social integration, or at least what the biologist regards as social integration, occur among animals, and some of them differ from the physiological integrations chiefly in that they take place between components which are not in protoplasmic continuity. They range from mere aggregations without integrating factors other than the common reaction of all members to some environmental factor to groups with various degrees of leadership or control. Herds of various species often assume a more or less definite surface-interior pattern in the presence of their enemies. In other cases real leaders exist and more or less definite and persistent integrations occur.

In connection with integrations of this character, whether in animals or in man, the question of the significance of sex and the family arises. The family appears, at least as a temporary or periodic integration, rather widely among animals, and in some cases is surprisingly persistent. From the biological standpoint, however, the family does not seem to have the importance for integration which has been assigned to it by some sociologists. The sex relation and the relation of parent and offspring afford a biological basis for limited association of individuals, and it is evident that because of their general occurrence in some form or other these relations may play a part in integrations which may equally well arise independently of them. Various social integrations may develop out of the family, not because it is a necessary or fundamen-

tal factor in their origin, but merely because it antedates them. Undoubtedly the family has played an important part in the history of social integration, but in what we may call the physiology of social integration it seems to the biologist to possess only a limited significance. Among animals, as among men, some social integrations develop in relation to sex and the family while others are obviously independent of them. Some animal species in which the family is well developed show little or no other social integration, while others in which the family scarcely appears develop definite social groups.

The social insects, particularly the termites, bees, and ants, seem to represent social integrations developing, at least in part, on the basis of sex and the family. These societies are matriarchal, but the leadership is apparently in no sense personal. The queen mother has become an institution around which the society centers. Wheeler has suggested that social life among the insects originated in the exchange of nutritive substances including secretions and excretions, but it seems more probable that much of this exchange has arisen secondarily in the development and complication of family relations. I am inclined to believe also that the lack of plasticity and the complete subordination of the individual to the society which is characteristic of the most highly developed insect societies are in some measure due to their development on the basis of sex and the family. Integrations developing on this basis must, it seems to me, be relatively rigid and unplastic because the possibilities are rather narrowly limited. In the most highly developed ant societies these possibilities of integration on a familial basis seem to be more completely realized than in any other case.

Conclusion.—In this brief consideration of integration I have endeavored to show that the organism represents, first of all, a behavior pattern in the cell or cell mass of which it consists. Physiological integration is not an autonomous process, but originates

through relation and reaction to environment. The likeness of different individuals of the same species apparently results, first from the fact that their protoplasms are similar though not identical as regards hereditary constitution and potentialities, and second from the fact that environment has been to a considerable degree standardized for each species in the course of evolution. If we alter the environment beyond the normal range we alter the course of integration and the resulting individual. In short, the organism appears to be the expression of an integrating and ordering institution which originates in the most general relations and reactions of living protoplasms to environment. The organism is inconceivable except in relation to environment, and that means that it is inconceivable except in terms of behavior. Integration is not the mere aggregation of units, but rather the development of definite relations between them. The relations, not the parts, are the real integrating factors. The organism is not merely the sum of its cells or organs, but of these plus all the physiological relations between them, and to the biologist the same appears to be true of human society. A cell as a part of an organism behaves differently and is therefore different in some way from that cell isolated. The biologist finds it difficult to believe that the individual human being as a member of a social group is the same as that human being isolated from the group.

In both the organism and society the primary factors in integration appear to be the transmissive rather than the transportative relations, that is, communication rather than material or commercial exchange. Communication does not require special organs of transmission, but may take place through various physical media, and whether it occurs through living protoplasm or some other medium is unimportant. Apparently all that is necessary for the beginning of orderly integration in protoplasm is a quantitative difference in rate of living and the possibility of communication.

Dominance or leadership in its most general physiological form apparently originates in the more rapid liberation of energy. The personal leader among men may not always have a higher metabolism and liberate energy more rapidly than those he leads, but in consequence either of his relation to the particular situation or his heredity or past experience he reacts to the situation in such a way as to develop an integrating force, usually psychological rather than physical. In social development we see leadership becoming impersonal and institutional, but in all cases the dominant conception is the one most effective in determining integrative behavior of different individuals with reference to a particular situation. To the biologist social integration appears first of all as behavior of living protoplasms, and the evidence at hand seems to indicate that from the behavior which integrates the individual organism into an orderly and definite whole to that which integrates a nation, a church, or other social group there is essential continuity. The foundations of social integration seem to him to lie, not in the simplest social integrations among men, not in the social integrations among animals, but in the ability of living protoplasms to react to environment, to transmit the effects of such reaction, and to maintain records of past reaction which influence present and future behavior. In human society new forms of dominance appear, new means of communication are developed; but in spite of such differences the fundamental principles and laws of social and physiological integration appear to be essentially similar in that they both represent general behavior patterns resulting from the reactions of living protoplasms to their environments.

C. M. CHILD

PHYSIOLOGICAL TENSIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

This paper may be taken as a preliminary statement of a theory that social life is a product of learning to manage the visceral tensions in accordance with the requirements and usages of the family and of the social group. This learning takes place through the instruction given to the young, who, almost from birth, are subjected to adult supervision in the adjustment of these tensions, and in general the child is expected to learn to sustain, diffuse, and release his physiological tensions only as and if the group-sanctioned occasion and custom permit.

The first problem of this tensional control arises from the parental management of feeding, which requires the child to learn to sustain the hunger contractions of the stomach until the appropriate time for feeding arrives. He must learn, not only to sustain those tensions, but to regularize his metabolism so that he can assimilate and release sufficient energy to endure the intervals between feedings. Later he must learn to obtain food or the means thereto by work or effort undertaken in anticipation of these recurrent hunger tensions.

The second problem of tensional management confronting the child is to learn how to sustain the pressures arising in his bladder and rectum until the appropriate time and place for their release are presented. This problem calls for a progressive raising of the threshold of the sphincters and learning to respond to the accumulating pressures sufficiently early to permit the necessary warning to parents, and, later on, the appropriate activities for eliminations. To meet this problem adequately the child must learn to sustain these pressure tensions in accordance with the requirements of the group life. This and the hunger problems may be taken as

the prototypes of his adult behavior, since they involve not only the ability to sustain tensions but to use these accumulating visceral tensions as the cue or stimulus to whatever activities are necessary to reach or achieve a group-sanctioned release. This means learning to deal with present situations and stimuli with due regard to their more remote consequences and their utility or disutility for tensional adjustment. In other words, growth to maturity calls for an increasing ability to respond to absent or remote situations which are adumbrated by the rise of visceral tensions and by their situational antecedents.

The next problem facing the young child is to learn the inhibition of the sympathetic reaction, which we call emotional response, evoked by shock, surprise, pain, and ambiguity or uncertainty. When stimuli of this character are received, the organism, as Cannon and others have shown, is profoundly altered physiologically, the sympathetic division of the vegetative nervous system becoming dominant. The immediate sympathetic reaction is, unless checked, followed by an accelerated and modified circulation of the blood, glandular activities especially of the suprarenals and thyroid, and alteration in the tonicity of the stomach and intestines. These physiological changes prepare the organism for greater effort, as in fighting or flight, or for quiescence, as in the death faint. They also render almost impossible any refined motor activity. The problem presented to the child by this susceptibility to sympathetic reaction and panic is that of learning to diffuse the tensions and increased physiological energy into overt motor activity, if they cannot be initially inhibited. This control is achieved by learning an adequate motor response to such emotion-provoking situations, thus rendering the situation relatively innocuous. This is ordinarily possible only by the active assistance of the elders, who can protect, reassure, and calm the child until he learns some motor response or way of handling these situations ef-

fectively and socially. Every group has historically derived methods of meeting these situations, and if the child is reassured and assisted to achieve these approved motor responses to the world, he will be able to bring his sympathetic reactions under control. If not brought under control, the child may, with increasing strength, become potentially dangerous.

What we call the secularization of life is just this progressive development of tools and techniques for meeting situations which, before such achievements, were stimuli to emotional responses.

The child must also learn to employ the verbal stimuli of approval and reassurance as substitutes for the close tactual stimuli received in infancy, as in mothering, caressing, and cuddling. Along with that he must also learn to respond to disapproving verbal stimuli as substitutes for physical coercion and the blocking of responses not meeting with adult assent.

Finally, at the beginning of adolescence, the specific sex tensions make their appearance and present new problems of tensional management, since the youth and maiden, in Western society, are expected to refrain from release of sex tensions until they have reached full maturity. This means that they are called upon to sustain and diffuse their sex tensions and to avoid any approach to the person of the other sex.

These lessons begin during the first and second years of life and call for the management and control of the several varieties of visceral tensions arising within the child. As the infant grows older and achieves locomotion he is brought into contact with an ever widening environment of things and persons presenting the stimuli for immediate release of these tensions or for arousing emotion. The same kind of problem is continually presented. Under the tutelage of parents the child must learn to refrain from approaching and using these stimuli, however freely exposed to his approach and despite the urgency of his visceral tensions. If hun-

gry, he must learn to sustain his stomach contractions and forego the easily appropriated food around him unless and until the elders give approval. If other persons intervene between him and the stimuli he seeks, or otherwise interfere with him, he must learn to refrain from approaching them or from attempting forcibly to remove them, just as he must learn to desist from approaching them for any direct tensional release. In other words, he must learn that each individual enjoys a varying degree of immunity from approach or invasion, which he must observe in all his behavior. Again, he must learn that objects and situations are likewise to be left untouched because they also are not to be approached or used, however strongly they exhibit stimuli to tension release. Such lessons involve the inhibition or repression of the naïve response, which is gradually learned under adult instruction: the parents frustrate the naïve response or inflict pain after such forbidden responses until the child learns to observe the parental prohibition even in their absence. In other words, the child is negatively conditioned until the stimuli of these things and persons are rendered partially impotent. To put it another way, the child, under the guidance and instruction of elders, learns to observe the differential taboos upon people and things which we call the sanctity of the person and private property. Private property is thus not a thing, but the learned behavior toward things.

We see then in early childhood how the institutional patterns of behavior are inculcated in the child as he learns to manage his tensions in accordance with the prohibitions and sanctions of the family life. The cultural tradition will, of course, set the general patterns, but the individual family life and circumstances will give these patterns their individual character and variations.

While the child is learning to observe these taboos he is also expected to learn how to behave toward others who find in him and his possessions sources of tensional adjustment. Thus he gradually

learns that he, too, enjoys an immunity to approach or invasion differing according to each person and his status. Thus, toward his parents he may enjoy no immunity, being subject to their manipulations and control with scarcely any restrictions. Toward others he enjoys ordinarily the same degree of immunity that he must grant to them, thus making possible reciprocal activities based upon the mutual observance or waiving of those immunities.

The child then grows up into the social life by learning his position and status in the group, as distinguished in this double manner of varying immunities of others to him and of varying susceptibilities by him to others. Toward every other person in the group, then, he has a more or less specific orientation, as defined more generally in family relationships, position, rank, office, and similar marks or signs of status. We might compare him to a chemical atom with a highly differentiated valence toward each other atom or like or unlike element. These he learns by often painful experiences in which his parents or other adults, as guardians and perpetuators of the group mores, see to it that he observes the prescribed patterns with more or less fidelity. He also learns from his contemporaries, especially as he grows older and begins to associate freely.

His lessons are not entirely those of prohibition and taboo, however, for he is also inducted into the institutional practices by his elders. While all things and persons are covered by their appropriate taboos, which he must learn to respect, the institutional practices of contract, barter, buying and selling, courtship and marriage, and similar rituals and ceremonies provide a method for lifting or setting aside, shifting, or removing entirely, the taboo which otherwise blocks approach. In every group life these institutional practices, usually employing specialized tokens and symbols, have been historically developed as patterns for the group-sanctioned approach to tabooed things and persons. They are essen-

tially patterns of approach to the person or persons who must be placated, appeased, cajoled, or otherwise stimulated to set aside the taboo upon their possessions or person in favor of the individual making the approach.

The situation is something of this character: With every person and his goods protected by a taboo against appropriation, use, or coercion, the achievement of any objective or the obtaining of tensional releases must be sought through the individual who alone can waive the taboo protection covering those goods or himself. These approaches are provided in the institutional practices, duly sanctioned by the group, of contract, barter, sale, courtship, marriage, and so on. The essence of the institutional practice is a formula for offering or promising (future offer) some thing or action designed as a stimulus to the person approached, to evoke from him the reciprocal response of giving the thing or performing the action sought, or promising to do so. This reciprocal response may be almost anything, but the important part of it is in the individual's waiving of the protection of his taboo or immunity in favor of another person. In so far as one person can supply the needs of another, he is in a position to exact as large a stimulus (consideration, the lawyers call it) as he can get, always subject to the possibility that another person may offer his goods or services for less.

To pursue the complexities of these transactions and negotiations among individuals would call for a treatise on economics, politics, and social relationships generally. It is sufficient here to emphasize that by virtue of these customs the approach to a goal or the achievement of tensional release is almost always through another person, to whom the appropriate institutional formula must be applied with sufficient stimuli to evoke the desired response.

In so far as the taboos and immunities and the use of the institutional practices are differentially observed by each person ac-

cording to his social, economic, political, racial, and sexual status, we have what we call a social organization. For an organization is a term we apply to a group of entities, things or persons, each member of which has a patterned way of responding to the other members of the group, be it social, political, economic or business, military or fraternal or biological.

We have in social life the interesting picture of an aggregation of individuals, each with his tensional requirements, but with a learned inhibition against seizing the tensional releases present in such abundance in the persons and goods of the other members of the group. The institutional customs and practices, by imposing taboos upon the naïve approach to tensional releases or the invasion of another's person or goods, acts like a dam in a stream: they both hold back energy until it has accumulated sufficiently to perform work. In the social life, the prohibition against seizing food or making a sexual approach to another, or coercing another in other ways, and the requirement that such taking or approach or coercion must be conditioned by the established institutional practice, operate to make the individual work for the achievement of his objectives. To use the figure of the dam, the taboos hold up the tensional release, until their energy has been made to yield, like the turning of the waterwheel, some work or accomplishment. Thus the group inducts the young into the laborious tasks of perpetuating and advancing the group culture, whatever it may be. When we recall the arduous labors of the past cultures in slowly conquering their environment and gradually bringing their members to the observance of these restrictions, it is clear that only such a damming of the waters could yield sufficient energy for such stupendous tasks.

We may then distinguish various cultures as we have already distinguished individuals and social classes, by the kind of tensional controls they foster, the taboos they observe on things and persons (and the immunities they enjoy from others), and the

institutional practices they have established for the approach to otherwise tabooed things and activities. In the institutional practices we should include, of course, the means for enforcing the taboos and the use of the institutional practices (government) and the various practices employed to give the group the necessary endurance for these tasks (religion, art, and value-creations).

Approaching social organization and cultures in this manner, we find that the differences between so-called "high civilization" and more primitive groups is one largely of elaboration and refinement in these learned patterns of behavior. The material culture (tools and techniques) is, of course, also a learned form of behavior, addressed primarily to things and animals, thus enabling the group to manipulate the environment.¹ It is, therefore, feasible to examine various cultures as variations upon the single theme of response to environment and to persons, and thereby to bring into the range of objective observation and even experimental manipulation the basic events of civilization and social organization. We may perhaps discover then that different races have different capacities for sustaining tensions or diffusing them, as they have for releasing them. We know from available clinical records that individuals in a given culture vary in their capacity for learning these arts of tensional management, and it is more than probable that different races may likewise differ.

The management of tensions and the capacity to maintain the physiological energy for achieving a remote objective (i.e., responding to a distant stimulus) are achievements of no mean order. For they require, not only effort and the energy to sustain that effort, but the ability to forego the relaxation of tensions that are so ready to release to the first available stimulus. All the social virtues of courage, perseverance, strength, loyalty, virtue and chastity, and their multitudinous synonyms and derivatives are

¹ Cf. Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture*.

but aspects of the management of tensions. Hunger, pain, emotion, such as fear and panic, and sex desire, are all ready to betray man from pursuing the long-term achievements and goals set by culture. To raise crops and animals, to build houses and buildings, to establish a family and to nurture the young—these call for endurance, patience, and the postponement of immediate consummations for the future achievement. Everywhere we find man has invented methods of sustaining his efforts and reinforcing his continence against the ever present stimuli to relaxation. We call these aids to his long-term pursuits and tensional management his values. For whatever a man uses to keep himself at work, to ward off the panic or the lure of quick consummation while he carries on, is a value. Put in another way, we might say that any behavior addressed to a remote stimulus is a form of value behavior.

The rôle of values in the achievement of civilization is enormous. In every group we find these values, handed down from the past, with elaborations and refinements, exercising their tonic influence upon the lives of the group members. Perhaps the most extraordinary creation man has ever made was the conception of the soul and of a life after death, for at once he obtained a value of incalculable potency, but not too great for the tasks he had to face. With his efforts directed toward a distant goal, a stimulus of rare potency, with its promise of reward, peace, comfort, freedom from the ever present fear, hardship, and suffering, he could meet the situations of the day sustained as no other creature probably has ever been strengthened. The long association of the arts with religion testifies to the numerous aids and devices prepared as auxiliaries to this main value stimulus.

The significant fact about all values which exercise a widespread influence upon human behavior is that they are social. Indeed, the many rituals and ceremonies for reaffirming the value and its potency are the essential processes for giving the values their

potency. And so we find group dances, meetings, prayers, rituals, ceremonies, and practices of every description repeated at stated intervals. Each repetition serves to re-establish and strengthen the individual's susceptibility to the stimulus of the value, thereby renewing its potency. So long as each person in his childhood and youth is instructed in these value responses, both as positive stimuli and as negative penalties in the form of threatened deprivation, he will be provided with an aid to the observance of the tensional controls required by the group mores. If, however, these traditional values lose some of their potency, their decline also threatens the observance of the established social customs and institutions, as we may see historically and in contemporary life. Probably the most effective agency for undermining the group values has been the progress of material culture, bringing tools and techniques for resolving precarious situations and achieving consummations that were formerly denied. With the development, for example, of modern medical practice to meet the exigencies of life, we are losing interest in religion as a consolation in proportion to our increased faith and dependence upon the physician to handle life's crises. Each such advance in material culture reduces the necessity for effort, renunciation, for postponement, and by so much changes the problems of tensional management. Every invention, every labor-saving device, every short cut and means of preventing the otherwise undesirable consequences of any activity (e.g., contraception) immediately alters the tensional problems and, through their newer solutions, modifies the social life. Social change and progress in material culture go hand in hand, as action, reaction, and interaction. The lag of institutional life behind the advancing material culture gives rise to our so-called "social problems," which can be solved only by accelerating the modification of the institutional life to meet the requirements of the material culture.

LAWRENCE K. FRANK

ORGANIC PLASTICITY VERSUS ORGANIC RESPONSIVENESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSONALITY

The terms "plasticity" and "responsiveness" are designed to express two different ways of looking at the interaction of a living organism and its environment. They represent two more or less opposed psychological viewpoints. They may also be used to express different viewpoints with respect to embryological development and with respect to post-natal physical growth. These same terms may, in fact, be applied also to physicochemical interrelationships. In their broadest implications, therefore, they take on a certain philosophical quality, in the sense that they represent a broad viewpoint under which many aspects of nature may be unified. It is this broader viewpoint and its general significance which is set forth with extreme brevity in this paper.

Let us note the significance of these terms, first on the physicochemical plane. If I put water in a pan and subject it to moderate heat it evaporates. This is a reaction more or less peculiar to water, for many chemical combinations would under similar conditions behave quite differently. We say in common parlance that water evaporates or turns to vapor under the influence of heat. Such an explanation is not entirely satisfactory to the inquisitive mind, which also wants to know why water acts that way. We can only answer that that is the nature of the combination H_2O . Such behavior is a characteristic trait of this particular chemical combination. If we have at hand some other chemical combination whose properties are unknown to us, we cannot tell in advance how it will behave under any given physical conditions until we have tried it. When one reflects on the great variety of ways in which different elements or compounds behave under the influence

of heat, moisture, pressure, contact with acids or alkalis, or other environmental conditions, he perceives that like conditions produce unlike effects in different substances. It is still proper to speak of the said conditions as causes of the varying results, so that we may say the same cause produces different results. These differences are of course due to the differences in the natures of the substances involved. In terms of plasticity or response we would have to say that the different substances responded in different ways to the same environmental conditions.

If we take a look at embryological development we reach a similar conclusion. Every organism develops an organic pattern according to its own nature. The same environmental medium, such as sea water, abounds with different forms of life. Each form reproduces after its own kind and draws its portion and kind of nourishment from the common environment. But we must not lose sight of those cases, the oft-cited sea-urchins and others, where an alteration of the medium results in some alteration of development. Professor Jennings, in his *Prometheus*, has recently laid marked stress on such cases. In contrast with the earlier statements of Mendelism, Jennings and others lay great stress upon the well-established fact that a given set of genes will produce more or less different traits under different conditions of development. This variability of development is usually referred to as "organic plasticity." The point I wish now to make is that the term "differential organic responsiveness" more accurately describes what actually occurs.

Let us pass over the fact that Professor Jennings takes back most of his extreme statements before he gets through and adopts a position scarcely distinguishable from that of the informed eugenicist. Let us also get away for the moment from the heredity-environment problem, and note more closely what happens in these cases where environmental change is accompanied by change

of organic pattern. Take for illustration the well-known case of the alteration in the number of legs of the fruit fly under the influence of different temperatures. We note first that this reaction is peculiar to this particular fly. Other flies do not show the trait. There is no general tendency for alterations in temperature to produce alterations in the numbers of legs of flies in general. Nor do other animals, insects, fishes, birds, or mammals, show any tendency to react in the way the fruit fly does to this particular environmental condition. In other words, there is something about the particular protoplasmic constitution of the fruit fly which causes it to respond to a change of temperature in this peculiar way. The change in organic pattern is really a response of this particular protoplasmic constitution to a special stimulus. It could not have been foretold on the basis of any knowledge gained from the study of other animals. Once discovered, however, it tends to be repeated under like conditions with the regularity we expect in the case of scientifically established phenomena. It is a response as characteristic of this particular physicochemical compound as evaporation is of water.

This illustration seems to be typical of all the cases cited by Jennings and others. Of them it seems possible to make the following assertions: (1) organic structures are selective in their relation to environmental stimuli, that is, they respond to some and not to others; hence we may say that *the nature of the organism determines whether or not a response shall be made* to a given stimulus. (2) In like manner, we may say that *the kind of response* made to a given stimulus is determined, not by the stimulus, but by the nature of the organism. This is only stating in different terms the point just made that different organisms react differently to the same stimulus. It is a good deal of a question, in the light of such a fact, whether we use exactly the right term when we say that the stimulus *produces* the response. A more exact statement would be

that the stimulus *arouses, elicits, or releases* the response. (3) The stimulus does not seem to be correlated with the response, or in any way integrated therewith, *except through the nature of the organism*. There seems no known reason why a change of temperature should result in such a peculiar alteration of the organic pattern of a fly as a change in the number of legs. In general one may suppose that an alteration of temperature is equally likely to produce more legs, fewer legs, or no change at all. As far as we can go in explanation is to say that it is in the nature of the peculiar protoplasmic constitution of the fruit fly to respond the way it does to the given stimulus. In exactly the same way we would explain that the formation of water by two units of hydrogen and one of oxygen is due to the nature of these elements; that is, these two elements are so constituted that they respond to certain conditions by forming water, and they are the only elements that do so. Likewise the various protoplasmic structures found in living nature seem to have peculiarities of reaction uniquely their own. Their nature alone explains why they respond as they do to certain stimuli; their nature, that is, their physicochemical constitution, alone accounts for the connection between certain stimuli and the responses elicited.

If now we bring these points together we are in position to query whether it is not more or less inexact to speak of organic plasticity. This term implies that the environment molds the organism to its own pattern. If, however, the environment molded the organic patterns we should expect the organisms of a given environment to be much alike. We note, on the contrary, the greatest variety of plant and animal forms in the same environment; at the same time there are even large similarities between different organisms in different environments. On the other hand, it is also true that the same organism in different environments develops differently. Change either the organic constitution or the environing stimuli and the end result is changed. It seems to many students

that consequently the two factors play an exactly parallel rôle. This is scarcely true, for the simple reason that the environment cannot produce in the organism a response which it is not in the nature of the organism to make. The selective and limiting quality of the organism in determining whether a response shall be made, and if so, what, seems inviolate.

Would we not then be on safe ground in holding that the environmental stimuli furnish opportunity for the expression of different potentialities contained in a given set of genetic factors? The environmental stimuli would still be looked upon as true causes of the organic development because they are essential conditions thereof. But the view here taken would put the organic constitution in its proper position as the active and delimiting agent in the developmental process. The organism is not a piece of plastic clay which can be molded according to any and every sort of environmental stimulus and pressure. It is rather an actor adjusting himself to his stage setting, behaving differently, to be sure, in different settings, but never losing the primary trait of utilizing the setting according to the bent of his own peculiar genius.

This view is strengthened by another consideration, namely, that the stimulus to which the organism responds does not furnish the energy displayed in the response. The stimulus serves as a release of the energies contained within the organism. The latter is thus dynamic in relation to its environment, rather than static.

This is true in a very important sense even as regards food, which may be viewed as the essential and yet external source of all organic energy. For example, each organism selects from among the various food elements of its environment those which satisfy its bodily cravings. What is food for one may be poison for another; what one rejects or casts out as waste may be eagerly seized by another as the source of a thriving organic system. On the human plane the point is illustrated by the difference in the food selections

by different members of the same family at the same meal, and by the changes in food cravings which occur in the same individual from age epoch to age epoch in consequence of changes in bodily chemistry and metabolism. Moreover, the manner in which food is utilized is also largely a matter of organic or individual idiosyncrasy, as is also the reaction to drugs and alcohol.

But, it may be asked, what has all this got to do with the development of the human personality? The answer is that it has much to do with it, provided the propositions laid down for an understanding of the relation of a physical organism to its environmental stimuli apply also to stimulus and response on the psychic plane. Here the potential variations in the habit systems that any given neural structure may acquire is more or less varied, just as the physical traits are more or less variable. It seems impossible in last analysis to think of mind and personality as existing *in vacuo*. The evidence that they rest squarely on psychophysical structures is generally admitted. Consequently we should expect a very close analogy between the way organic traits are built up through the interaction of their hereditary protoplasm and their environing media, and the way their habit systems are organized through the interaction of their psychophysical structures and the environmental stimuli. It would seem, then, that precisely the before-mentioned propositions apply equally well to both sets of phenomena.

In any case, we can test the validity of our basic propositions on a low psychic plane by considering first very simple organisms. Such unicellular creatures as the amoeba and paramoecium, though living in precisely the same medium, have quite different and quite characteristic modes of behavior. Each expresses itself in its own way. Each responds to a very limited number of the possible stimuli in its environment. These primary propositions remain true as we move up in the animal scale to more and more complex neural

systems. At all levels there is a selection of stimuli to which the animal will respond, and the response is characteristic for each animal because in the very nature of the case the animal must respond in ways laid down by its psychophysical structures.

What shall we say, however, of the fact that the behavior of even the lowest organisms is "modified by experience"? We may note, in the first place, that such modifications, like the unmodified reflexes and instincts, are characteristic for each organism. Learning for an amoeba is not the same thing as learning for a paramoecium, so far as learning expresses itself by overt behavior in improved reaction to, or adaptation to, experienced situations. On these lowest levels each organism responds selectively to the possible stimuli of the environing medium, responds thereto in characteristic ways, and evolves a set of habits which are equally characteristic of it under the given conditions. As we ascend the psychic scale the range of possible modifications multiplies rapidly; the elemental reflexes and instinctive reactions, which presumably represent the behavior patterns laid down in the psychophysical structures, may be blocked altogether or have their energies redirected along different channels.

But at all psychic levels we again discover that the environmental stimuli cannot *create* a response which the organic structures are not prepared to give. The first responses are due to the release of energy within the organism; the conditioned responses are likewise due to a similar release of energy, but the energies now flow along more or less different paths. These paths, however, are laid down by the organic structures, so that the habits resulting from experience for each organism take on a character outlined and limited fundamentally by the organism itself. These habits are also determined in large part by experience. I am not interested to deny that. I am, however, interested in showing that the whole chain of habit formation is rooted in the organic structure;

that the organic energies are capable of redirection only along lines laid down in the hereditary constitution or the organic pattern.

At the same time we must not lose sight of another important aspect of the matter, namely, that only a part of the potentialities of any organism can be developed. If the same baby could grow up successively (or simultaneously) in two different media, he would undoubtedly be more or less different; he might, in fact, be very different. But in actual life he necessarily grows up in one cultural medium and not in the other. The end result, therefore, is one and not the other. Only a fraction of all his potentialities in thought, feeling and overt behavior are elicited by the particular stimuli to which he has been subjected. Likewise, the simple unicellular organisms may never have occasion to give expression to all the tricks contained potentially in their systems. That much very clearly depends on the environment. The organism is not plastic in the sense that the environment *molds* it willy nilly; and yet, the organism becomes a different set of reaction habits in different environments.

But at all levels of psychic life it remains true that (1) responses are characteristic of each type of organism; (2) the nature of the response is peculiarly determined by the organic constitution; (3) the process of conditioning and habit formation rests upon the selective and differential action of the individual neural structures. First responses to stimuli flow along the lines of least resistance laid down in the nervous system by genetic factors; there are no other channels. To the extent, therefore, that early stimulus-response experiences become conditioning factors for later stimulus-response behavior they contain as an implicit and ineradicable element the bias due to the original nature of the organism. If the first response conditions the second, and the second the third, and so on, and if the organic structures determine the nature of the response to the first stimulus and also play their part in the condi-

tioning process, then there would be a definite tendency for the nervous structures to give a certain character to the habit system of each organism, whether animal or human.

The so-called "plasticity of behavior," it would seem, must in the last analysis rest upon plasticity of structure; but we have seen that what appears on the organic plane to be plasticity of structure is in fact variable responsiveness to stimuli. It would follow that the habit systems which individuals develop represent their own more or less unique responses to the numerous stimuli about them. It is because of this dynamic relation of the human organism to its environment that such unlike individuals come from social media as nearly alike as it is humanly possible to make them. All such individuals are variants of the statistical average man of their community. While they, to a large extent, share a common culture, it is also true that each of them reveals a distinct personality. As we watch the evolution of our children we observe each of them weaving an individual garment of behavior patterns out of his differential responses to the cultural environment. The bright ones respond to a greater variety of stimuli than the dull. Those with special aptitudes respond to stimuli that leave others wholly unaffected. We are accustomed to say that the bright children absorb more of their environment, but it would seem to be sounder to say that the bright ones, by responding to a wider range of stimuli and by more adequate responses, adjust themselves more perfectly and on a higher plane than the dull ones.

I have been careful throughout to use language which in no way denies very great importance to the cultural environment in which the individual evolves. I am quite willing to say that the cultural factor alone accounts for such differences in motor, emotional and intellectual habits as those of members of the Old American stock today and of a century ago; and such differences are indeed extensive. I have reiterated that in different media a given

individual would develop more or less differently. But the reason is, not that he is molded by his environment, but that different environments release different potentialities contained within his original nature.

This view opens the way to a sound philosophy of education, for by suitable research we can discover what kinds of stimuli produce the desired types of response and behavior patterns. We may even say that we can control the developmental process by controlling the stimuli which excite it. We might in time develop a system of child training which would produce desired results, always assuming that the genetic constitutions of the children involved were good. Under those circumstances it may not seem to make any difference whether we speak of molding the child's nature or giving the child an opportunity to express himself. Nevertheless, it seems to represent a more accurate picture of the operation of causal factors to say that a perfected scheme of education will establish environmental conditions in which the child organism will so shape itself as to conform to our intentions. Society cannot create personalities, nor develop them, but it may some day be able to establish a social medium in which a larger number of individuals, endowed by nature with high potentialities, will develop themselves into splendid types of personality. But even in the best of cultural media the coarser genetic constitutions will remain wholly immune to the finer stimuli about them.

FRANK H. HANKINS

THE PERSONALITY OF MIXED BLOODS

It is a matter of common notoriety that human groupings of any size and permanence, historic and contemporary, bear distinguishing and characteristic marks. As a result of ethnic contacts and intermixture supplemented by the selective action of diverse environments upon variable organic traits, they come to differ in racial constitution. As a consequence of culture contacts and the fortuitous appearance of exceptional men in definitive situations, groups differ in their material culture and institutional arrangements as well as in the fundamental social organization. To the extent of its historic continuity and in terms of its historic experience, every group develops and perpetuates a body of tradition that contributes to the psychological aggrandizement of the group and operates as an independent factor in determining survival and growth. In the congeries of groups each has a status determined by its historic rôle. As a consequence of its historic activity and present status there is elaborated a conception of the group and its place in the social order that operates as an independent factor in the determination of future status and subsequent rôle. Each major human grouping has an individuality and a personality which are characteristic and unique.

It is also a fact commonly recognized that the individual personality bears a definite relation to the group membership: the characteristics of the group are impressed upon its members. This is obvious on the biological level, where the physical features and the mental constitution which identify the individual with the racial group are patent evidences of his ancestry. It is perhaps equally obvious that his language and thought-forms, his moral code, his political conceptions, and other culture values are a

consequence and an evidence of his group affiliation. But it is not alone nor chiefly in his native traits and culture characteristics that the member mirrors the group. These are important, to be sure, inasmuch as they operate to determine the number, the type, and the frequency of contacts, but membership in a group operates in more subtle ways to condition personality. The personal status of the individual and his consequent conception of himself is conditioned by the status of the major groups with which he is identified. The individual is an Englishman, a Negro, a Jew. Each group has a well-defined status in the existing social order, and membership carries with it a corresponding prestige. The individual's conception of himself, perhaps the most important single item in the determination of personality development, is commensurate with, and is the counterpart of, the prestige of his group.

But the personality of the man is also a function of the part he has to play in the group in which he holds membership. This rôle is determined by a complex of factors, both individual and social. The biological facts of race, sex, physique, and mentality are certainly basic; they set limits to the originality of the personality and, by setting the limits of social contact and cultural participation, determine its richness. They are, however, of no greater importance than the facts of economic class, educational status, family connection, and other conventional demarcations which give status, direct activity, condition attitudes, and limit personal achievement. By virtue of race, sex, and class, the individual has a certain status in the group and, consequently, a certain conception of himself, a confidence or a timidity, that operates to condition his behavior. He is aware of his own position in the group as well as of the position of his group in the larger society. In terms of these more or less constant factors he develops a philosophy of life appropriate to a tolerable existence in the situation and a body of behavior responses in general accord with his definition of the total situation.

Of particular significance to the present inquiry—the personality of individuals of biracial ancestry—are the biological traits of race in their determination of personal status and opportunity, the relative status of the mixed-blood group, and the mixed blood's conception of himself and of the place of his group in the society.

Incident to the contact and commingling of races and peoples has been the appearance of individuals of biracial ancestry. Where the culture level and political status of the groups are not wide apart and where the racial crossings take place within the forms sanctioned by the sex mores, no stigma attaches to the offspring. Where the physical similarity of the blending groups is close, the hybrids may bear no revealing marks of origin and pass as individuals in the interracial situation. Even when the intermixture is between sharply contrasted types, if the cultural status be similar and intermarriage tolerated, the hybridized individuals, though bearing the hallmark of their origin, may, especially in an urban and cosmopolitan environment, lead individual and culturally unobstructed lives. Such hybrids are not without interest, biological and sociological, but they do not form segregated groups, hence they lie outside the orbit of present interest.

But when the mixed-blood individuals are the result of temporary relations between members of races that differ in social tradition and culture status as well as in physical type they are not only variant physically, they are branded socially. The biological marks of origin set them apart from other elements of the population and serve as an ever present reminder that sex taboos are violated and caste integrity threatened. The emotional tension consequent upon the violation of the tribal mores finds relief in behavior inimical to the dignity and self-respect of the hybrids. Outraged tribal sentiment demands a victim. In the circumstances the mixed bloods are unable to participate on equal terms in the culture life of either group.

In some historic situations the halfbreeds have been excluded from one, and in others from both, parent groups. In the one case they are associated with the culturally and politically inferior race; in the other they are literally outcasts and lead an economically precarious and culturally isolated existence. As their numbers increase they tend to be formed into a special caste intermediate in physical type and polygenic in culture. This group unity, at first imposed by external forces, may develop into a functional solidarity as the individual struggle for status and self-respect strengthens the internal bonds. Sometimes this hybrid group is repressed and its importance ignored; sometimes its development is encouraged in order that it may be utilized as an instrument in the manipulation and control of the native race. In either case the hybrids sentimentally idealize the culturally dominant group and seek recognition from, and admission to, it. The mixed blood's hysterical and insistent knocking at the white man's door is a familiar sound in every biracial situation. Its disguises are many, though its objective is ever the same. When an American mulatto intemperately abuses the white man and fervently thanks his God that no drop of Anglo-Saxon blood courses through his veins he is displaying a familiar mechanism but deceiving only the psychologically uninitiated. The mulatto student who recently remarked, in a discussion of the darker and less refined members of the race, that, "No white man can despise the dirty animals as I do," differs from the mulatto who idealizes the lower orders only in candor and in the absence of self-deception.

But a mixed-blood group occupies a strategic position and comes to play a distinctive rôle in the political situation. It functions as a buffer and intermediary if the policy of the dominant race encourages its separation and gives it recognition as an independent social reality. It functions as an aristocracy and furnishes leaders for the native race if the policy of the dominant group re-

fuses formal recognition and discourages the class separation. But in any case, regardless of the prevailing policy and independent of any design, the mixed-blood group comes to function as a cultural intermediary in the interracial situation. In terms of function in the inclusive social and political organization the group gets recognition and comes to have a clearly understood, though generally not a formally defined, status. The group develops the body of folklore and tradition, the set of beliefs and prejudices, that a tolerable life in the situation demands. It develops a body or rationalization, couched in terms of the prevailing social emphasis, to explain in the least unflattering way the group status and rôle that evolved in response to the requirements of the situation. With variations suited to, and understandable in terms of, local differences in culture standards and philosophies of life, every mixed-blood group conforms to a single general pattern. They manifest common culture characteristics; they occupy similar caste status; they play comparable rôles; they exhibit the same psychological characteristics and type of mind. They define the objective of collective endeavor in identical ways; they strive for the same objectives by use of the same methods. In brief, every mixed-blood group conforms, psychologically and culturally, to type.

The mixed-blood individual is thus born into a peculiar and complex environment of which his personality development is the subjective aspect. Aside from any biological determinants of personality development, the importance of which is recognized but which are not here under consideration—personality is determined by the type of interaction possible within the institutional and traditional limitations imposed by the fact of group membership. The original and originally undifferentiated reaction equipment differentiates, under the influence of environmental stimulation, into socially defined attitudes and wishes. The wishes must find their satisfaction within the conventional patterns set by the group, and

there results, in consequence, a characteristic personality norm. There is, to be sure, a considerable range in the ability of individuals to conform to cultural patterns, and a somewhat wider variation in the conventional obstacles to free participation. Certain individuals, because of native deficiency or because of early conditioning, are incapable of making the adjustments demanded in any normally complex social life. There are also differences in individual accessibility to cultural stimulations that go with the accidents of sex, family connections, economic status, formal education, and other incidents of imperfect social organization. But back of these minor variations is a common experience that gives a personality norm about which the variations arising from original and conventional differences tend to fluctuate. The sociological aspect of personality is a product of interaction, and the basic similarity in the cultural status of mixed-blood groups results in the formation of a characteristic personality type.

Where an arbitrary social fiat excludes the individuals of bi-racial origin from participation in the social and cultural life of the politically dominant group, the alternatives are a special caste organization or a cultural identification with the backward group.

In the latter case, where the mixed bloods fail of social recognition, they come to occupy a status, more or less definitely aristocratic, within the cultural minority. The biological fact of relationship to the politically dominant group gives a prestige and assures a preferential status. They are born into an assured social position. They compose, more or less exclusively, the group from which leadership emerges. The status is understood and accepted, the ethnic and class differences are realized; the mixed-bloods' conception of themselves is that of the native proletariat. Where the mixed bloods are thus identified with the native group, there is no conflict between the individual wishes and the socially enforced standards. There is no divided loyalty and no conscious

effort to escape status. The mixed bloods in this situation are accommodated; they are conventional persons. They have surrendered the socially disapproved individual wishes and have accepted more or less completely and absolutely the standards imposed by the overgroup. In this case they display no personality characteristics of distinctive type. They are identified in sentiment and interest with the minority group, and the sociological characteristics of personality are determined by their status and rôle in that environmental situation rather than by the hybrid group to which they belong biologically.

But the hybrid leader of the native group is not necessarily a philistine. His identification with the native race may be an individual adjustment providing a practical resolution of the conflict between his wish complex and the requirements and limitations of the social order. He may achieve a socialized realization of his wishes through a re-creation of the situation. In such case the result is what Thomas has termed a "creative man." In the American race situation, the case of Booker T. Washington is known to everyone, but he was merely the best known of many mulattoes who have achieved the status of full manhood through a sublimation of their wishes and an identification of their interests with those of the black folk.

But the individuals of mixed blood are not always, nor usually, able to resolve the conflict between personal desires and social taboos. Denied admission to one group, they are unable to accept the alternative, identification with the other. They are unable to sublimate the wishes to effect a socialized realization. Superior in fact and in their psychology to the natives, they are at the same time inferior in fact and in their psychology to the caste from which they desire recognition. They may form a separate caste, but the essential conflict remains; regardless of political status, the personal wishes cannot get satisfaction within the socially sanc-

tioned forms. Denied recognition by the one group and refusing to be identified with the other defines a conflict that the typical mixed blood is unable to resolve in either a philistine or a creative reconstruction. The result is a characteristic and clearly defined personality type. It should be emphasized that this personality type is not a biological consequence of racial intermixture, but a sociological phenomenon resulting from the fact of divided loyalties.

The mixed-blood individual is in a fundamental sense a member of different and exclusive groups. Each group has its rules and definitions in accordance with which the wishes must find their satisfaction; each impresses a set of beliefs and behavior standards; each develops a body of sentimental loyalties. As an aspirant for membership in the culturally advanced group, the mixed blood approves and upholds its ideals and standards. But as a member of a special caste or as an unaccommodated member of the excluded racial group, he embodies the ideal and standards of the minority. Thus, within the individual, incident to the real or potential membership in opposing groups, there is mental disorder, a conflict between opposing group loyalties. In last analysis the conflict is between opposing groups; the mental conflict is but the counterpart of the external situation. The covert conflict is irresolvable so long as the mixed-blood is denied admittance to the idealized group and remains unaccommodated to the other.

Individual escape takes varied forms, which do not require enumeration here. The tendency to overcompensation for inferiority status is familiar to every observer of racial and social phenomena, as is also the tendency toward formalism, bohemianism, egocentrism, and introversion.

The mixed blood is thus an unadjusted person. His immediate group has no respected place in the society. In ideals and aspirations he is identified with the culturally dominant group; in social

rôle and cultural participation he is identified with the excluded group. He is, in consequence, a man of divided loyalties. It is only when the resulting conflict is resolved by the mixed blood's accommodation to the socially defined place—membership in, and leadership of, the backward group—only when he identifies himself with it, participates in life on that basis, and finds the satisfaction of his wishes in that group organization that he escapes the conflict resulting from his divided heritage. It is only through an identification of himself with the social group to which the social definitions consign him that he can find a tolerable life and develop a wholesome personality.

E. B. REUTER

HUMAN MIGRATION AND THE MARGINAL MAN

Students of the great society, looking at mankind in the long perspective of history, have frequently been disposed to seek an explanation of existing cultural differences among races and peoples in some single dominating cause or condition. One school of thought, represented most conspicuously by Montesquieu, has found that explanation in climate and in the physical environment. Another school, identified with the name of Arthur de Gobineau, author of *The Inequality of Human Races*, has sought an explanation of divergent cultures in the innate qualities of races biologically inherited. These two theories have this in common, namely, that they both conceive civilization and society to be the result of evolutionary processes—processes by which man has acquired new inheritable traits—rather than processes by which new relations have been established between men.

In contrast to both of these, Frederick Teggart has recently restated and amplified what may be called the catastrophic theory of civilization, a theory that goes back to Hume in England, and to Turgot in France. From this point of view, climate and innate racial traits, important as they may have been in the evolution of races, have been of only minor influence in creating existing cultural differences. In fact, races and cultures, so far from being in any sense identical—or even the product of similar conditions and forces—are perhaps to be set over against one another as contrast effects, the results of antagonistic tendencies, so that civilization may be said to flourish at the expense of racial differences rather than to be conserved by them. At any rate, if it is true that races are the products of isolation and inbreeding, it is just as certain that civilization, on the other hand, is a consequence of contact and com-

munication. The forces which have been decisive in the history of mankind are those which have brought men together in fruitful competition, conflict, and co-operation.

Among the most important of these influences have been—according to what I have called the catastrophic theory of progress—migration and the incidental collisions, conflicts, and fusions of people and cultures which they have occasioned.

“Every advance in culture,” says Bücher, in his *Industrial Evolution*, “commences, so to speak, with a new period of wandering,” and in support of this thesis he points out that the earlier forms of trade were migratory, that the first industries to free themselves from the household husbandry and become independent occupations were carried on itinerantly. “The great founders of religion, the earliest poets and philosophers, the musicians and actors of past epochs, are all great wanderers. Even today, do not the inventor, the preacher of a new doctrine, and the virtuoso travel from place to place in search of adherents and admirers—notwithstanding the immense recent development in the means of communicating information?”¹

The influences of migrations have not been limited, of course, by the changes which they have effected in existing cultures. In the long run, they have determined the racial characteristics of historical peoples. “The whole teaching of ethnology,” as Griffith Taylor remarks, “shows that peoples of mixed race are the rule and not the exception.”² Every nation, upon examination, turns out to have been a more or less successful melting-pot. To this constant sifting of races and peoples, human geographers have given the title “the historical movement,” because, as Miss Semple says in her volume *Influences of Geographic Environment*, “it underlies most written

¹ Carl Bücher, *Industrial Evolution*, p. 347.

² Griffith Taylor, *Environment and Race: A Study of the Evolution, Migration, Settlement, and Status of the Races of Men*, p. 336.

history and constitutes the major part of unwritten history, especially that of savage and nomadic tribes.”³

Changes in race, it is true, do inevitably follow, at some distance, changes in culture. The movements and mingling of peoples which bring rapid, sudden, and often catastrophic, changes in customs and habits are followed, in the course of time, as a result of interbreeding, by corresponding modifications in temperament and physique. There has probably never been an instance where races have lived together in the intimate contacts which a common economy enforces in which racial contiguity has not produced racial hybrids. However, changes in racial characteristics and in cultural traits proceed at very different rates, and it is notorious that cultural changes are not consolidated and transmitted biologically, or at least to only a very slight extent, if at all. Acquired characteristics are not biologically inherited.

Writers who emphasize the importance of migration as an agency of progress are invariably led to ascribe a similar rôle to war. Thus Waitz, commenting upon the rôle of migration as an agency of civilization, points out that migrations are “rarely of a peaceful nature at first.” Of war he says: “The first consequence of war is that fixed relations are established between peoples, which render friendly intercourse possible, an intercourse which becomes more important from the interchange of knowledge and experience than from the mere interchange of commodities.”⁴ And then he adds:

Whenever we see a people, of whatever degree of civilization, not living in contact and reciprocal action with others, we shall generally find a certain stagnation, a mental inertness, and a want of activity, which render any change of social and political condition next to impossible. These are, in times of peace, transmitted like an everlasting disease, and war appears then, in spite of what the apostles of peace may say, as a saving angel, who rouses the national spirit, and renders all forces more elastic.⁵

³ Ellen Churchill Semple, *Influences of Geographic Environment*, p. 75.

⁴ Theodor Waitz, *Introduction to Anthropology*, p. 347.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 348.

Among the writers who conceive the historical process in terms of intrusions, either peaceful or hostile, of one people into the domain of another, must be reckoned such sociologists as Gumpłowicz and Oppenheimer. The former, in an effort to define the social process abstractly, has described it as the interaction of heterogeneous ethnic groups, the resulting subordination and superordination of races constituting the social order—society, in fact.

In much the same way, Oppenheimer, in his study of the sociological origin of the state, believes he has shown that in every instance the state has had its historical beginnings in the imposition, by conquest and force, of the authority of a nomadic upon a sedentary and agricultural people. The facts which Oppenheimer has gathered to sustain his thesis show, at any rate, that social institutions have actually, in many instances at least, come into existence abruptly by a mutation, rather than by a process of evolutionary selection and the gradual accumulation of relatively slight variations.⁶

It is not at once apparent why a theory which insists upon the importance of catastrophic change in the evolution of civilization should not at the same time take some account of revolution as a factor in progress. If peace and stagnation, as Waitz suggests, tend to assume the form of a social disease; if, as Sumner says, "society needs to have some ferment in it" to break up this stagnation and emancipate the energies of individuals imprisoned within an existing social order; it seems that some "adventurous folly" like the crusades of the middle ages, or some romantic enthusiasm like that which found expression in the French Revolution, or in the more recent Bolshevik adventure in Russia, might serve quite as effectively as either migration or war to interrupt the routine of existing habit and break the cake of custom. Revolutionary doctrines are naturally based upon a conception of catastrophic rather

⁶ Franz Oppenheimer, *The State: Its History and Development Viewed Sociologically* (1914).

than of evolutionary change. Revolutionary strategy, as it has been worked out and rationalized in Sorel's *Reflections on Violence*, makes the great catastrophe, the general strike, an article of faith. As such it becomes a means of maintaining morale and enforcing discipline in the revolutionary masses.⁷

The first and most obvious difference between revolution and migration is that in migration the breakdown of social order is initiated by the impact of an invading population, and completed by the contact and fusion of native with alien peoples. In the case of the former, revolutionary ferment and the forces which have disrupted society have ordinarily had, or seem to have had, their sources and origins mainly if not wholly within, rather than without, the society affected. It is doubtful whether it can be successfully maintained that every revolution, every *Aufklärung*, every intellectual awakening and renaissance has been and will be provoked by some invading population movement or by the intrusion of some alien cultural agency. At least it seems as if some modification of this view is necessary, since with the growth of commerce and communication there is progressively and relatively more movement and less migration. Commerce, in bringing the ends of the earth together, has made travel relatively secure. Moreover, with the development of machine industry and the growth of cities, it is the commodities rather than men which circulate. The peddler, who carries his stock on his back, gives way to the traveling salesman, and the catalogue of the mail order house now reaches remote regions which even the Yankee peddler rarely if ever penetrated. With the development of a world-economy and the interpenetration of peoples, migrations, as Bücher has pointed out, have changed their character:

The migrations occurring at the opening of the history of European peoples are migrations of whole tribes, a pushing and pressing of collective units from east to west which lasted for centuries. The migrations of the Middle

⁷ Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (New York, 1914).

Ages ever affect individual classes alone; the knights in the crusades, the merchants, the wage craftsmen, the journeymen hand-workers, the jugglers and minstrels, the villeins seeking protection within the walls of a town. Modern migrations, on the contrary, are generally a matter of private concern, the individuals being led by the most varied motives. They are almost invariably without organization. The process repeating itself daily a thousand times is united only through the one characteristic, that it is everywhere a question of change of locality by persons seeking more favourable conditions of life.⁸

Migration, which was formerly an invasion, followed by the forcible displacement or subjugation of one people by another, has assumed the character of a peaceful penetration. Migration of peoples has, in other words, been transmuted into mobility of individuals, and the wars which these movements so frequently occasioned have assumed the character of internecine struggles, of which strikes and revolutions are to be regarded as types.

Furthermore, if one were to attempt to reckon with all the forms in which catastrophic changes take place, it would be necessary to include the changes that are effected by the sudden rise of some new religious movement like Mohammedanism or Christianity, both of which began as schismatic and sectarian movements, and which by extension and internal evolution have become independent religions. Looked at from this point of view, migration assumes a character less unique and exceptional than has hitherto been conceived by the writers whom the problem has most intrigued. It appears as one, merely, of a series of forms in which historic changes may take place. Nevertheless, regarded abstractly as a type of collective action, human migration exhibits everywhere characteristics that are sufficiently typical to make it a subject of independent investigation and study, both in respect to its form and in respect to the effects which it produces.

Migration is not, however, to be identified with mere movement. It involves, at the very least, change of residence and the

⁸ Carl Bücher, *Industrial Evolution*, p. 349.

breaking of home ties. The movements of gypsies and other pariah peoples, because they bring about no important changes in cultural life, are to be regarded rather as a geographical fact than a social phenomenon. Nomadic life is stabilized on the basis of movement, and even though gypsies now travel by automobile, they still maintain, comparatively unchanged, their ancient tribal organization and customs. The result is that their relation to the communities in which they may at any time be found is to be described as symbiotic rather than social. This tends to be true of any section or class of the population—the hobos, for example, and the hotel dwellers—which is unsettled and mobile.

Migration as a social phenomenon must be studied not merely in its grosser effects, as manifested in changes in custom and in the mores, but it may be envisaged in its subjective aspects as manifested in the changed type of personality which it produces. When the traditional organization of society breaks down, as a result of contact and collision with a new invading culture, the effect is, so to speak, to emancipate the individual man. Energies that were formerly controlled by custom and tradition are released. The individual is free for new adventures, but he is more or less without direction and control. Teggart's statement of the matter is as follows:

As a result of the breakdown of customary modes of action and of thought, the individual experiences a "release" from the restraints and constraints to which he has been subject, and gives evidence of this "release" in aggressive self-assertion. The overexpression of individuality is one of the marked features of all epochs of change. On the other hand, the study of the psychological effects of collision and contact between different groups reveals the fact that the most important aspect of "release" lies not in freeing the soldier, warrior, or berserker from the restraint of conventional modes of action, but in freeing the individual judgment from the inhibitions of conventional modes of thought. It will thus be seen (he adds) that the study of the *modus operandi* of change

in time gives a common focus to the efforts of political historians, of the historians of literature and of ideas, of psychologists, and of students of ethics and the theory of education.⁹

Social changes, according to Teggart, have their inception in events which "release" the individuals out of which society is composed. Inevitably, however, this release is followed in the course of time by the reintegration of the individuals so released into a new social order. In the meantime, however, certain changes take place—at any rate they are likely to take place—in the character of the individuals themselves. They become, in the process, not merely emancipated, but enlightened.

The emancipated individual invariably becomes in a certain sense and to a certain degree a cosmopolitan. He learns to look upon the world in which he was born and bred with something of the detachment of a stranger. He acquires, in short, an intellectual bias. Simmel has described the position of the stranger in the community, and his personality, in terms of movement and migration.

"If wandering," he says, "considered as the liberation from every given point in space, is the conceptual opposite of fixation at any point, then surely the sociological form of the stranger presents the union of both of these specifications." The stranger stays, but he is not settled. He is a potential wanderer. That means that he is not bound as others are by the local proprieties and conventions. "He is the freer man, practically and theoretically. He views his relation to others with less prejudice; he submits them to more general, more objective standards, and he is not confined in his action by custom, piety or precedents."

The effect of mobility and migration is to secularize relations which were formerly sacred. One may describe the process, in its dual aspect, perhaps, as the secularization of society and the individuation of the person. For a brief, vivid, and authentic picture of

⁹ Frederick J. Teggart, *Theory of History*, p. 196.

the way in which migration of the earlier sort, the migration of a people, has, in fact, brought about the destruction of an earlier civilization and liberated the peoples involved for the creation of a later, more secular, and freer society, I suggest Gilbert Murray's introduction to *The Rise of the Greek Epic*, in which he seeks to reproduce the events of the Nordic invasion of the Aegean area.

What ensued, he says, was a period of chaos:

A chaos in which an old civilization is shattered into fragments, its laws set at naught, and that intricate web of normal expectation which forms the very essence of human society torn so often and so utterly by continued disappointment that at last there ceases to be any normal expectation at all. For the fugitive settlers on the shores that were afterwards Ionia, and for parts too of Doris and Aeolis, there were no tribal gods or tribal obligations left, because there were no tribes. There were no old laws, because there was no one to administer or even to remember them; only such compulsions as the strongest power of the moment chose to enforce. Household and family life had disappeared, and all its innumerable ties with it. A man was now not living with a wife of his own race, but with a dangerous strange woman, of alien language and alien gods, a woman whose husband or father he had perhaps murdered—or, at best, whom he had bought as a slave from the murderer. The old Aryan husbandman, as we shall see hereafter, had lived with his herds in a sort of familiar connexion. He slew "his brother the ox" only under special stress or for definite religious reasons, and he expected his women to weep when the slaying was performed. But now he had left his own herds far away. They had been devoured by enemies. And he lived on the beasts of strangers whom he robbed or held in servitude. He had left the graves of his fathers, the kindly ghosts of his own blood, who took food from his hand and loved him. He was surrounded by the graves of alien dead, strange ghosts whose names he knew not, and who were beyond his power to control, whom he tried his best to placate with fear and aversion. One only concrete thing existed for him to make henceforth the centre of his allegiance, to supply the place of his old family hearth, his gods, his tribal customs and sanctities. It was a circuit wall of stones, a *Polis*; the wall which he and his fellows, men of diverse tongues and worships united by a tremendous need, had built up to be the one barrier between themselves and a world of enemies.¹⁰

¹⁰ Gilbert Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic*, pp. 78-79.

It was within the walls of the *polis* and in this mixed company that Greek civilization was born. The whole secret of ancient Greek life, its relative freedom from the grosser superstitions and from fear of the gods, is bound up, we are told, with this period of transition and chaos, in which the older primitive world perished and from which the freer, more enlightened social order sprang into existence. Thought is emancipated, philosophy is born, public opinion sets itself up as an authority as over against tradition and custom. As Guyot puts it, "The Greek with his festivals, his songs, his poetry, seems to celebrate, in a perpetual hymn, the liberation of man from the mighty fetters of nature."¹¹

What took place in Greece first has since taken place in the rest of Europe and is now going on in America. The movement and migration of peoples, the expansion of trade and commerce, and particularly the growth, in modern times, of these vast melting-pots of races and cultures, the metropolitan cities, has loosened local bonds, destroyed the cultures of tribe and folk, and substituted for the local loyalties the freedom of the cities; for the sacred order of tribal custom, the rational organization which we call civilization.

In these great cities, where all the passions, all the energies of mankind are released, we are in position to investigate the processes of civilization, as it were, under a microscope.

It is in the cities that the old clan and kinship groups are broken up and replaced by social organization based on rational interests and temperamental predilections. It is in the cities, more particularly, that the grand division of labor is effected which permits and more or less compels the individual man to concentrate his energies and his talents on the particular task he is best fitted to perform, and in this way emancipates him and his fellows from the

¹¹ A. H. Guyot, *Earth and Man* (Boston, 1857), cited by Franklin Thomas, *The Environmental Basis of Society* (New York, 1921), p. 205.

control of nature and circumstance which so thoroughly dominates primitive man.

It happens, however, that the process of acculturation and assimilation and the accompanying amalgamation of racial stocks does not proceed with the same ease and the same speed in all cases. Particularly where peoples who come together are of divergent cultures and widely different racial stocks, assimilation and amalgamation do not take place so rapidly as they do in other cases. All our so-called racial problems grow out of situations in which assimilation and amalgamation do not take place at all, or take place very slowly. As I have said elsewhere, the chief obstacle to the cultural assimilation of races is not their different mental, but rather their divergent physical traits. It is not because of the mentality of the Japanese that they do not so easily assimilate as do the Europeans. It is because

the Japanese bears in his features a distinctive racial hallmark, that he wears, so to speak, a racial uniform which classifies him. He cannot become a mere individual, indistinguishable in the cosmopolitan mass of the population, as is true, for example, of the Irish, and, to a lesser extent, of some of the other immigrant races. The Japanese, like the Negro, is condemned to remain among us an abstraction, a symbol—and a symbol not merely of his own race but of the Orient and of that vague, ill-defined menace we sometimes refer to as the “yellow peril.”¹²

Under such circumstances peoples of different racial stocks may live side by side in a relation of symbiosis, each playing a rôle in a common economy, but not interbreeding to any great extent; each maintaining, like the gypsy or the pariah peoples of India, a more or less complete tribal organization or society of their own. Such was the situation of the Jew in Europe up to modern times, and a somewhat similar relation exists today between the native

¹² “Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups,” *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. VIII (1914).

white and the Hindu populations in Southeast Africa and in the West Indies.

In the long run, however, peoples and races who live together, sharing in the same economy, inevitably interbreed, and in this way if in no other, the relations which were merely co-operative and economic become social and cultural. When migration leads to conquest, either economic or political, assimilation is inevitable. The conquering peoples impose their culture and their standards upon the conquered, and there follows a period of cultural endosmosis.

Sometimes relations between the conquering and the conquered peoples take the form of slavery; sometimes they assume the form, as in India, of a system of caste. But in either case the dominant and the subject peoples become, in time, integral parts of one society. Slavery and caste are merely forms of accommodation, in which the race problem finds a temporary solution. The case of the Jews was different. Jews never were a subject people, at least not in Europe. They were never reduced to the position of an inferior caste. In their ghettos in which they first elected, and then were forced, to live, they preserved their own tribal traditions and their cultural, if not their political, independence. The Jew who left the ghetto did not escape; he deserted and became that execrable object, an apostate. The relation of the ghetto Jew to the larger community in which he lived was, and to some extent still is, symbiotic rather than social.

When, however, the walls of the medieval ghetto were torn down and the Jew was permitted to participate in the cultural life of the peoples among whom he lived, there appeared a new type of personality, namely, a cultural hybrid, a man living and sharing intimately in the cultural life and traditions of two distinct peoples; never quite willing to break, even if he were permitted to do so, with his past and his traditions, and not quite accepted, because of racial prejudice, in the new society in which he now sought to

find a place. He was a man on the margin of two cultures and two societies, which never completely interpenetrated and fused. The emancipated Jew was, and is, historically and typically the marginal man, the first cosmopolite and citizen of the world. He is, par excellence, the "stranger," whom Simmel, himself a Jew, has described with such profound insight and understanding in his *Sociologie*. Most if not all the characteristics of the Jew, certainly his pre-eminence as a trader and his keen intellectual interest, his sophistication, his idealism and lack of historic sense, are the characteristics of the city man, the man who ranges widely, lives preferably in a hotel—in short, the cosmopolite. The autobiographies of Jewish immigrants, of which a great number have been published in America in recent years, are all different versions of the same story—the story of the marginal man; the man who, emerging from the ghetto in which he lived in Europe, is seeking to find a place in the freer, more complex and cosmopolitan life of an American city. One may learn from these autobiographies how the process of assimilation actually takes place in the individual immigrant. In the more sensitive minds its effects are as profound and as disturbing as some of the religious conversions of which William James has given us so classical an account in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*. In these immigrant autobiographies the conflict of cultures, as it takes place in the mind of the immigrant, is just the conflict of "the divided self," the old self and the new. And frequently there is no satisfying issue of this conflict, which often terminates in a profound disillusionment, as described, for example, in Lewisohn's autobiography *Up Stream*. But Lewisohn's restless wavering between the warm security of the ghetto, which he has abandoned, and the cold freedom of the outer world, in which he is not yet quite at home, is typical. A century earlier, Heinrich Heine, torn with the same conflicting loyalties, struggling to be at the same time a German and a Jew, enacted a similar rôle. It was, according to his latest biog-

rapher, the secret and the tragedy of Heine's life that circumstance condemned him to live in two worlds, in neither of which he ever quite belonged. It was this that embittered his intellectual life and gave to his writings that character of spiritual conflict and instability which, as Browne says, is evidence of "spiritual distress." His mind lacked the integrity which is based on conviction: "His arms were weak"—to continue the quotation—"because his mind was divided; his hands were nerveless because his soul was in turmoil."

Something of the same sense of moral dichotomy and conflict is probably characteristic of every immigrant during the period of transition, when old habits are being discarded and new ones are not yet formed. It is inevitably a period of inner turmoil and intense self-consciousness.

There are no doubt periods of transition and crisis in the lives of most of us that are comparable with those which the immigrant experiences when he leaves home to seek his fortunes in a strange country. But in the case of the marginal man the period of crisis is relatively permanent. The result is that he tends to become a personality type. Ordinarily the marginal man is a mixed blood, like the Mulatto in the United States or the Eurasian in Asia, but that is apparently because the man of mixed blood is one who lives in two worlds, in both of which he is more or less of a stranger. The Christian convert in Asia or in Africa exhibits many if not most of the characteristics of the marginal man—the same spiritual instability, intensified self-consciousness, restlessness, and *malaise*.

It is in the mind of the marginal man that the moral turmoil which new cultural contacts occasion manifests itself in the most obvious forms. It is in the mind of the marginal man—where the changes and fusions of culture are going on—that we can best study the processes of civilization and of progress.

ROBERT E. PARK

PERSONALITY TYPES AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR

Literature and common sense, and in these latter days, the press, have given us stereotyped pictures of persons engaged in various occupations: the old-maid school teacher, the parson, the village blacksmith, the farmer, the professor, the politician, the financier. All these and many other types so created are expected to react to the situations of life in characteristic manner. To many the cartoonist adds a face and costume. Social scientists and philosophers have taken the cue and have sometimes related types of men to their tasks, as Adam Smith in his classic paragraph on the nature of the differences between the philosopher and the man with a wheelbarrow. In common-sense discussion the question is not asked as to the manner in which the differences arise: it only talks of them as facts or fiction.

In our branch of social science much attention has lately been turned to the classification of persons into types, according to their behavior. Some of the older classifications, as good and bad, criminal and law-abiding, rich and poor, have been called into question—not because the classes indicated do not exist, but because they do not give sufficient clues to the behavior of people. Dr. Burgess has undertaken to study the delinquent as a person, taking into account sequences of behavior, the rôles assumed by the person in his group, the rôle accorded him by his group; and with the further provision that one take into account the group in which the person wishes to have status. That is to say, the group in which he “lives.” The delinquency, or the breaking of the law, thus becomes a mere item in a pattern of behavior, and emphasis is put on the fact that this one item is not always the same, even when the overt

act involved comes under a given legal category. In this is a recognition that behavior types do not necessarily coincide with the common-sense or legal definitions.

In this paper we appear to be reverting from the position already gained; looking for a set of personality types in a classification of people according to the work they do. A number of questions at once arise. To what extent do persons of a given occupation "live together" and develop a culture which has its subjective aspect in the personality? Do persons find an area for the satisfaction of their wishes in the associations which they have with their colleagues, competitors, and fellow-servants? To whose opinions is one sensitive? What part does one's occupation play in giving him his "life-organization"?¹

A prerequisite for the answering of these questions is study of persons engaged in various occupations, to determine the nature of occupational selection, and what happens to a person once he does find a place in the division of labor. A number of such studies have been undertaken. Some are statistical studies; others are what one might call case studies of occupations, as Mrs. Donovan's work on the waitress.² We can go no farther in this paper than to put the problem into a frame of reference, and illustrate from one occupational group.

HUMAN ECOLOGY AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR

We are indebted to Durkheim for a distinction between two types of social units, the *social segment* and the *social organ*. The *social segment* is that sort of minute community which exists in independence of all others; its members grow up under conditions so uniform that their consciences are concrete, uniform, and strong. It is also characterized by the presence of as many generations as

¹ See Thomas, *The Polish Peasant*, I, 27.

² Donovan, *The Woman Who Waits*.

the longevity of the group allows. It is different in a number of ways from all other communities. The individual cannot imagine any other set of social attitudes than the one common to the people of his own group. The *social organ*, on the other hand, is dependent for life upon other communities; it represents only a unit in the division of labor, and must engage in exchange with other communities. This exchange requires at least a minimum of understanding between the groups of communities involved. The division of labor represents a set of exchanges between communities whereby these communities become involved as functioning parts of a larger community. This larger community, however, has no common conscience, or only a very tenuous, vague, abstract one. As the division of labor proceeds, the life of each social organ is more conditioned by the others; the forces which hold it in place come to include neighbors as well as the soil beneath one's feet. It is this pattern of social organs, treated spatially, with which human ecology concerns itself.

SACRED DIVISION OF LABOR

In the type of community which Durkheim calls a "social segment" the division of labor is either very simple or very rigid. It may be mere incident of the social organization of the community, consisting in sets of sacred prerogatives, as in the caste system, where a person is born to his trade and station. We may call this sort of division of labor a sacred one. The prerogatives of a given caste may or may not constitute a unit of technique.

In a study of the division of labor among preliterates, done under the tutelage of Dr. Faris at the University of Chicago, the writer isolated a set of occupations which he called "preliterate professions," including healers, performers of rituals, charmers, medicine men, etc. In them he found associated with a certain amount of practical technique a great amount of secret ritual and prerogative whose connections with each other were traditional and arbitrary

and fortified by taboos. In a society where the division of labor is of this character, its relation to personality is fairly obvious, especially if it include the "caste" feature of evaluation and a complete set of social relationships involved with it. This type of division of labor is essentially a phenomenon of an unchanging, immobile society. There may be a tendency for it to develop in a changing society, or at least to persist. For instance, one can think of no principle of technique which naturally associates the activities of the clergyman: he directs the business affairs of his parish, marries, baptizes, comforts the sad, prays for the recovery of the sick, and acts as interpreter of morals and theology. The functions are set in a traditional and somewhat arbitrary complex; they are prerogatives.³

THE SECULARIZATION OF THE DIVISION OF LABOR

In contrast to this type we may characterize the division of labor in our world as secularized. New occupations are created every day, and the concatenations of functions of old ones are subject to change. The industrial revolutions of every day mean to the individual that he is not sure of his job; or, at least, that one is not sure of one's son's job. This is true of whole regions, as well as of individuals; changes in transportation, methods of production, extension of the frontiers of commerce do violence to the most deeply rooted and sacred prerogatives.⁴

³ North, *Social Differentiation*, p. 255. "A group in which status, occupation, and culture have become hereditary is known as a caste. As a matter of fact, however, the distinction between a society based upon caste and one in which open classes prevail is simply one of degree. There are present in all societies forces which tend to crystallize the form of social institutions and social organization. And it is merely a question of how freely these forces have made themselves or worked themselves out to a logical conclusion."

⁴ North, *Social Differentiation*, p. 255. "The discovery of new territory or natural resources, the appearance of new inventions or new fields of industry, the coming of war—all tend to upset the old arrangement and make for an exchange of

Occupational selection becomes a major process, to which social organization is incidental. This selection becomes a fierce process which begins anew each day, atomizing families and tearing them loose from their soil.

We may call the division of labor "secularized" both in that new occupations or units of function are developed, which are not hampered by tradition, and in that the persons who enter the occupation come without very definite, traditional notions about the way of carrying on the occupation.⁵ We shall pursue this point further in consideration of what the occupational selection process is and what it does to the person.

OCCUPATIONAL SELECTION

In his recent work, *Wirtschaftsleben im Zeitalter des Hochkapitalismus*,⁶ Sombart has made his major theme the selection of the leaders of industry, as well as that of the proletariat. The chief point in regard to the former is that the life-histories of a very large percentage of them show small beginnings. The corporation and the credit system have made this possible. This fact of democratization does not mean an increase in the chances of the person of low degree to rise in the economic and social scale so much as an acceleration of change, the disappearance of old occupations, and the rise of new ones. Sombart makes this clear in his consideration

places on the social ladder. A high state of intelligence and communication will make it possible for individuals to pass up or down in the scale according to their abilities and character."

⁵ Sombart, *Hochkapitalismus*, p. 30.

⁶ Sombart, "The Extraction of the Entrepreneur," *Hochkapitalismus*, p. 19. "Finally the economic leaders in the age of *Hochkapitalismus* are new according to their extraction. If we consider first of all the field of recruiting the entrepreneurs with a given body of people, also their social extraction, we shall find as the most important characteristic of our epoch a far-reaching democratization of leadership: the leading men of economic life climb up from ever broader and ever deeper layers of the population."

of the sources of the proletariat. The proletariat comes from the ranks of those, says he, who have been dislodged from their traditional places on the soil, and from those whose birth and family do not presume for them any place in the economic system except a place which the individual himself may find. Selection of occupations of the proletarian sort depends largely on time and place availability, both of the job and the person who fills it. Dr. North concludes⁷ that "the determination of the precise task that most individuals perform within the larger class of occupations lies in chiefly local, temporary, and fortuitous circumstances." The sum total of conclusions from most of contemporary discussion is that one can predict neither the occupational fate of the individual nor the origin of the person who will next fill a given job. It amounts to a recognition of the essentially complicated nature of the processes involved.

In certain types of occupations the process can be analyzed within certain limits; as, for instance, in the clergy of evangelical churches where one needs a more definite "call" to the profession. This call comes more frequently to rural youths than to urban. The country furnishes the ministers for the city. Also the more evangelical churches furnish the ministers for the less evangelical. The Unitarian denomination furnishes practically no ministers, but must recruit its prophets from emancipated ones of more orthodox denominations. The occupation of the parent undoubtedly has certain tendencies to affect that of the children. The minister's son, for example, has a flare for more emancipated occupations, but still retains some of the father's tendency to appraise rather than participate in the life of the community. Sociology is full of ministers' sons. These processes of selection may well be studied both by case studies of occupations and of families.

⁷ *Social Differentiation*, p. 235.

THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MOBILITY OF THE PERSON

The secularized division of labor is a most powerful mobilizer of persons. Durkheim stated this fact as one of the first order of importance among the effects of an increased division of labor upon social life.⁸

The persons who become commodities or functionaries in the division of labor are persons most of whom have been reared in families. In the family the person has acquired a set of social objects and attitudes more or less common to the community. To get into the occupational world, one must be mobilized. This mobilization, according to its degree, implies a removal from the base of one's morals. The study of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (Thomas and Znaniecki) shows nothing more clearly than that this removal ends in radical personality changes. Miss Remmelin, in her study of *The Itinerants*, suggested that the itinerant is, by his very itineracy, cut off from the more settled world over which he moves. These two examples represent, respectively, an extreme of initial movement and an extreme in degree of mobility in a given type of occupation. The essential fact of the mobilizing of the person for participation in economic life is only less, not different, in character in other and more common cases. The process of finding a place in competition with others is one involving a great deal of spatial movement in a world where urbanization is proceeding at a rapid rate. Professor Sorokin gives us statistics to show that in 1920 one-third of the people of the United States lived outside the states in which they were born. He assumed that the

⁸ Durkheim, *De la division du travail social*, 2d ed., p. xx. "For to live by a métier one must have clients, and he must sally forth from his house to find them; he must sally forth also to enter into relations with his competitors, to struggle against them, and to converse with them. Moreover, métiers suppose more or less directly, cities, and cities are always formed and recruited principally by means of immigrants who have quitted their *milieu natal*."

number living outside the communities in which they were born would be much higher.⁹

The general circulation of population over the face of the earth is continually putting individuals in countries whose language they do not know, and in whose social scheme they have no place. The effect of this mobilization on existing social groups is called, by students of family disorganization, atomizing of the family. One large family group shows the following mobilization of the children and grandchildren of one couple:

Seventeen sons and grandsons, and one granddaughter, distributed in 11 occupations. Resident in 10 states and 16 different cities. Each of those who has moved away from the home community has his social life essentially in the professional group to which he belongs in his present place of residence. One is a professor of chemistry in a state school; he has become an avowed agnostic; one is president of a Methodist college; he decries the un-Christian nature of education in state colleges. One grandson is a lawyer and politician; he is conservative Republican, a Philistine. His sister is a singer and actress; she is emancipated to the full. Four have remained farmers; they are in the home community, good Methodists, who do not smoke or swear. Practically all of those who have left home and changed occupation do both, varying in amount according to the professions in which they are engaged and the distance from home. In such a family all that is left in common is a memory. Each lives in a world made by his occupation, and is sensitive to his professional reputation rather than to his family one (private manuscript).

The Catholic clergy probably represents the most complete removal of the person from his *milieu natal* for professional life. In a West Side community in Chicago the writer became acquainted with a number of Irish families who had sons in a seminary. In each case the attitude of the family was one of conflict between pride at the son's achievement and heartbreak because of losing him. To quote from one father: "The wife is proud of the boy. But he breaks her heart. He ain't our boy any more. He doesn't talk to us the same way. He never stays home long, and when he

⁹ Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, p. 383.

does he seems like a stranger. We are going to keep the youngest home. We gave two to the church already."

The very process of making a priest is to envelop the candidate in the ecclesiastical world, definitely to limit even the number of letters he can write to his family, to give him a new formalized language; in short, to make a new person of him, with new definitions of his wishes. This does by discipline what sects attempt to do by conversion; namely, to erase the person's past so that he may be completely mobilized for carrying out his mission.

This cutting off of the person from his home base simultaneously with his entrance into an occupation, with his change from one occupation to another, or even from one job to another, is that characteristic phenomenon of the modern division of labor which carries with it personality change. The change is ordinarily more casual than the change from layman to priest, or from Pole to American. It may begin with a move from a rural to an urban community. Even if it be only the entrance into new groups in one's home community, it may lessen the contacts with the family, and the part of the family in determining one's social attitudes.

CLASSIFICATION OF UNITS IN THE DIVISION OF LABOR

We may make a rough classification of the types of places in the division of labor according to (1) the manner in which persons enter, (2) the attitude of the person to his occupation, and (3) the implied standing of the occupation in the eyes of the community. One may be born to his place. There are still hereditary titles and prerogatives. Some are born to a life of leisure, but without the assumption that their parents were so born, or that the person may be assured by society of this position.

1. Those occupations to which a person is called or converted we may call *missions*. The more violent the call or conversion, the less are the ethics within the occupational group. One may become

convinced that he is a servant with a special mission. The evangelist, for instance, proselytizes from the congregations of regular denominations; for these regular denominations have departed from the true faith. The missionary easily becomes a fanatic, inspired of God, having no earthly colleagues, and recognizing no one's salvation except his own. A remnant of this attitude may survive in old and well-established institutions. The Protestant minister vaguely hopes to convert the Catholics, and the priest rejoices over one Protestant soul brought into the fold. The missionary belongs to a cult, whether it be a healing, soul-saving, utopian social order cult, or a sacred branch of learning. Editors of organs of opinion acquire this sense of a mission. In such occupations a peculiar language and metaphysics are developed, which one may understand only when he has partaken of the emotional experience common to the group.

2. The *professions* and *near-professions*. The professions are entered by long training, ordinarily in a manner prescribed by the profession itself and sanctioned by the state. The training is assumed to be necessary to learning the science and technique essential to practice of the function of the profession. The training, however, carries with it as a by-product assimilation of the candidate to a set of professional attitudes and controls, a professional conscience and solidarity. The profession claims and aims to become a moral unit. It is a phenomenon of the modern city that an increasing number of occupations are attempting to gain for themselves the characteristics and status of professions.

3. The *enterprise* deals with a commodity. Sombart makes the point that the entrepreneur finds his function changing almost daily in the modern world. If he enters his business with the sense of a mission or of preserving some value to the world, he is in danger of being superseded by someone less hampered by traditional ideas. To carry on an enterprise it may be necessary for one to have long

training of the so-called "practical" sort. If this training makes the person unfit to engage in other enterprises, he becomes something of a professional.

4. The *arts* are presumably entered by a combination of a special talent or ability plus a training in a technique.

5. The *trades* are very close to the arts; so close that some of the arts are associating themselves with the trades for mutual protection. The trade is entered presumably by the acquisition of a certain skill.

6. Beyond these types are the occupations which are called *jobs*. The method of acquiring a job of the more casual sort is simply to present one's self at the proper time and place when manpower of a certain age, sex, and perhaps a certain grade of intelligence, is wanted. The hobo himself, for all of his reputed aversion to work, has an occupation. There are certain jobs for which he is fitted and for which he is wanted.

All of these classes of occupations may demand a degree of mobility. Certain specialists within these classes are especially mobile, as casual laborers, actors, ministers, etc. Others have a technique or skill which is presumably capable of being practiced anywhere, as medicine; but medicine as actually practiced depends on local and personal acquaintance. Others are limited to places where an appreciative client exists, as the artist, the minister, etc. Another important variable in occupations is the nature of the contact of its practitioners with each other, and the nature of competition.

SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR

Within some occupations there may be persons who represent any one of the foregoing types of units in the division of labor. Especially is this true in the world of business. These different degrees of devotion to the business or to one's function, different degrees of casuality, status, different degrees of sensitivity to one's

colleagues, represent different types. In the individual these are facts of his life-organization and of his personality.

In those who come to assume the professional attitude the occupation is represented both as a culture and a technique. The technique is developed with reference to certain objects or activities. The technique of the physician is in relation to the human body. It must be for him a different sort of object from what it is for the layman. To the layman it is a sacred thing, and an object of sentiment. To the real-estate man, real-estate law and the land itself are objects of technique. If he opposes change in real-estate law, it is not from sentiment, but as a matter of policy. In relation to its technique and the interests of those who use that technique, the occupational group tends to build up a set of collective representations, more or less peculiar to the occupation and more or less incomprehensible to the community. The interests, which the occupational group couches in a language more or less its own, are the basis of the code and policy of the occupational group. The code is the occupation's prescribed activity of the individuals within toward each other; the policy represents its relation to the community in which they operate. There is always a limit to the degree in which the code and policy of an occupation can deviate from the general culture of the community. Its members are products of a lay society. The practice of the occupation demands some degree of social sanction by the outside world.

This culture and technique, the etiquette and skill of the profession, appear in the individual as personal traits. The objects become to the individual a constellation of sacred and secular objects and attitudes. In general, we may say that the longer and more rigorous the period of initiation into an occupation, the more culture and technique are associated with it, and the more deeply impressed are its attitudes upon the person.

Some occupations are entered into and left so casually that no collective representations develop. But the casual worker himself, because of the very casual nature of his work, may develop certain characteristic traits. Although distinctly casual, waitresses seem to live together so much that they have developed a language and a set of social attitudes peculiar to themselves, individualistic though they be.¹⁰

PERSONALITY TYPES ON THE FRONTIER

The essential phenomenon of the frontier is a change in the division of labor. By extension of the frontier in China or India, we mean that those countries are being swept into a larger division of labor and that the hitherto local and self-sufficient division of labor is being destroyed or altered. In India, according to Messrs. Joshi and Wadia (*Money and the Money Market in India*), the nexus between the local world of India and the outside world is made by certain half-caste bankers or money-lenders, the *mahajan* and the *shroff*, who freely swindle the Indian peasant and who translate his crops into European bank credit. A Chinese student says there is a similar type of money-lender in China who literally sells his own people into the hands of the outside commercial world. In Western Canada Chinese are said to engage in the business of hiring men of their own nationality for Canadian employers of labor. These are personality types developed in the changing division of labor on a frontier. Such persons are without ethical or moral precedent. They are unscrupulous in that they operate to undermine the social and economic order of their peoples.

¹⁰ Donovan, *The Woman Who Waits*, p. 128. "The waitress is markedly individualistic in her attitude toward life, and the status of her occupation as it exists today tends toward the individualistic. She does only what she has to do to earn her wages, and her only real interest is in the tip. In her work she does not often consider the house, the manager, nor her fellow-workers, but herself only, and she seldom hesitates to advance her own interests at the expense of others."

THE PERSON IN THE NEW OCCUPATION

In his paper on ecology last year Dr. McKenzie introduced "the center of dominance." Among other things the center of dominance is the place of a very great division of labor. It is, likewise, a frontier in which new occupational types develop. Among these new types is the man of finance, for the center of dominance is a center of credit and finance. Sombart gives us a picture of this new type. The new type must upset the existing order.¹¹

When this new type, the financier, was just being developed, he was unscrupulous not only in his dealings with the outside world, but toward his competitors and colleagues as well. The biography of Daniel Drew,¹² one of the first operators on Wall Street, tells stories of boards of directors of corporations who betrayed the very companies they were supposed to represent. The life of Gary by Ida Tarbell tells something of the same story, and tells of the etiquette which in course of time this new element in economic life developed for their protection.¹³ As the occupation grows older it be-

¹¹ Sombart, *Hochkapitalismus*, p. 29. "The new men are as such free from the reference to the tradition of the family, of the business, of mercantile *Sitten*. Earlier large business lay mostly in the hands of aristocratic families with seignorial tendencies, who shied anxiously before unsound changes or makeshifts, who held the view that it is more honorable to preserve than to win, who therefore were 'neophobes,' filled with a predilection for tradition. That the *Sitten* and usages which regulated the individual merchant in his behavior were very strict stands in close relationship with the essentially traditionally minded entrepreneurship. From all these bonds and barriers the upstart is free; he transforms the world freely according to his purpose. . . . The old families live in the continuity of business. . . . The new men are unscrupulous."

¹² White, *The Book of Daniel Drew*.

¹³ Tarbell, *Gary*, p. v. "Judge Gary belongs to a group of powerful men who in the last fifty years have led in the creation in the United States of what we call Big Business. The most conspicuous of these leaders have been the elder Rockefeller in oil, the elder Morgan in banking, E. H. Harriman in railroads, and in the earlier half of the period, Andrew Carnegie in steel. The men of undoubted financial and commercial genius typified certain attitudes of mind toward business and were the

comes a social climber, bidding for a fixed or improved status in the community. The individuals in the occupation bear the marks of this social climbing. Once this status is gained, the individuals in it become "regulars," and the persons who attempt to break in with new techniques are in turn unscrupulous upstarts.

TYPES IN THE REAL ESTATE BUSINESS

The real-estate business is a comparatively new one. In its rather brief history it has gone through part of the cycle from an upstart, unscrupulous business to a settled, somewhat respectable one. We may illustrate the types of personality in a unit of the division of labor from the real-estate men of Chicago.

The realtor.—The "realtor," or regular real-estate man, represents the type who has been in the business longest. He thinks, moves, and has his being in the world of real estate. He is fairly well assimilated to a code of real-estate ethics or practice, supports the policies which the leaders of the business conceive to be for the ultimate welfare of the trade. The real-estate board is his club, and generally his only downtown club. It is among his fellows there that he has his professional or business status. He sponsors action to make it more difficult for others to get into the business and into the board. A few older member of the Chicago Real Estate Board have made almost a mission of their business, and in so doing have well-nigh lost their business. They are occupationally conscious and jealous. Their name is intended as an advertisement of their place in the real-estate world.

The real-estator.—The member of the Cook County Real Estate Board is poorer than the "realtor." He is perhaps less successful, and espouses the cause of democracy in real estate. He ac-

sponsors of practices and an etiquette essential to understand if we are to have a realizing and helpful sense of the actual development and meaning and potentiality of Big Business."

cuses the realtor of being a monopolist and a representative of "big interests." When he becomes more successful he usually becomes a "realtor."

The foreign-language agent.—He has a more casual connection with the real-estate business. He gets his business with people of his own nationality, and lives in part by accelerating foreign invasions of native communities. The collective representations of the organized real-estate world mean nothing to him. He lives in his own language group and capitalizes his acquaintance with this group. His neighbors are his clients.

The salesman.—The salesman is the casual of the real-estate business. His services are enlisted by ads which assure the prospect that no experience is necessary. According to the realtor, the salesman is the lowest order of the real-estate man. He came into the business because he could not get a job elsewhere. He stays only long enough to get an advance draft on commissions, and will not govern his occupational conduct in the interests of his employer or the real-estate business in general. Every salesman complains of mistreatment from his former employer and of "dirty deals" given him by his fellow-salesmen. He is the Ishmael of the business; like the waitress, he accuses his fellows of having stolen his tips, and proceeds to steal theirs. He considers the formulated codes of business as checks upon his enterprise.

The promoter or boomer.—The real-estate business in Chicago started in a land boom; the heads of now respectable and conservative firms were once boomers, as wild in their own day as the more recent boomers of Florida and Muscle Shoals. The boomer of today, however, is to them an upstart. He takes money from the sacred local market. The boomer, in turn, calls the conservative local real-estate man a selfish, short-sighted pig. This boomer or promoter is the functionary of the land mania. In manner, he is a salesman of the most high-pressure sort; what he happens to be

selling at the moment is merely incidental. His optimism turns itself with facility from one thing to another. His ethics are immediate expediency, and he is mobile, changing both the subjects and objects of his activity frequently. To him, likewise, restrictions of any sort put upon the business by law or the trade itself are a handicap.

The center of the real-estate business is occupied by a group of men whose fortunes, clientèle, and standing in the business are more or less secure. They are no longer upstarts. Their competitors are their bosom friends. To them, their real-estate board has become almost a religious organization; it is certainly a fraternity. To be president of that board is an objective to which they look forward when they are well on in their lives and careers. One could name a group of men in the Chicago Real Estate Board who considered it a religious duty to attend meetings of the Board, to serve on its committees, etc. They clearly sought status nowhere so much as in their business group.

Especially when an occupation develops its own institution for control of the occupation, and protection of its prerogatives, is it likely to develop what we may call a culture, an etiquette, and a group within which one may attain the satisfaction of his wishes. This etiquette may be more or less incomprehensible to the outside, or lay, world. The hobo or casual, on the other hand, develops a set of attitudes and wishes such that his wishes are satisfied, not at work, but away from it. He is none the less sensitive to the opinions of people of his own occupational sort, and he undoubtedly constitutes a personality type.

EVERETT CHERRINGTON HUGHES

THE RELATION OF THE FARMER TO RURAL AND URBAN GROUPS

The most striking phenomena of the group relations of the farmer are due to a lack of adjustment to new environmental conditions. A comparison of the group life of the farmer in the past with that under present conditions may reveal the trend of social change.

As a critical date dividing the past from the present, let us use the year 1900, for since then rural life has been revolutionized more radically by the rural free delivery, the telephone, the automobile, good roads, and the radio than in all the previous history of agriculture. Prior to 1900 the structure of rural life was chiefly determined by its relative isolation; since then this limitation has been very largely removed. Formerly the rural groups were those of the family and kinship, the neighborhood, the district school, the country church, the ladies' aid, and the local grange or farmers' club, all largely within the local neighborhood. They were personal or primary groups, involving the whole personality, and in the main were groups into which one was born rather than ones which were joined voluntarily. These groups were homogeneous and stable because of consanguinity and relative lack of mobility. The life and behavior of their members was largely molded by them. The neighborhood was distinctly self-conscious, but the rural community, at least in the sense in which we use the term today, as including the village center and surrounding farms, was rarely conceived as an entity. Prior to the general commercialization of agriculture American farms were largely self-sufficing, and, being isolated from each other, there was little reason for group activity except for an occasional exchange of work between neigh-

bors. Not until common marketing problems arose did American farmers form groups for business purposes. Formerly they competed against each other.

What is the significant difference in the present situation? In the first place let it be made clear that it is impossible to speak of "*the farmer*" for the whole United States. Our generalization of "*the farmer*" is a carryover from the days of the pioneer and the homesteader, when all were on much the same footing. But if we confine our attention to the northeastern United States it is true that the farmers of the second and third generation from the pioneers, the generation which Warren H. Wilson¹ has called the "household farmer," were much more undifferentiated than they are today. Although there were always considerable differences in economic and social status, in the past there was a greater similarity of status and a very general spirit of democracy among rural people. Unfortunately this often degenerated into a false sense of equality which frowned on anyone who became different from the group norm, and therefore prevented the growth of individuality and encouraged exceptional individuals to go to town or city where they might associate freely with others having like interests without being the subject of neighborhood gossip.

With better transportation and communication the neighborhood breaks down as a social unit and the rural community with the village as its center becomes a functional group. The decline of the neighborhood is due to its inability to meet the growing social desires of its people and also to the fact that owing to greater mobility the population is more demotic and has fewer ties. The church, the school, and the grange hall tend to locate in the village. On the other hand, community activities increase because of an increasing competition with the city with regard to matters educational, social, and economic. Modern transportation and com-

¹ Cf. *The Evolution of the Country Community*.

munication make possible the organization of rural life on a new basis. Although the farmer has increased association with the villager, and they both come to appreciate their interdependence, yet the farmer of ability and public spirit now assumes a place of leadership so long dominated by the villager because of his central location.

The automobile and the telephone make possible the organization and maintenance of many more groups than when contact was only occasional by the slow horse-drawn conveyance. This has been particularly noticeable in the business organization of agriculture. Doubtless the farm bureau and farmers' co-operative marketing associations might have developed without the automobile and telephone, but their growth would have taken much longer and it would have been impossible to conduct them with their present degree of efficiency.

The increase of voluntary associations of women and children is also a product of the new era and has a direct effect on the farm family. Whereas formerly the "ladies' aid" was almost the only organization for farm women, now they belong to farm-and-home bureaus, lodges, W.C.T.U.'s, parent-teacher associations, and various women's clubs, while the children belong to 4-H clubs, Boy and Girl Scouts, school athletic teams, etc. The effect of the larger association of farm women in these newer groups is most far-reaching. In them individual farm women receive a group support for new attitudes concerning home management and family relationships which do much to change their own lives and that of their families. Furthermore, on account of their greater concern for the welfare of their children, as they become aware of the social and civic problems of modern life, women are much more active than men in promoting social improvement, so that the new group life of rural women makes a very important change in the group relations of rural communities.

Just as the neighborhood has broken down as a rural social unit, so there is every indication that the hamlet or small village is now losing many of its functions to the larger village or town, particularly in the older-settled portions of the country where villages often grew up three or four miles apart, and in those sections where there has been a notable decline in rural population. The high schools locate in the larger villages and towns, and those who attend them form wider associations which they maintain, thus weakening the ties of the small community. Recent studies in Ohio,² Nebraska,³ and New York all indicate that the merchants of the smaller hamlets and villages are unable to compete with the larger places and that they are losing patronage. The rapid growth of chain stores in our smallest villages is one of the most striking changes in rural life. The old personal relationship to the local merchant who bought the farmer's produce and gave him credit as needed is being replaced by an impersonal relationship where each buys and sells on the best market. It seems probable that this process tends to the advantage of the larger villages and trade centers. The growing desire of farmers for moving pictures, automobile service, hospitals, libraries, etc., gives them increased contact with the larger places, for these services depend on a larger volume of business than the small village can secure.

The grange and the church still center in the smaller communities and serve rather restricted areas, though in many sections there is a tendency for the open-country church to be absorbed in that of the village. These facts seem to support the hypothesis that economic and public institutions tend to center in the larger

² Perry P. Denune, *The Social and Economic Relations of the Farmers with the Towns in Pickaway County, Ohio*, Ohio State University Studies, No. 9, 1927, Bureau of Business Research Monographs.

³ *The Influence of Automobiles and Good Roads on Retail Trade Centers*, Committee on Business Research of the College of Business Administration, University of Nebraska Studies in Business, No. 18.

villages, while the social agencies, those which involve the personal relations of intimate acquaintanceship, tend to remain in the smaller centers. Doubtless some of the reasons why farm people cling to these local groups for their social life is their lack of experience in larger groups and their inability to dress and spend on the same scale as those living in the larger villages. But if the standard of living of farm people continues to increase in the next generation or two as it has in the past, if an increasing percentage goes to high school, and if our economic system is so adjusted as to give the farmer a fair return for his products, then, with the better transportation now available, we shall doubtless see even those personal social groups extending over larger areas.

Another factor which tends to widen the farmer's area of association is his need for better marketing facilities. With the commercialization of agriculture, the growing domination of the city market, and the increased competition with other sections of this and foreign countries due to better means of transportation, farmers have been forced to organize into co-operative selling associations for the marketing of their products. It is now appreciated that to be successful these marketing associations must be built up from local units, but these local associations usually cover a larger area than the small local community, and the whole influence of these associations is to widen the farmer's contacts.

Swifter and easier transportation inevitably makes possible and tends to produce a stratification and segregation of rural society. In the same time that he could formerly go to the local village by horse the farmer can now go to a larger center three or four times as far away. Now this larger center draws from an area having from ten to fifteen times the population of the smaller community. It is possible, therefore, for the larger center to become the place of meeting of special-interest groups whose members may meet there with no more loss of time than formerly at the smaller cen-

ters. The same principle applies to the intervisitation of relatives and people of similar social status. It is now possible for a family to visit another ten miles away more easily than it could formerly drive two or three, and there is a tendency to visit those who are most congenial rather than to be limited to the immediate neighborhood or small community. This stratification of rural society is the same process which has occurred in the city, and will tend to increase rural civilization by giving greater freedom to the individual. It gives opportunity for association with others of special tastes and interests, and so must gradually give rise to a larger tolerance and appreciation of gifts and abilities and a decrease of the deadening attitude of the isolated community that all are equal and the desire to compel all to conform to the same pattern of behavior.

It might be feared that although this realignment of rural society is of obvious advantage to the status of the individual, it may lead to a scattering of associations and a weakening or breaking down of community ties. Doubtless there is a tendency in this direction, and we have as yet no accurate observations upon the facts, but there is ground for the belief that the increased socialization of those who have wider contacts will bring with it a sense of responsibility for the welfare of the local community which will thus retain their loyalty in spite of their outside interests, and will result in a more general socialization of the local community than would occur had it not had the benefit of the larger contacts of the few.

There seems no question that the smaller rural communities will be absorbed into larger ones which are able to support desired institutions and services, but it is not at all clear that the size of the functional community will be governed by the radius of easy accessibility by automobile. Rather it will probably be determined by the area giving a sufficient support to certain institutions, and yet not so large but that more or less personal acquaintanceship and the characteristics of a primary group may be maintained.

Although there has been considerable mobility among farmers, the rate of mobility will probably decrease in the future, for successful farming must be more or less permanent. A farmer cannot move every year or two and succeed, as may the townsman. The farmer's associations are therefore more permanent. He has more relatives in the community, a larger percentage of whom have been born and raised in the same community. Furthermore, the local community is held together by the common vocation of most of its people and by the fact that they are increasingly compelled to act collectively for the successful conduct of their business. There is a tendency, therefore, for the farmer to cling to groups within an area in which he has personal acquaintance, which will probably coincide very largely with the functional community area. For these reasons it is doubtful whether there will ever be as marked class differences in the country as in the city.

The effect of the segregation of those of similar social status may, however, already be seen in many rural sections, as, for example, in church relationships. It is a matter of common knowledge that since the war there has been a considerable increase of small groups of minor religious sects, such as the Church of the Nazarene, Pentecostal Holiness, Holy Rollers, and various fundamentalist groups. No adequate study has been given this movement, but it seems evident that in most cases these groups are composed of marginal people who, because of educational, social, and economic status, do not find the established churches congenial. They arise in the "interstitial" or unsocialized areas of rural society. Thus in the intellectual, social, and religious spheres the relations of rural people are becoming more voluntary, freer, and less controlled by custom; but in the economic sphere, the chief area of social conflict with the city, social control is tightening, and the farmer, like the trade-union man of the city, is being forced to act collectively for the maintenance of his economic interests.

With the increasing complexity and organization of rural life the individual is freed from customary control, but if satisfactory rural civilization is to exist he must be brought to participate voluntarily and intelligently in more associations than in the past. If he remains isolated he is a drag on the standard of life of the whole community. This means that much more active effort must be made by all agencies toward the socialization of the individual. It also means that the more successful farmers will have to give more time to the leadership of group activities than in the past. Only the farmer who is economically successful can afford to give much time to group leadership. The question is whether those economically successful will have sufficient interest in agriculture and rural life to work for its interests, or will they retire to town and village, or sell out their ability to other interests, as trade-union leaders have so often done. A study of seventy-four "master farmers" of the Middle West made by Dr. Eben Mumford⁴ shows that "in not a single instance is the interest of these farmers confined to their home and to the farm, but they are also members of several kinds of organizations in their community, county, and state, and they belong to and actively support a much higher number of community organizations than the average farmer. Moreover, they are not merely members of these organizations, but are now or have been officers of several of them and have assumed much of the responsibility for their success." There is every reason to believe that farmer leadership is developing as rapidly as can reasonably be expected and that it will show the same loyalty as that which has characterized the agrarian movement in other countries.

Turning now to the relation of the farmer to the city, it seems safe to assert that in the past he has rarely been a member of any urban groups and has had little to do with the city directly. In the past the city has dominated the countryside, and although the city

⁴ *Farm Income and Farm Life* (Ed. by Dwight Sanderson), pp. 142, 143.

has been the cradle of civilization and has brought to the countryman a higher standard of living, yet on the whole the city has amassed wealth through the exploitation of the country through military, political, and economic power, as so well described by Oppenheimer.⁵ In the past, therefore, the city and the farm have been in conflict.

At present, however, a new integration of economic and cultural areas tributary to city centers seems to be commencing, and a new understanding of their interdependence is being developed between the city and its hinterland. We witness the beginning of the countryman having a place in urban groups. This general process seems to involve two fundamental movements: The first may, for convenience, be called the growth of *regionalism*, while the second may be termed *rural urbanization*.

It is becoming evident that the continued growth of our larger metropolitan cities has no sound economic basis, and the idea of decentralizing industry is already being advocated by hard-headed business men. At the same time we are seeing the advantage of promoting regional economic areas rather than further encouraging the tendency toward regional specialization. Thus France has organized her business interests into a series of regional chambers of commerce, each fostering and promoting the economic life of its own area, while in this country we have recognized this principle in the organization of the Federal Reserve banking system, and we see the migration of the textile and shoe industries from New England and the packing industry from Chicago. Is it not probable that in the long run the relatively self-sufficient economic system of France organized in autonomic economic units will be more successful than the highly specialized and unbalanced economy of Great Britain? There seems to be a tendency to strengthen the functional economic areas, which will result in a strengthening of

⁵ Franz Oppenheimer, *The State*.

the ties between the urban centers of those regions and their tributary territory.

At the same time the city is having an increased place in the life of the countryside; there is a definite rural urbanization. Farm and village people now read city papers; they buy their good clothes and furniture in the cities; and they go to the cities for movies and other forms of entertainment. They have become part of the city "public" if they have not entered city groups. But the relation of rural people to the small cities, such as the county seats or small industrial centers of 5,000-25,000 inhabitants, is even more intimate and tends to increase with the rising standard of living of the farmer. A rapidly increasing percentage of the rural population adjacent to these cities is composed of city workers.

In a very suggestive article entitled "The Indivisible Utility," Miss Mary Austin⁶ has called attention to the unifying power of the common dependence of southwestern communities on irrigation, and she has offered some very keen observations concerning the application of this principle to the evolution of rural life. May we not see the beginnings of this "indivisible utility" in the trade facilities which the small city now furnishes its tributary area, in the county hospital with its clinics, in the county library system,

⁶ Mary Austin, "The Indivisible Utility," *Survey Graphic* (December 1, 1925), pp. 301-6, 327: "If there is any hope that a superior type of civic attachment may be evolved on American soil it can only be in those communities which cannot even come into existence except by a prearranged community of *interest*, patterned around the indivisible utility. . . ."

"Possibly the destruction of rural life in the eastern United States—which, if you examine it in the light of your own reactions and mental images, means the destruction of the self-sustaining farm-complex—is nothing like so despairful a probability as it appears in some quarters. It may be merely the decay of an otherwise insuperable barrier to the reformation of the town-and-country complex on the basis that the whole sum of civilization, science, art, and the social impetus constitutes, for the temperate zone farmer, an indivisible and indispensable utility which will bring him at last completely into the community."

and in the theatrical and musical entertainments for whose maintenance it needs the patronage of its rural communities? The time was when the farmer would have thought it quite utopian to dream of going to the city one or two evenings a week for moving pictures. Once a year to the circus was a never-to-be-forgotten event for the average farm boy. The day will come when the city will be an aesthetic center whose theater, music, and fine art will be patronized by the people of the open country just as today they support the annual circus. The development of this "indivisible utility" between farm and city seems to be directly dependent upon the ability of the farmer to enjoy a higher standard of living. With the better organization of farmers so that they may be in a position to more or less control the volume of their products and to bargain collectively for the price they receive, and with a relative under-production of farm products which will raise the price-level to that of other industries, the farmers of the next generation will insist upon enjoying more and more of the cultural advantages heretofore confined to the cities, and with their support many a small city will be able to maintain institutions not now possible. A better understanding between farmers and the small city is also developing through the better organization of farmers which gives them a tangible means of representation. When groups of farmers are doing a considerable business in buying and selling they are included in the business life of the small city the same as any other group; and when farm women are organized for various lines of domestic, civic, and social betterment they become part of a unit composed of city and country members. Already in many small cities we find leading farmers members of various luncheon clubs or of the chamber of commerce, and county farmers' organizations meet in the cities and are part of their life. Of course these tendencies are stronger in the strictly agricultural regions of the

country, but as they develop there they will extend to the more highly industrialized regions. Ultimately the rural areas tributary to every city should have a definite relation to the organized group life of the city. In the past the farmer has been unable to take a place in the group life of the city because he has not had the advantage of experience in association which the city man has enjoyed; but since transportation has made possible effective farmers' organizations, and since farmers are having the advantage of secondary and higher education, they are developing leaders who can take their place in conferences and organizations composed of urban and rural interests, as do the leaders of city groups.

The antagonism of the farmer to the city has in the past been chiefly due to fear and a sense of inferiority. Organization and education now make it possible for representative farmers to meet the representatives of business and industry with a feeling of equality. For the first time in history rural people have a chance successfully to challenge urban domination. There is no more fundamental basis of conflict between farmer and city man than between manufacturer and laborer, or laborer and merchant, within the city, and in both cases progress lies in the strong organization of each interest so that it may bargain effectively with the other, and gradually each may come to see that its greatest good is to be achieved only through their mutual adjustment to the common welfare.

The day of rural isolation is past. Any effort to segregate rural from urban life is a vain attempt to stem the tide of progress. There are values in urban civilization which when rightly used will make rural life much more congenial, as there are values in country life which are essential to the happiness, health, and sanity of our increasing city population. Increased contacts with cities means a larger life for rural people. Nevertheless, owing to the relation of

successful agriculture to the land, there will be a greater permanency of rural locality groups, and rural people will find a satisfaction in the personal groups of their own local communities which will not be filled by the broader but less personal associations in the urban centers. The progress of rural civilization depends upon the extent to which its people obtain the advantages of urban associations and yet remain loyal to the fundamental values of farm life and to promoting the socialization of their local communities.

DWIGHT SANDERSON

HOTEL LIFE AND PERSONALITY

I. STATISTICS OF HOTELS AND THE HOTEL POPULATION

Hotels.—The Bureau of the Census compiles no statistics of hotels or of the hotel population.¹ The Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes the number of new hotels based on building permits in representative cities of the United States, but its reports do not indicate what is meant by the term "hotel" or whether it is defined identically in all of these cities.² Hotel directories afford an unofficial source for statistical data, but each directory defines its subject matter in a different way. Hotel associations do not include all hotels as members.

The unofficial and obviously incomplete statistics released in August, 1922, by the Hotel Association of New York City give a total of only 22,760 hotels in the United States, but the Chicago classified telephone directory for 1921 shows 478 hotels, not counting duplications, as compared with 112 in the Hotel Association's list. Many of the places listed as hotels in the telephone directory were probably ruled out by the so-called "legitimate" hotel man as

¹ Based on a letter to the writer from W. M. Steuart, director, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C.

² The reports of the Bureau of Labor Statistics also include tables showing the number and percentage of families provided for in new multi-family dwellings as compared with new one-family and two-family dwellings in identical cities. Although these figures are for apartment houses rather than hotels, they indicate that the trend is definitely toward multiple dwellings and wholesale housekeeping. The percentage of families provided for in new one-family dwellings during the first six months of 1927 decreased to 32.6 as compared with 43.4 during the same period of 1922. The percentage provided for in new multi-family dwellings during the same periods increased from 34.6 to 53.8 (*Monthly Labor Review* [October, 1927], p. 90). See the writer's article on "Hotel Homes" in *Sociology and Social Research* (November-December, 1927, pp. 124-31) for a discussion of the movement from homestead to hotel and its significance for the family.

merely rooming-houses or houses of ill repute. For San Francisco, however, the incompleteness is more pronounced: 149 hotels according to the New York hotel men, 1,330 licensed hotels and lodging-houses (1924) according to official count.

An unpublished study of the *American Hotel Book and Supply Directory* for 1925, supplemented and checked by the *Official Hotel Red Book and Directory* for 1925, shows that San Francisco ranks first among the twenty largest cities in the United States in the number of hotel rooms it provides in proportion to its population. Seattle and Los Angeles rank second and third, respectively. These three Pacific Coast cities have approximately three times as many hotel rooms for their populations as New York or Chicago.³ This suggests a greater mobility of population in the Far West than in the Middle West or East.

The hotel population.—Definite information about the hotel population in general is not available. To be adequate, statistics of this kind should not only give a cross-section of this mobile group at a given time, but should also measure weekly and seasonal fluctuations and those sudden inroads of population that come with a big convention. Approximately 3,500 "international, national, state, and interstate conventions, exhibitions, and fairs" may be expected in the course of a year.⁴

³ The exact number of persons to each hotel room in the twenty largest cities in the United States (1920), as determined by this study, was as follows:

City	Number of Persons to Each Hotel Room	City	Number of Persons to Each Hotel Room
San Francisco.....	25.2	Chicago.....	96.1
Seattle.....	30.8	Cleveland.....	102.8
Los Angeles.....	32.3	Buffalo.....	120.9
Washington, D.C.....	40.7	Milwaukee.....	121.4
Kansas City.....	43.7	Pittsburgh.....	136.9
Indianapolis.....	56.7	New Orleans.....	147.4
Boston.....	70.1	Philadelphia.....	223.3
Detroit.....	78.6	Baltimore.....	238.0
Cincinnati.....	79.4	St. Louis.....	329.9
New York.....	89.1	Newark.....	363.0

⁴ *World-Convention Dates*, August, 1922.

In order to get definite statistics on the hotel population for this paper, the writer directed a student survey of all the hotels in Seattle, using this city as a sample. Seattle presents a situation favorable to the gathering of such statistics. The state of Washington requires an annual inspection of hotels and the fee charged for this is based on the number of bedrooms. The hotel is defined legally in this state as any building or dwelling which contains five bedrooms to be rented out to transient guests, i.e., by the day or the week. Although this definition includes a number of apartment, boarding-, and rooming-houses that are not hotels, strictly speaking, it is significant sociologically because it stresses mobility of population. As compared with the area in which the hotel is located its population is always relatively transient.⁵

The Seattle survey was made during the month of November, 1927. This month does not represent a low or a high period in hotel business, nor was there any large convention in Seattle at the time. The results may consequently be taken as typical. The total number of places listed as hotels in the inspector's files and found by investigation to be actually in operation was 437.⁶ There was a total of 27,012 bedrooms in these hotels, or one hotel room for every 11.7 individuals in the 1920 population (315,652). In 247 of these hotels, with a total of 15,462 rooms, the house counts⁷ on

⁵ The hotel guest need remain only one month to be designated as "permanent."

⁶ The New York Hotel Association credits Seattle with only 74 hotels. Another interesting point is that 125 of these 437 hotels, with an aggregate of 8,957 rooms, are members of the Japanese Hotel Association. There are also forty more small hotels operated by Japanese that are not members of the association. In sixty-eight of the associated Japanese hotels all the guests are white; in fifty-one they are of various races, with whites predominating in thirty-one, Japanese in eleven, Filipinos in six, Chinese in two, and Negroes in one; in two the guests are all Negroes; in only four are they all Japanese.

⁷ The house count refers to the total number of persons sleeping in the hotel on a given day.

the day previous to investigation totaled 13,030, or 84.3 per cent of the number of rooms.

Arranged from the largest to the smallest, the total house counts on each day in the week for fifty-eight Seattle hotels were as follows: (1) Saturday, 4,139; (2) Sunday, 3,827; (3) Friday, 3,570; (4) Monday, 3,314; (5) Thursday, 3,304; (6) Wednesday, 3,303; (7) Tuesday, 3,259. Fifty-nine other hotels specified that business was better over the week-end, without giving details. Apparently some individuals in Seattle's hinterland like to spend the week-end in the metropolis.⁸

Seattle experiences a flood of tourists during the summer, and this period is also a popular season for conventions. These invasions tend to increase the house count and percentage of transiency in the better-class hotels. In winter these same hotels may have as many guests, but the percentage of permanents is higher. Cheap hotels exhibit the reverse in seasonal fluctuations. With the exception of a short period of lively business before and after the Fourth of July, winter is the big season. During that period the migratory returns to the "skidroad" area of the metropolis. A study of the daily house counts in a typical workingman's hotel over the period of a year (1926) indicates that December and January are the peak months, with the hotel filled to capacity during Christmas week. During the remainder of the year this hotel averages a house count of only three-fifths its capacity.

Table I shows the composition of the hotel population in Seattle as determined by an analysis of 220 schedules in which the data seemed to be complete and accurate.

⁸ The 365-room Nelson House in Rockford, Illinois, eighty-six miles from Chicago, is usually filled to capacity Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, while over the week-end the number of guests sometimes drops as low as fifty. A city as far west as Dubuque, Iowa, is said to feel the pull of Chicago over the week-end. Travelers do not care to spend Sunday in a smaller center. In fact, the length of time a transient guest will stay in a given place seems to vary directly with the size of the city.

It is interesting and significant that there were two and one-half times as many couples without children as couples with children in these 220 hotels. In only twenty hotels does the number of families, i.e., couples with children, exceed the number of childless couples, and ten of these are Japanese.⁹ This suggests that the hotel is a natural habitat for the "companionate," which has been defined by M. M. Knight as "the state of lawful wedlock, entered

TABLE I
COMPOSITION OF THE HOTEL POPULATION IN SEATTLE

Class	Number	Percentage
Total house count.....	10,961	100
Males.....	7,854	71.8
Females.....	3,107	28.3
Couples with children.....	226
Couples without children.....	594	10.8
	(1,188 individuals)	
Lone* males.....	7,000	63.9
Lone* females.....	2,156	19.7
Guests over 60.....	784	7.2
Children under 12.....	203	1.9

* This means living alone. In most cases these guests are also single, i.e., unmarried.

into solely for companionship, and not contributing children to society." There is, however, nothing in the schedules to indicate whether these couples without children were married or unmarried.

The fact that one-fifth of the total number of guests in this table are listed as lone females is an index to the growing freedom and independence of woman.¹⁰ In the city of Seattle as a whole there were, according to the 1920 census, 47,951 children under ten years and 68,498 under fifteen years, or 15.2 per cent and 21.7

⁹ Sixty-seven, or about one-half of the associated Japanese hotels, are operated by "husband and wife incorporated." In such cases the proprietor's children usually live in the hotel.

¹⁰ This point is discussed in greater detail later in the paper.

per cent, respectively, of the population for which the age was known (315,312). In other words the percentage of children is nine times as great in the general population of Seattle as in its hotel population.

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF HOTEL LIFE

Impersonality and detachment.—In the metropolitan hotel the guest is only a number. His mark of identification is a key and his relation to the host is completely depersonalized. His status, in so far as he has any, is almost entirely a matter of outward appearance and "front." The bellboy and waiter judge a guest largely by the size of tip he is likely to yield. Even the barbers look at him in a cold, hungry, calculating way. The personal hospitable relation between landlord and guest in the inns and taverns of the past has been replaced by impersonality and standardized correctness. The huge hostelrys of our great cities have all the comforts and luxuries that science can devise; but they have lost, as have many other institutions, the friendly individuality of an earlier day.

The modern hotel dweller is characteristically detached in his interests from the place in which he sleeps. Although physically near the other guests, he is socially distant. He meets his neighbors, perhaps, but does not know them. "One may be ill and die without producing a ripple on the surface of the common life. One loses his identity as if a numbered patient in a hospital or a criminal in a prison."¹¹

But the human being is like a vine. He is made to have attachments and to tie onto things. If the tendrils are broken it is a great

¹¹ From the unpublished hotel experience of a woman who has resided transiently in some three hundred hotels and stayed for brief periods in about two hundred more. It is interesting in this connection that a study of *Suicides in Seattle*, by Calvin Schmid (soon to be published), indicates that over 50 per cent of the suicides in the downtown area occurred in hotels or rooming-houses.

loss. Hotel dwellers have, to a large extent, broken these attachments, not only to things and to places, but to other people. They are free, it is true; but they are often restless and unhappy. "At home I should have felt relaxed and happy; here I am always restless unless quite exhausted."¹²

I have traveled a good deal, but never learned to enjoy life in a hotel. I recall when I was a boy sitting on the balcony of the old Merchant's Hotel in St. Paul, enjoying a delightful sense of utter loneliness, watching the crowd pass by on the pavement and reflecting how utterly indifferent they were to all my joys and sorrows. I felt so bad about it that I wept.

I have never got over this feeling of utter loneliness whenever I have been condemned to live for any length of time in a hotel. I am always timid and self-conscious when I enter a hotel and feel myself assessed and tagged and chucked away in one of its luxurious cells.¹³

Comfort and freedom.—Now it is just this anonymity and impersonality which make the hotel "the most lonely place in the world" that make it also free. So long as the guest preserves the conventions he may do as he pleases and no one will object. School teachers seem to enjoy this freedom. This is particularly true in the West, where there is not the stigma attached to hotel life for young women that persists in the East. In a hotel the lights are always on if they come home late, and no one will ask questions; they can sleep late Saturday morning without being disturbed by children drumming on the piano; the water is always hot; there is an abundance of linen; the room is always warm; life is luxuriously comfortable. "The main disadvantage is that you have little chance to show any originality in selecting your surroundings. One hotel bedroom is very like another; meals are surprisingly uniform,

¹² From a long manuscript written by a young woman who with her mother was "forced" to spend four months in a residential hotel. She disliked the hotel when she first came, but at the end of four months, in spite of a protesting conscience, she liked it—the idleness, the heat, the comfort, the "cushy" life.

¹³ Excerpt from an unpublished hotel experience.

even when chosen from an *à la carte* menu; there is no friendly, intimate method of entertaining one's friends; and one is very much in the public eye."¹⁴

Among the many other types of people who enjoy the luxurious comfort and freedom of hotel living, the writer has been particularly impressed by the relatively large number of Jews. In *The Ghetto*, Louis Wirth writes:

The latest avenue of escape from the Ghetto is represented by the rapid influx of Jews into the apartment and residential hotels of Chicago, particularly of Hyde Park and the North Shore. So popular have these hotels become with the Jewish population that a "Jewish Hotel Row" is rapidly springing up. The middle-class business men among the Jews moved into these hotels originally not merely because their wives wanted to be free from household duties; nor merely because they had reached a station in life where they could afford the luxuries of hotel life; but rather because they wished to be taken for successful business or professional men—not merely successful Jews. The hotels offered anonymity; they offered freedom from ritual and the close supervision of the intimate community. Here one could be one's self, and, if one spent a little occasionally on parties, dinners, and entertainment, and if one "Americanized" one's name and put up a good front by playing golf and being a good sport, one could get to know the best people and break into gentile society.¹⁵

III. PERSONALITY PATTERNS IN THE HOTEL ENVIRONMENT

Release from restraints.—Many of the guests in New York's great hotel center come to the metropolis for a good time—something more thrilling and exciting than the drab monotony of the small town. Stopping temporarily in these hotels are also travelers from all parts of the world and with varied backgrounds. "In the Times Square district of a hundred city blocks bounded by Twenty-eighth and Forty-eighth streets, Park and Eighth avenues, there

¹⁴ From the unpublished manuscript of a traveling librarian who also exclaims, "I do not know of any place in the world where one feels more independent."

¹⁵ Doctor's thesis, University of Chicago, 1926, chap. xii.

are ninety hotels accommodating 26,824 guests a day. A stream of more than 30,000 people register at these hotels every week."¹⁶

Decadence of tradition is a significant aspect of the freedom and detachment that comes with a visit to the metropolis. Although a certain formal etiquette—a kind of mechanical correctness—tends to develop in the better-class hotels, the “mores,” that part of our tradition which is thought to involve the general welfare, tend to break down in the hotel environment. “We are dependent for moral health upon intimate association with a group of some sort, usually consisting of family, neighbors, and other friends,” writes Professor Cooley. “It is the interchange of ideas and feelings with this group, and a constant sense of its opinions, that make standards of right and wrong seem real to us.” Released from the bonds of restraint operative in smaller and more intimate circles, the individual tends to act in accordance with his impulses rather than after the pattern of the ideals and standards of his group. Among the heavy offenders for stealing hotel property are listed “men and women who in their own communities command respect, but who, on going to a hotel, take a ‘moral holiday’”:¹⁷ “Apparent-

¹⁶ *The World Survey* by the Interchurch World-Movement of North America, revised preliminary edition, American volume, p. 53.

The relation between the theaters on the Great White Way and this great fluctuating hotel population is intimate and significant. To draft a paying audience from this aggregation and at the same time retain the patronage of the tired business man and commuters of the great city calls for an appeal to fundamental passions. The problem before the theater manager is similar to that before the editors of metropolitan newspapers in their attempts to increase circulation, and the answer in both cases is the same, namely, make the appeal elementary enough so that even the feeble-minded will be interested. One significant result of this situation is that the type of performance which is successful on the Great White Way is passed on to smaller centers. “Broadway dominates the theater circuits of the country” (see John Collier, “Before the Footlights,” *Survey* [July 3, 1915], and also “The Theatre of Tomorrow,” *Survey* [January 1, 1916]).

¹⁷ Austin G. Denniston, “Curbing the Souvenir-Taker,” *Hotel Management* (May, 1922), pp. 149-50. Mr. Denniston was house officer at Hotel McAlpin, New

ly there are people who leave their manners and even their morals at home when they travel. Others seem to forget to take their wits with them. But there are some whose good breeding is so much a part of them that even the maid who 'does' their rooms gives a sigh of regret when she finds that they have gone."¹⁸

A questionnaire sent by *Hotel Management* to "five hundred representative hotels of all classes in all parts of the country" indicates that towels and demi-tasse spoons are the most popular "souvenirs."¹⁹ But more important sociologically is the fact that the larger and more transient the hotel the greater the "souvenir problem" tends to be. In the residential hotel the guests stay longer and are likely to be known by the management, but in a huge metropolitan hostelry like Hotel Pennsylvania in New York, the social situation is more impersonal, transitory, and anonymous.²⁰

Hotel men "surely come in contact with life in all its streaked regalia," and some of them, like some newspaper men, become cynical and disillusioned. They have caught prohibitionists drunk and reformers with women. Responsible citizens and good patrons of the hotel have "parties" in their rooms and bring in alcohol. Fighting and destruction of furniture, rugs, and fixtures frequently follows. "One hotel preserves photographs of the interior of a hotel room after a Princeton student, the son of a rich man, held a party

York, when he wrote this article, and has been "in the game" thirty-five years. He describes the "souvenir habit" as including "everything from the taking of a carnation from the lobby bouquet to the theft of hundreds of dollars' worth of silver and linen at a time."

¹⁸ Gray Allison, "The Queer Things Guests Leave—and Take," *American Magazine* (January, 1924).

¹⁹ "How to Thwart Hotel Thieves," *Hotel Management* (November, 1922, and January, 1923). Towels were reported as the most popular souvenir in 147 Seattle hotels.

²⁰ About 2,000 face towels and about 300 bath towels a month is the reported loss from Hotel Pennsylvania.

there. Every breakable thing was smashed. Even the tiles in the bathroom and the plumbing fixtures were torn out."²¹

Overstimulation and urbanity.—The individual who lives continually in hotels tends to become either blasé or urbane. "I do not like to be unkind or snobbish," writes a temporary guest in a large and fashionable residential hotel, "but I have never seen such people as the majority I see here—so cheap and ostentatious in appearance—the faces a vacuum." But on the other hand if the number and variety of stimulations to which the individual responds are not too great, he will develop an immunity to them and instead of becoming blasé or overstimulated he will become urbane, poised, sophisticated, mature. Thus the individual may gradually accommodate himself to "living in public, eating in public, and all but sleeping in public."

While the men living in residential hotels of the better class are usually very busy persons, the women, for the most part, find that time is their own to do with as they please. Some women in hotels are employed, as indicated before; a few are interested in charities and social reform; a very few have children; but many are like hobos, they have no vocation. They, too, have gained their freedom, but lost their direction.²²

The following conversation took place between a waiter and a guest in an exclusive North Shore "hotel home" in Chicago.

"You do not wish bread tonight, madam?"

"Not bread and potato, too. That makes me fat."

"Ha, ha. The ladies are all afraid to get fat."

"And the men! Are not they also afraid?"

²¹ Herbert Corey, "What the Hotel Men Think of Us," *Colliers*, LXXV (February 14, 1925), 15. In answer to a query as to what kinds of hotel property are most frequently destroyed by guests, Seattle hotel men emphasized the damage done to bedding, furniture, and carpets by burning tobacco, especially cigarettes. The explosive behavior of sailors while on shore leave was also deprecated.

²² See Robert E. Park, "The Mind of the Rover," *World Tomorrow*, September, 1923.

"Oh, no. The men, they work hard. They do not get fat. But the ladies! They sit and play cards; they sit and talk. All the time they just do this and so they get fat."

The men who patronize the better-class hotels are to a large extent men of affairs. They commonly regard the hotel as a convenience, a thing to be used. It is one of the great machines that serve men in this iron age. Such men are molded in character and personality more by the special profession or business in which they are engaged than by their place of temporary abode. Traveling about a great deal undoubtedly makes men more sophisticated, but it is usually an aspect of their occupation. They are usually traveling somewhere. They tend to make use of their experiences and are not mental rovers.

The influence of hotel life on the developing personality is well illustrated in "The True Story of a Hotel Child."²³ Although the writer of this interesting article calls herself a child, she is really twenty-seven years old; "and even for twenty-seven I have the maturity and poise that living in public gives both men and women." "What I am is a hotel child," she continues. "I am a product of the hotel, just as surely as one speaks of a southerner or New Englander, or as a girl bears the imprint of a certain school or college."

As a child she came to understand "certain aloofnesses and social differences between ladies in the hotel—certain abrupt departures and looks of intelligence" exchanged between her mother and other women. "In fact, I suffered as a sensitive child must suffer through coming at knowledge prematurely. It affects, I suppose, each child differently. Some children have a morbid curiosity aroused by learning too early the difference between good and evil. Others it wounds deeply and makes them draw into themselves, and this is what happened to me."

²³ "The True Story of a Hotel Child—An Autobiography," *The Designer* (April, 1922).

The extent to which this hotel child and her mother became accommodated to the hotel environment is indicated in the following statement:

Only three times have we had what could be called a home of our own. Three different times we rented a furnished house; and I will say that the use of other people's furniture, the servant problem and the matter of meals, and the general discomfort which resulted from my mother and myself not knowing how to cope with the situation—and I suppose not taking the pains to learn, because we knew that after all we would return to our real home, a hotel—make housekeeping all seem much less homelike, if I know what the term means, than when we go back to some hotel where we are well known, and where we have the same little suite that we are accustomed to, and where we are waited on by willing bellboys and smiling chambermaids whose comings and goings do not disturb the economy of our family.

On the basis of the foregoing analysis four types of personality patterns seem to be distinguishable. In some cases a restless, lonesome, unhappy state of mind is the result. Such a person finds it difficult to adjust himself and satisfy his wishes in the anonymous, impersonal atmosphere of the hotel, and may never be able to do so. The second type is perhaps best described by the term "individuation," i.e., free play of impulses when released from restraint. The resulting behavior ranges in nature from a mere "good time" to an explosive "blowout." The third pattern represents a response to the stimulations and excitements that tend to be associated with life in a hotel. The personalities in this group tend to be blasé and overstimulated. Ennui and "blank faces" are characteristic. The tendency seems to be, however, toward the development of immunity to the influences of the hotel environment, and this accommodation is best described as sophistication or urbanity. Thus, after long experience with hotels, the individual may become so accustomed to this environment that, as in the case just cited, he may feel that his "real home" is a hotel.

NORMAN S. HAYNER

THE FAMILY AND THE PERSON

The historical family has been recognized by all students in the social sciences as an institution; indeed, as the original institution. In comparison, other institutions, as the school, the church, industry, and even the state, may be regarded as subsequent and derivative.

Historically, as these and other institutions have evolved, the family has lost one by one its original collective activities, until the question may be raised whether the modern family is any longer an institution. Is it now anything more than a mere unity of interacting personalities?

Certainly the modern family of husband and wife and three, two, one, or no children, living in a rear apartment on the tenth floor of a skyscraper apartment in New York City, is a family in a somewhat different sense from the large Chinese kinship group of grandparents, married sons and their wives and children, sixty-odd in number, living for twenty generations in one large household worshipping the same ancestral gods and obedient to the one recognized family head. The Chinese family seems, at first glance, to be an institution in a degree and in a sense which the modern family is not.

Psychiatrists and psychoanalysts who by reason of their treatment of behavior problems of individuals have been led into the study of family relationships are preconditioned to treat, as they do, of family life as a state of emotional harmony or of emotional conflict of its component individuals. Count Hermann Keyserling, of the school of wisdom (who is not a psychiatrist, but a philosopher), in his article "The Correct Statement of the Marriage Problem," defines marriage as "essentially a tragic state of tension."

→ These two cursory references are sufficient to indicate the large group of biologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, and others who look upon the modern family as a collection of individuals temperamentally compatible or incompatible, emotionally in harmony or in conflict.

It is evident that an institution means more than mere temperamental or emotional solidarity. The family as an institution is the form of relationships between husband and wife, parents and children, sanctioned, if not prescribed, by society. These rôles that constitute the family are, in fact, cultural patterns, and, like all cultural patterns, have a history and are subject to social change. At the same time these familial rôles are idealized by the members of the family. The stern but just father, the loving and prudent mother, the dependable and honest son, the dutiful and virtuous daughter are ideals toward which conduct is directed and by which shortcomings are measured.

→ Thus it comes about that the family as an institution performs what seems to be a double function, but what actually is a unitary function. The family still remains the chief social agency both for transmitting the cultural heritages from the older to the younger generation and for the development of the personality of its members. It is, indeed, in the circumstances of this cultural transmission and in the interaction of the family and its members with the environing community that modifications and conditionings of the personality of all the members of the family take place. Herein for the family lies the significance of the definition by Thomas of personality as "the subjective aspect of culture."

It is not only that in the family its members assume rôles consistent with the cultural tradition, and in which they feel a vested personal interest, but the family itself sets up claims and obligations which tend to become sacred and to transcend the rights and even the individuality of its members.

This brief introductory statement is preliminary to the presentation of a life-history in which the influence of the family in its interrelations with the community upon the development of the personality may be more concretely stated and perhaps more simply and clearly defined. One document was selected in preference to reading extracts from several documents in order to give a longer perspective of personal growth. Clues to interpretation, however, are derived in part from similar and different cases. The following life-history is that of Marie, the daughter of a German-American family who lived in several culturally different communities, some German-American, and others native American. The interaction of the family and its members to these variable cultural environments provides the setting for the personal development of the child.

The first childhood memories often focus upon conflict situations. Not infrequently the young child takes an attitude of objectivity or even levity toward objects and ideas that to the adult are sentimental or sacred.

This seems to me to be my first clear memory of my mother: My father had driven to town, nine miles away, and Mother and I were having lunch together. I said or did some naughty thing and my mother told me that God would see me. I said that I'd pull down the blind and then He couldn't see.

"Oh, but He sees everything. He can see through the blind."

I looked up into the sky. In my imagination I saw an old gray-bearded man with human attributes. I took a superior attitude toward my mother, and thought "How could anyone be so stupid as to believe that He could see through a blind?" I wondered if she *really* believed it; I didn't think so.

I felt detached from this young and rather pretty creature sitting across the table from me. There was none of the feeling toward her that poets sing of.

This detached, almost perverse, attitude of the child toward its mother and the culture of its group is an expression perhaps, of what the Calvinistic theology defined as "the innate depravity of man."

The way in which the discipline imposed by the family is mediated by affection is revealed in the first recollection of her father:

The first memory of my father was when, one time, I took a hatchet and started to chop at one of the porch posts. I knew that I shouldn't, but I thought they wouldn't know that I knew that I shouldn't. I was playing that I was in a forest cutting down trees. My father nearly spanked me. I remember his black hair and those brown eyes. I was somewhat afraid of my father, and yet I felt like a pal with him also.

The nervousness and German mannerisms that annoyed me so much a little later did not bother me at this period. I thought my father was a pretty fine daddy.

How the person's conception of his rôle is created not so much by his own behavior but by the reaction of the members of the family toward it is revealed by certain oft-repeated family anecdotes.

This story my father told with pride:

"We never let anyone frighten her of the dark or anything else if we can help it. You see, she goes any place now in the dark. One night after dark we missed her, and there she was out in the granary piling handfuls of wheat out of the bin onto the floor." After hearing this told, of course I was never afraid; at least I would not let myself be.

I think I was quite an egotistical little thing. I felt superior to my mother; I felt real pals with my dad. I played quite an important rôle and I knew it.

The appearance of the second child may, unless the situation is skilfully and sympathetically handled by the parents, create a crisis for the older child.

The following impression of my mother and father I remember vividly: I was over four. It was dusk. They were sitting side by side on a lounge, holding hands, I think, when I came into the room. They asked me if I didn't want a little brother. I was embarrassed. I said I thought I did, but I felt uneasy and left the room.

When I was five, my brother came. Now the tables turned. It developed later that he was a paralytic. He was always ill. He cried a very great deal. My mother was not well. We had a "hired girl" all the time. At first I demanded attention. Once I asked my mother to comb my hair. She did not have time right then. "But you simply have to!" I shrieked at her, and she proceeded to tame me down.

Mother is naturally undemonstrative. I remember sometimes standing by her chair and wanting to put my arms around her, but being afraid that she would not pay any attention, or worse still, that she would not understand and ask me to run away. One day when I was seven I made some remark that drew from her, "Why, don't you think I love you?" I wanted to cry. I didn't know what to say. At last I said, timidly, without resentment, "No!" I think she sensed some of the situation, for she said, with real warmth, "Why, of course I love you!"

What a relief! I was happy for days! Did my intense love for children and the lavish affection I bestowed upon them in my adolescence grow partly out of the memories of this situation? I have always said that no child should go hungry-hearted around me. I have thought it was because I understood.

Even the preadolescent child makes comparisons between its family and the others in the community. The feelings of inferiority or superiority of the child are bound up with the status of its family.

I saw that my home was different from others, but everything was always spotlessly clean. We did not have all the nice little things that give the home touch. I had a little playroom upstairs, and here my chum and I fixed up things to my heart's content. This should be charming like other homes.

In comparing my family with other families I felt at once proud and humble also. My father took his place among the leading farmers. I was always proud of that, but his emotional mannerisms and his broken English annoyed me before my friends.

This conflict, which I am sure every child of an immigrant feels, had begun.

The new adjustments in adolescence have caused it to be designated as a period of stress and strain. In this case a new change of residence of the family into another and an American community intensified the personal and social maladjustments. Conflicts between standards and ideals of the family and the values of the community lead to emotional disturbances, confusion, and restless, anomalous behavior.

When I was twelve we bought a little ranch near Y, a little town of about five thousand inhabitants. There was a mortgage on it; we guarded this secret very carefully.

My parents seemed to be disturbed because I had no girl friends my own age. They showed this in the form of teasing. I wished that I had a girl friend, too, but I didn't know how to make friends with any of the girls. They all had their chums. They were nice to me, and sometimes went to see one another on Sunday afternoons, tame formal calls, no spontaneity.

This period became one of tears, storm, and stress. I wept over the least little thing; my mother did not understand what made me act so strangely. My father began to get disgusted with me at times and to let me know it, and then I wept more than ever.

The village was one of the "toughest" places in which we had ever lived. Whenever any of us girls had to go by a place where young fellows were grouped together, the boys would make remarks. I was terribly sensitive over this, and it was not the least of my worries.

Sometimes when I wept I felt that I should like to die. What was the use of living? What was I heading for? At last a dream began to formulate. I should like to be a teacher; I loved children. Everyone remarked about my hold on them. I remember the day the idea became very real to me. I was given to day dreaming, anyway, but this day was different. I walked as in a haze all day. I saw the profession with all the ardor of a romantic and idealistic adolescent. In my eyes it was not ordinary now—it was glorified.

I guarded my secret carefully. It was almost too sacred a thing to discuss. Finally I told my mother that I should like to go to work to earn some money. I wanted to go to high school. Falteringly I said I'd like to be a teacher. To my joy she was pleased. I believe she had been worrying more over me than she let me see, for she had always said, "I shall see that my daughter has an *education*. She shall not *have* to get married."

My parents did not want to let me go; they said they could still afford to send me to school; but I finally prevailed and I went to a nearby state institution to work. My father was displeased with the type of men and women with whom I worked and soon saw that I came home. I had earned about seventy-five dollars. In the summer I picked grapes.

My father wanted to have me help with the corn, which was much easier work, but I felt that I must earn money. It was not customary in that locality for children to go to high school, and I felt that if I wanted to go I must help myself.

Finally the grand day came and I started to high school. I was nervous about it. I was slight and undeveloped physically, and although I was sixteen, I passed for one of the little thirteen- or fourteen-year-olds. This made it possible for me to enter into the school life quite freely.

Since many of the other freshmen were from out of town also and were strangers, I soon made friends. I soon became enthusiastic about high-school life and wanted to enter into it. When the class was organized, I found myself on a committee. Since there were over a hundred in the class I felt happy over even this small distinction. But the committee always met after school and I had to take the car home even before three. Now that I was going to high school, I had to hustle up my work at home to get it all finished.

I helped my mother with the washing and ironing on Saturday and with all the mopping and cleaning. I felt very keenly my responsibility for helping my mother. Soon I was placed on another committee, and here I was also unable to serve. I was always too busy. I realized that I must be content with only a formal education.

I owed my help to my parents. In my scholastic standing I always excelled. I did not tell any of my friends that I wanted to become a teacher. Perhaps they might think that I would not have the ability.

I did tell my class teacher. I knew that she was fond of me; but she said, "No, I don't think you should go into teaching. I think that you are too nervous." It was as if someone had given me a mortal wound—*me*, with all my dreams; didn't my attitude count for something? She herself had some definite nerve trouble and could not hold a class's attention. Soon my money was nearly all gone. I would never be successful as a teacher probably, so why waste my parents' money? I decided to stay at home.

I said nothing, but just simply didn't get ready to go to school one morning. My mother came out into the kitchen about 8:30 and found me there finishing up the work. "But why are you here?" I told her that I was going to quit. I had no more money. "Why, of course you haven't. I knew it wouldn't last very long; but now that you have started to school you go on and finish." And she proceeded to give me one of those talks that played such a vital part in my life during this period when I was so unadjusted. To this day my mother holds my admiration for this ability. I would feel that the whole world was against me, and before she would get through with me I could face anything. So calmly and wisely she saw my problems. Sometimes I needed disciplining, and her talks usually toned me down. I felt at the time that she did not understand all the high-school problems. Very often at this period I did feel horribly misunderstood. At times I resolved that when I grew up I should be the friend of every adolescent girl. This I still hold as a hobby. I was working rather hard; I was commuting nine miles to school; I was ambitious in my studies.

Marie goes to school, but has no time for social activities. She must assist with the household work.

I helped my mother a great deal. I worried over the financial situation. I probably suffered from malnutrition. Very often I was so tired that I did not feel life worth living. One day someone said something about how joyous were the days of youth, and I flared back, "Huh, if the rest of life is worse than this, I'm sure I don't want to live!" This sort of thing perplexed and worried my mother.

Finally, one day, I discovered an article in the *Ladies' Home Journal* on adolescent girlhood. There I was, all described, and it said that this was only a period of adjustment. This was a great relief. I had thought that I should always be as I was now.

In high school my art and English teacher was my idol. She had a keen mind, a charming personality, and was the most popular instructor of the school. I decided to ask her if she thought I could ever become a teacher. I put it off as long as I could, and, finally, on the last day of school, at noon, I went up timidly and asked her. She was busy, but she took time for me. "Why, I think you would make an excellent teacher." She asked me to come back again in the afternoon; then she gave me a long talk on personality development. I was in the clouds again and determined now that I would go through with anything that was reasonably within my ability.

In this account of adolescent unadjustment four points should perhaps be made: First, there is the crystallization of a vocational life-goal out of the main trends of her attitudes and interests. This solved her problem by giving direction and meaning to her life. Then, as in many other cases, it is the mother who understands, not completely, but in the light of her own girlhood experience. So, also, she gained from reading the article on adolescence the realization that her personal problems were not unique but universal, and not insolvable. Finally a sympathetic teacher who personified her ideal gave her the encouragement and inspiration necessary to put forth every effort to achieve her goal.

The persecution of German-Americans in the World War solidified the family and brought to the daughter a sense of cultural unity with her parents.

This life-history is, it must be admitted, an incomplete, and in all probability an imperfect, record of the unfolding of the person in the family and community environment. It is only the person's own story of the memorable events in his career, to the exclusion, no doubt, of many other incidents and circumstances. What, then, is the value, if any, of such a document, or of documents like these, when they must be discounted at once as fragmentary and subjective?

I must confess that I cannot answer all these objections in a fashion that would be convincing to you, nor even to myself.

Yet, admitting all these and other criticisms that might be raised, there is a certain type of knowledge or understanding that comes from the examination of personal documents which one does not obtain in dissertations on the origin and nature of personality, nor from psychological, psychiatric, or psychoanalytic classifications of personality types.

This life-history, taken as a whole, does throw much light on the actual process by which a child comes to self-consciousness and obtains a conception of his rôle, first as a member of the family and then as a participant in the wider life of the community.

The dialectic of personal growth, however, as pictured in this life-history, is widely different from the celebrated abstract definition of it made by J. Mark Baldwin. The achievement by the person of self-consciousness in the family situation is no logical consistent process, as described here. What is suggested by this case is quite the opposite. Before the person arrives at some stable conception of his rôle—before, as we say, "his character gets set"—he is subject to the play of many diverse and conflicting impulses. The great variety of attitudes and the wide range of random, mischievous, and even devilish, behavior in children is suggestive both of the possibilities of personality development in children and of the order which the conventional discipline of the family imposes

upon the chaotic tendencies to behavior in the young child. Out of the child's own struggle with his conflicting impulses and wishes within first the code of family life, and then with the conflicting patterns of the freer community life, does he assume a rôle and achieve some coherent consistency in his behavior.

It becomes obvious, then, why the ordering of a child's behavior is a comparatively simple matter where the mores of the community are of one pattern with the standards of conduct of the family, and the reason why the problem of personal organization always becomes more acute with the degree of divergence between familial and communal ideals.

This and similar life-histories give a picture of the family and the interrelations of parents and children which departs widely from the legal definitions of the rights and duties of parents and children, and is scandalously at variance with our cherished ideals of family life. For in the law and in the mores the obligations of the members of the family are defined in their external and formal aspects with reference to what are regarded as norms of familial behavior.

This conventional schematization of familial interrelationships is not to be dismissed as unimportant. To the contrary, it is an expression of our deepest sentiments and of our most profound convictions of what family life ought to be. But as a matter of fact, these moral and legal conceptions of the family are totally different from what family life actually is. This life-history does give us a sense of family interrelationships that are living and changing, of family bonds that loosen and tighten, and of shifts and mutations of attitudes rather than the static and permanent ordering of relationships of affection and duty subsumed under the conventional theory of the family.

It is interesting to speculate upon the way in which psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts would label this case. In-

terpretation by instinct has indeed gone out of fashion. Freud doubtless would point out evidence for the Electra complex; Jung might well enter it as an introvert type; Adler would start his analysis from feelings of inferiority. Kretschmer would perceive the schizoid type. Others would place emphasis upon this or that glandular type.

These classifications are all helpful, no doubt; but they seem arbitrary, mechanical, and even somewhat irrelevant when compared with the process concretely set forth in this document by which the person, out of the cultural conflict of the family with the other groups in the community, out of the warring impulses in his own bosom, out of shameful experiences and praiseworthy endeavor, out of lonely reverie and social contacts, organizes his life and directs it to some goal of achievement.

This life-history, as well as other life-histories, seems to show how little we have reckoned with the flood of feelings and emotions, impulses, and ideas that color and give individuality to our lives, especially in childhood.

Then, even more important, is the fact, which all of us realize when once our attention is called to it, that, particularly as children, many or most of our multitudinous impulses never eventuate in our acts. They find expression but in play, in day-dreaming, or in a great variety of attitudes that to adults may seem inexplicable, amusing, perverse, or diabolical. Certainly in the mind of the child a world of events is transpiring which are beyond the perception of even the most sympathetic and discerning outside observer.

Most important for the understanding of the process of personal development is a recognition of the rôle of these uncompleted acts. In the uncompleted act the person is thrown back upon himself. These conflicts and maladjustments, distressing and painful as they are, provide the situations necessary for the development of the subjective life of the person. As one reflects over his past life

is it not significant that the attention is fixed upon conflict situations? It is in these that the child and the youth works out slowly and painfully a conception of his rôle in society and a philosophy of life about which his impulses become organized and his character becomes formed.

This inner life of the individual, of unexpressed impulses, of concealed memories, and of secret ambitions, seems to him private and personal, the essential nucleus of his personality and of his individuality. And so, at least to the sociologist, it acutally is. What constitutes the intensity of the problem of the child is its isolation, its loneliness, its feeling that its own subjective life is unique. No matter how objective the child is in many realms of his activities, there always are those regions of life which are mysterious, where he gropes as in the dark, where he feels confused and bewildered.

A first clue to the understanding of one's self and to the solution of the enigma of one's relation to others seems to be the perception, as in the case of Marie, that one's problems are not unique, but are common to others. Through this human finding the person not only tends to obtain mastery over his own experience and problems, but he begins the discovery of the world about him. He is able to sympathize, to enter into the feelings and attitudes of other persons. Through making his own adjustments and in solving his own problems he acquires a skill in detecting and in assisting others in their problems.

Finally, in life-history materials we may expect to discover the conditions under which mutations in personality occur, as in religious conversion, or, as in the case of Marie, of secular conversion to teaching as a vocational career. These critical experiences, to use the phrase of W. I. Thomas, are not, so this case indicates, bolts out of the blue, but rather the crystallization of trends of impulses, aptitudes, and interests which are then projected in some organized

form into the future. The significance of further knowledge of personality mutations is only too evident to need elaboration.

The life-history method is in its infancy. Attempts doubtless will be made to standardize the technique of securing and interpreting them. It is to be hoped, however, that this method will not become so formalized and the interpretations of cases so abstract that the unique value of the personal document will be lost. For in the life-history is revealed, as in no other way, the inner life of the person, his moral struggles, his successes and failures in securing control of his destiny in a world too often at variance with his hopes and ideals.

ERNEST W. BURGESS

THE SECT AND THE SECTARIAN

Social origins have rested so far chiefly on a foundation of ethnology. Primitive peoples were assumed to represent earlier stages of the life which we are living, and from Comte and Spencer till now men have sought to answer fundamental questions about our own religion, morals, art, and economy by collecting facts regarding savages. But the results have been disappointingly meager. The ultimate origin of any of our basic activities is lost in mystery. The answer to the question of origins which seemed at first to be promised by ethnography has actually been sought by an appeal to psychology, and since the psychology of primitive man is a matter of inference, the net result of nearly a hundred years of writing is little more than a collection of theories of the origin of institutions, not one of which can be disproved, but each one of which is unproved and indeed unprovable. The curtain rises in the middle of the drama—sometimes, indeed, toward the end of the last act—and the process by means of which the past has been reconstructed differs in no essential respect from the most primitive of mythology.

There exists a contemporary phenomenon, relatively neglected, which offers brighter promise of success. The religious sect, and particularly the modern isolated sect, has many advantages which ethnography does not afford. In many cases all their history is accessible, since the date can be found when the sect was not dreamed of, and the whole evolution can be traced. If sociologists cared to give the same careful and detailed study to the foot-washing of the Dunkers or the dancing of the Shakers as they do to the totem dances of the Australians or the taboos of the Bantus the material would not only be found equally interesting but in all probability more fruitful.

The religious sect is a valuable field for the study of sociology as distinguished from social psychology, since it furnishes a body of facts concerning the rise of institutions. The current notions of the origin of institutions include the theory that they developed from a fixed set of instincts, the theory that they are determined by the geographic environment, and the theory that the whole phenomenon arises out of the conditioning of the infantile reflexes. Now psychology is very important and there are many problems which are essentially psychological, but the sociology of institutions can be studied without positing any foundation of psychology, and indeed need no more depend on psychology than on astronomy or geology. There are questions that need to be answered, facts that can be gathered, hypotheses that can be tested, and conclusions that can be arrived at when institutions are studied with the essential abstraction which all scientific inquiry demands.

Nevertheless the religious sect is also a valuable field for the study of social psychology. The sect is composed of sectarians and the sectarian is a personality. Moreover, his personality issues from the life of the sect and can only be understood if we take into account the social matrix in which it took form. The relation of the individual to the group and of institutions to the instinctive equipment, as well as the problem of the relation of inherited temperament to institutional organization—all these and other psychological questions can be profitably studied in considering the sectarian and his sect. If we assume that human nature is not a fixed or constant or hereditary thing, but on the contrary results from the presence of, and contact with, one's fellows, the sect affords a field for the study of personality in its development which, in cases where the group is cut off with relative completeness from outside influences, gives a situation analogous to a laboratory set-up where the conditions are controlled and the variables studied.

The relation of individual personalities to institutions is ap-

parently reciprocal. The members of a religious sect are shaped and fashioned in accordance with the traditions and world-view which prevail within the group. To ask why a man who has lived from infancy in a Mormon community looks at life from the standpoint of Mormonism is to ask a very easy question. His life has been defined within the given social whole. But if we become curious and inquire how the institution of Mormonism was constituted the question is more complex. For the sect has its roots in the far-distant past, besides having *differentia* that mark it off from any other institution. If it be true that the sectarian has been too often studied in isolation from the sect it is even more apparent that the sect has been studied with too little regard for the other groups with which it was in contrast and conflict. The telescopes have had too small a field of vision. The conventional accounts include a certain description of the times and conditions, but the sect is usually set off rather too sharply against a definitely opposing group. Indeed, one may think of the sect in a figure. Arising at a time when the fixed order is breaking up, or tending to break up, the sect is the effort of the whole community to integrate itself anew. It is the order arising from social chaos, though the order may not be overstable nor the chaos a condition of utter disruption. If we examine the organization of a large number of sects such as Quakers, Shakers, Mennonites, Dunkers, Perfectionists, and Am-anas, what appears upon close scrutiny is that at a crucial moment in the history of a society a situation occurs which is literally unique, never having been present before in any group of people anywhere in the world at any period of time. And since the situation is unique and since the personalities of the members form a unique assemblage of forces, interests, and ideals, the solution of the difficulty has also a certain uniqueness about it.

The student of the literature becomes familiar with a priori assumptions and the explanation by general principles, but these

do not stand the test of a comparative study. One writer remarks that it was quite natural that Ann Lee should found a celibate community since she had such a disastrous married life. But many women have had disastrous married lives who did not found celibate communities, and many celibate communities have been founded by those who did not have disastrous married lives. Indeed, Ann Lee did not begin her sect with celibacy. The feature was a later addition. One writer has explained a colony of communistic celibates as response to their environment. They were in the wilderness in Pennsylvania shut off from associations and in a physical milieu very much like an ancient Egyptian sect that was celibate and communistic. The proof offered of this causal statement is that when civilization conquered the wilderness their distinguishing doctrines were given up, which forces the remark that there are many settlements in the isolated wilderness that were neither communistic nor celibate, and, moreover, that some communistic sects persisted, and some still persist long after the whole surrounding community has been conquered by civilization.

It is therefore impossible to say of any given region that it will produce a definite type of religion. The set forms of the constitution of a sect vary so much that the details must be regarded as chance or accidental. The problem here is very similar to the problem of an invention, differing chiefly in that the sect is a collective affair while an invention is individual. Of course the various members of a group are not equal in influence, and usually the fate of a whole religious movement will be modified by the biographical details of some important early leader. As is well known, polygamy was not the original program of the Mormons, but came in in response to an attempt to solve a particular emergency. The Amana community has practiced communism for nearly a century, but they had many years of continuous existence before communism came into their mores. It all happened when, after one of their

migrations, it developed that the poorer members who owed the more wealthy ones large sums of money for their lands seemed to be hopelessly in debt. Whereupon, after some divine inspirations and much conference and objection, it was at last agreed that they should hold all things in common. But, having so decided, this feature became an integral part of their society and has remained unquestioned for generations.

There are many instances of the traditions of a group being affected for long periods by the experience and influence of a single man. The Disciples, who form one of the larger denominations, have a peculiar inconsistency in their treatment of non-members. Baptism by immersion is a *sine qua non* for membership, but those who are not baptized are freely admitted to the intimacies of the communion table. The problem is completely explained by the experience of their leader, Campbell, who began as a Presbyterian and practiced open communion, later affiliated with the Baptists, and finally organized an independent sect. This variety of religious experience caused him to advocate the inconsistency which, being adopted by the small group and retained when it began to grow, has endured for a hundred years and been the occasion of much friction and at least one division.

The sect is originally constituted, not by non-religious persons, but by those who have split off from existing organizations. Christian Science grows largely by accretion from former adherents of organizations which are older, and this is typical. The condition of unrest and confusion loosens the bonds of union and sometimes a few kindred spirits find each other and a nucleus is formed. It is very rare that the original motive is separation, but when the divergent nucleus excites opposition and achieves group consciousness the stage is set for a new sect. The first stage is then typically a stage of conflict, though the methods of warfare vary according to the standards of the times. Many of the organizations are short-

lived, and it would be highly instructive to have an exhaustive study of the small sects that did not survive. When group consciousness and morale characterize the original company or *cadre* of the sect, there is often a more or less rapid growth by accretion or attraction by others. Just why they are attracted is a very interesting problem. It is often assumed that the chief appeal is to men of like temperament. Perhaps this is what Giddings means by consciousness of kind, men outside the sect join themselves to it because they feel a consciousness of kind, that is, they are similar in temperament and regard themselves as being like-minded. The question is not easy to decide, but there are facts which make this a doubtful explanation. Thomas Edwards, writing in 1646 about this very problem, gives a long list of motives which in his opinion are leading men to join the hated sects about him, among which are the following: some were needy, broken, decayed men who hoped to get something in the way of financial help from the new sect; some were guilty, suspected, and obnoxious men who were in the lurch and feared arrest or indictment, and to these the sect was a sanctuary; some, he claimed, had lawsuits and hoped to find friends to help them in their litigation; others he thought were ambitious, proud, covetous men who had a mind to offices; still others he insists were libertines and loose persons who seek less restraint than the older communities insisted on; another class he calls wanton-willed, unstable persons who pretend to be convinced, while others he calls quarrelsome people who like to stir up trouble; and still others include those who have quarreled with their ministers or had some trouble about their church dues and thus go off disaffected.

Even if we make a liberal allowance for the bitterness of the controversies of the seventeenth century it seems necessary to conclude that the new converts were men of many types. To join a group it is not necessary that you regard yourself as like them; it

might be more accurate to say that you have an ambition to be like them and therefore want to change. In the histories of most sects it is possible to describe a period of relatively intense conflict, and here the necessities of comparative study are the greater. For the conflict is modified by the opponents. Men learn the art of war from their enemies, and when they start out they are rarely as extreme as they come to be under the stress of the fighting. The Amanas attacked the clergy for immorality and laxity; they refused all military services and did not send their children to the public schools; while in their turn they were beaten, harassed, and imprisoned. William Penn's plea for religious freedom he justified on scriptural grounds, calling it natural, prudent, and Christian, finding in the Bible justification for loving one's enemies and refusing to employ human force. Tolerance he regarded as prudent because the Scripture says "no kingdom divided against itself can stand." But the opponents of Penn are necessary if one is to understand the position he takes, a position which at that time was new and revolutionary. In Edwards' *Gangraena* there is a seventeenth-century expression of the view of the dominant group; toleration was wrong since "a kingdom divided against itself could not stand." Edwards regarded tolerance as a great evil, as the following quotation will show:

Toleration is the grand designe of the Devil, his Masterpeece and chiefe Engine he works by at this time to uphold his tottering Kingdome; it is the most compendious, ready, sure way to destroy all Religion, lay all waste, and bring in all evill; it is a most transcendent, catholique, and fundamentall evill for this Kingdom of any that can be imagined: As originall sin is the most fundamentall sin, all sin; having the seed and spawn of all in it: so a Toleration hath all errors in it, and all evils, it is against the whole streame and current of Scripture both in the Old and New Testament, both in matters of Faith and manners, both generall and particular commands; it overthrowes all relations, both Politicall, Ecclesiasticall, and Oeconomically; and whereas other evils, whether errors of judgment or practise, be but against some one or few places of Scripture or relation, this is against all, this is the Abaddon, Apollyon,

the destroyer of all religion, the Abomination of Desolation and Astonishment, the Libertie of Perdition (as Augustine calls it) and therefore the Devil follows it night and day, working mightily in many by writing Books for it, and other wayes, all the Devils in Hell and their Instruments being at work to promote a Toleration (Thomas Edwards, *Gangraena* [London, 1646], pp. 121-22).

The conflict unites the sect, creates *esprit de corps* and heightens morale. Usually, but not always, if the conflict be too severe so that confidence is lessened, dissensions may arise and factions appear. Conflict united the German people for four years, but when they began to feel that the cause was lost the conflict broke up the unity of the nation. In the sect, however, a conflict can be with the "world," which is a subjective image, and it is possible for a sect to survive great disasters since they are so certain of ultimate success. The sect therefore has always some degree of isolation and is more apt to have a high morale when they succeed in securing a location shut off from the rest of the world. There are, however, devices of cultural isolation which overcome lack of physical separation, as can be observed in the present state of the Christian Science church. In this case isolation depends upon a separate vocabulary and particularly upon the admonition not to argue or discuss the matter with outsiders. The Masons, and to some extent the Mormons, achieve isolation by secrecy.

In this conflict period of the life of the sect the tendency is toward exclusiveness wherever feasible. Certain economic relations with the "world" are necessary, but the cultural life is protected. There is always a tendency to be an endogenous tribe. Sometimes to marry an outsider is to forfeit membership in the group. Yet the time always comes when this is difficult to enforce, for from the beginning of time the sons of God have looked upon the daughters of men and found them fair and desirable. Inter-marriage never becomes general until disintegration has set in, and it is always a destructive influence, for queens make good foreign

missionaries and no child can easily despise the religion of his mother.

A highly interesting aspect of the development of a sect is found in the tendency to divide and become two sects, typically more bitter toward each other than toward the "world" which they formerly united in opposing. There appear to be two types of divisions. Sometimes it merely represents a stage in the process of reabsorption into the larger society from which they came out. In this case the progressives or innovators want to change the old customs to conform with what is being done outside. The Disciples split on the question of whether an organ should be used in church, the organ party wishing to imitate the outsiders while their opponents wanted to maintain the older tradition. Another type of division seems to give no such clue. It is apparently a differential interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional phrase. The Dunkers had an issue concerning multiple foot-washing; one party insisted that each person should wash the feet of only one other, while their opponents contended that each should wash the feet of several. There are other examples of ambiguity of the initial statement or doctrine, and unless there is an adequate machinery, or supreme court, which can settle the matter, divisions may result.

But whether the group divides or not, a period arrives when the isolation begins to disappear and the customs of the outside world with its beliefs and practices, even its ideals and doctrines, begin gradually to penetrate the group. When two people live side by side they always influence each other. The Boers in Angola smear their floors with fresh cow dung, which picturesque custom they acquired from the savages around them. These tendencies are slow in coming and are often very strenuously resisted. In 1905 the annual meeting of the Old Order Brethren solemnly decided that it was unscriptural for any of their members to have a telephone. The Dunker authorities have solemnly ruled on erring

brethren who attend animal shows, played authors, bought county bonds, served on juries, bought pianos, used sleigh bells, wore neckties, used fiddles, wore standing coat collars, erected tombstones, and joined the Y. M. C. A. All this was many years ago and the process starting then has gone on until many of the progressive Dunkers smile at what they now call old-fashioned objections.

If we turn now to the question of personality and the light which a study of sects can give us on this problem it is clear that the sect in its collective life produces the sectarian. The sectarian is therefore a type, and types of personality turn out to be the end-products which issue from the activities of a group. Types can be studied with reference to the morphology of the human body. Thus men can be divided into the fat and round, the lean and slim, and any other discoverable groupings. They may be divided into introverts and extroverts, though nearly all the people you meet are neither one nor the other, but rather mixed. These and many other classifications are of value and should be encouraged; but they fail to meet all the needs, and it becomes apparent that the social life men live is more relevant than the physical constitution they inherit. There is a typical Mormon and his personality can be described. He is in favor of the highly centralized institutional organization; he is ruled by a characteristic system of theology; he believes in private property controlled to a certain extent by a theocracy. Likewise, there is a typical Shaker; but the Shaker holds private property to be undesirable and even against the will of God. Moreover, to the Shaker all sexual intercourse is immoral, and there is a long list of definite statements that could be applied to this typical individual. There is also a typical Dunker, neither communistic, like the Shaker, nor ruled by a central hierarchy, like the Mormon. He belongs to the one true church, as most sectarians do, but each sectarian belongs to a different one true church

than the other sectarians. The Dunker regards it as obligatory to be immersed in water three times, facing forward each time. He must ceremonially wash his brother's feet and give him a holy kiss of love, keeping himself unspotted from the world.

Each of these sects and all closely organized sects have a peculiar vocabulary, a fixed tradition, and a specific and peculiar way of regarding God and man, the world and the hereafter. The sect then is analogous to a primitive tribe, and the primitive tribe has long been recognized as productive of specific types of personality. There is more difference between a Shaker and a Dunker than between the equatorial Bantus and the South African Zulus. And this difference exists in spite of essential similarities in race, language, and geographical similarities in environment.

These types are the result of social heritage and breed true socially for long periods of time. They cannot be explained by geographical environment, for the Dunkers and the Amanas and many others live in the same kind of environment, cultivating the same soil and surrounded by neighbors who are alien. Nor can appeal be made to physical heredity, for the sects are constantly acquiring members from outside the line of descent. The Mormon missionaries traveled all over America and Europe seeking and finding new recruits for the community in Utah. The cultural life produces the mores, and the mores are irresistible when skilfully inculcated into the young and into the new recruits.

Moreover, as time goes on new and often important variations in the mores arise. Neither for the group nor for the individual are all moments equally important. Life does not consist of unaccented rhythms, but rather in periods of uniformity followed by important moments of decision, and from these later issue changes which may determine the course of the group for generations to come.

In this connection it becomes necessary to refer again to the

assumption frequently made that there is a temperamental uniformity which explains the group. They are all assumed to be like-minded; new converts come in because of a consciousness of kind. The group is assumed to select those of a certain temperament. This interpretation fails to meet just criticism. An examination of the membership of the sect and the phenomenon of division and dissention forces the assumption that many varieties of temperament are included in the membership of the sect. The hypothesis here advanced is that the new convert does not come in because he was of like mind, but that he comes in because he changes his mind. He makes it up in a different way. The sect attracts him because he wants to be different and it takes him and makes him into a different type as he comes to enter into the cultural life.

In support of this notion several types of facts seem relevant. First, the sect arises in a time of disorganization which is always a period of unsettling. Men are thus ready for a new stable or organizing influence. They do not join because they are like anybody; they join because some solution is offered to their unrest. Second, the descendants of the members of the sect can be assumed to be of different temperaments, and this assumption is borne out on investigation. In spite of the difference in temperament the typical sectarian in each case can be accurately described and is held to loyal membership until it begins to disintegrate.

The third group of facts are more important and more conclusive. It has been shown that the history of the sect shows a typical progression. The period of extreme isolation, conflict, and high morale is followed by a more irenic era when conformity with the outside world gets increasing approval. The end result is the disappearance of the sect as a separate conflict group and the lessening importance of their differences when considering the influence of these on the personality of the sectarian. The typical sectarian

is, therefore, a different person in the different stages of the life of the group. The assumption of the temperamental uniformity is difficult to hold in the light of the progressive alterations which are demonstrable. A combative, exclusive, non-conformist who dresses differently from those in the society in which he lives is a very different personality from him who joins with others in their associations and enterprises and who comes to be a patriotic and regular member of an American political unit. Since the sectarian is the individual aspect of his sect, he changes when his group changes and his group changes with a changing set of relations. The changes in the sect are not dependent on the temperament of the members, and the changes in the sectarian reflects the collective life. Therefore the temperament of the sectarian is a varying element and the theory of the temperamental selection seems inadequately founded.

Those who appeal to temperament as a causative factor do not always keep in mind that temperament is an inference and not a fact. Temperamental qualities are abstractions. A definition of temperament would include those factors in the personality which determine the mode of behavior and which are innate. Since, however, temperament does not become important until the personality is formed, it is always a matter of inferential abstraction. The temperament can be shown to change, and arguments about inherited temperament ought to be made with the greatest care.

Experience is then creative. The sect is not safe refuge where the temperament and desires of an outsider can be comfortably expressed and realized; it is rather a formative force or set of forces; and the motives which lead a man to join a sect may be quite different from those which assure his continuance in it. No one on the outside can fully know what the experience on the inside is. Being a sectarian may be more satisfying than was at first imagined, or it may be less so, but it is certainly never exactly antici-

pated. The motives which lead a woman to the altar in marriage may be quite different from those which make her decide to endure to the end. The reason a man takes up smoking is rarely the motive which makes him continue the habit. The sectarian is therefore in some sense a new creature. He may regard himself, and quite accurately, as entirely made over. Very commonly he refers to the new existence as a rebirth.

If we attempt to analyze the personality of the sect in terms of attitudes we have available the theoretical discussion of W. I. Thomas and Znaniecki. An attitude is stated to be a process of individual consciousness set over against a corresponding value. R. E. Park in discussing attitudes is concerned with the relation of attitudes and the wishes and opinions. The attitude is said to be the mobilization of the will. Psychologists, among whom Allport and Thurstone may be mentioned, have attempted to investigate attitudes by questionnaires and inquiries regarding verbal assent or dissent. The assumption is that the attitude corresponds to the verbal expression of it.

In the work of V. Pareto there are distinguished three elements which we may roughly force into some kind of relation with the preceding points of view. There are C, the customs, convictions, and principles which the members share; these he calls the *dérivées*. The second element, B, is the verbal expression when the first is questioned or challenged and represents the need to be logical or the desire to appear reasonable. These he calls the *dérivations*. There is a third element, A, relatively invariable, arising from the sentiments and interests which may be admitted, but which is often concealed. These are spoken of as the *résidues*.

The social attitude seems to correspond to the *résidues*, but there is also an attitude of a more general sort corresponding to the *dérivées*. The *résidues*, or attitudes, are never the object of direct perception. They must be inferred, but the inference is a necessity.

Thus Mormon polygamy was at one time an accepted practice; it was a *dérivée*, in class C. The reasons assigned for the practice in debate, argument, and propaganda belong to the class B. They are highly variable and a premium is placed on ingenuity and originality in the inevitable forensics. But the inner motives and deep-lying attitudes arising out of their instinctive cravings and sentiments, class A, may be very different from what would be admitted. Without going into detail here it is apparent that sexuality is involved to a degree to be determined by whatever methods are at hand.

Now the origin of social forms, the creation of new mores, need be uniform in a given group only in class C. The elements B tend to have more uniformity, but are still quite various, while the element A admits a far wider variety. Some people join the Dunkers for economic security; others, to avoid military service; others, out of disgust for the state religion; and so on through a great variety. The *dérivations*, or class B, among religious sects are often taken from Bible texts, and it sometimes happens that the same *dérivation* will be used by opposing sects to justify contradictory practices. "Suffer little children to come unto me for of such is the Kingdom of Heaven" is quoted by Baptists to show that infants do not need to be baptized; it is quoted by Paedo-Baptists to justify the baptism of children.

"Every kingdom divided against itself cannot stand." This *dérivation* is quoted by Quakers to prove that sects should be tolerated, and by Edwards to prove that they should be suppressed.

"In Heaven they neither marry nor are given in marriage." This is a favorite proof text for the Shakers to show that there should be no sexual intercourse, and was the central text quoted by the Perfectionists to justify the form of free love which they called complex marriage.

The number and nature of the attitudes, the *résidues*, is large

and bears upon the question of like-mindedness and similarity of temperament. As already pointed out, there may be a score of varying motives which bring people into a common organization.

But now comes the most important consideration. The attitudes in class A, the *résidues*, are continually being reformed. They are created as emotional experiences multiply and result from later *dérivations* and new objects and new loyalties. The common experience in the sect tends to make widely varying *résidues* more nearly common and identical.

Pareto points out the necessity for caution in assuming, as Allport and Thurstone do, the correspondence of *dérivation* and *résidue*. The literature of the Shakers abounds in ascetic sentences and repeated assertions that sex is an unnecessary evil, but sometimes the Shakers worked all day and danced all night, and in the early period the men and women were nude and danced together. It seems necessary to assume a far greater interest in sex than their opinions and principles express. One cannot understand a sect by merely studying its creed.

The study of the sects which survived needs supplementing by a knowledge of those which died. In certain periods of disorganization there were many small aberrant attempts at organization which did not live and many doctrines which did not take on. One John Boggis who became a preacher of note in seventeenth-century England is quoted by Edwards as refusing to say grace at dinner where the meat was a shoulder of roast veal, scornfully asking "to whom shall I give thanks, whether to the butcher, the bull, or the cow." Such extreme divergence failed to take on.

In every time of disorganization there is always a certain disorder in the sex mores. This happens in political revolutions and also in a time of religious unrest. The new sects are very often accused of sex practices contrary to the mores. Some of these accusations are probably exaggerated because the enemies are rarely

restrained in their statements, but it is easy to point out a certain trend toward sex liberty among many of the sects. Edwards quotes a certain scriptural argument. One of the sects insisted that since death dissolved the marriage bond, and since the Scripture teaches that sleep is a form of temporary death, it is no sin to engage in sex intercourse if one's husband or wife is asleep. In such an instance there is a clear indication of a strong attitude and an example of the ingenuity of the *dérivation*, or, in this case, the rationalization.

We conclude, then, that the sect is the result of collective forces that surround it and to which its own life is in part a reaction. The sect produces a type which comes to take on certain attitudes, to be devoted to certain objects and values, and to define life and the world in the way that is approved. The most fruitful field for study would seem to lie in the securing of complete and adequate life-histories of sectarians, including new converts to the sect, members who have always been in it, and dissidents and deserters who have gone out from it. For the intimate life-histories will give light on the actual product that the sect is responsible for and afford material for the accurate answering of some of the problems at present unresolved.

The purpose of this paper has been to call attention to a field of study which has not been wholly neglected but which has not yielded the results which it might yield if the material were studied with diligence. It seems not too much to say that the sect and the sectarian, if adequately investigated, could throw a flood of needed light upon one of our oldest and most perennial problems: the relation of society to the individual, the leader to his group, the relation of institutions to instincts, which is the same problem that interested Plato when he discussed the relation of the one and the many.

ELLSWORTH FARIS

TYPES OF POLITICAL PERSONALITIES

Seasoned observers of political life have undertaken to define political types. Their contributions, if deficient in formal completeness, are rich in practical insights which may be profitably exploited by future investigators. They have said that while temperamental qualities predispose the individual to play one political part more successfully than another, such qualities are not immutable, for common observation shows how they are sharpened or softened in the act of adjusting to the demands of specific situations. Political institutions have a twofold function: they favor the accession of men of particular attributes to positions of effective influence, and they continue to operate upon the personalities of the influential.

Modern political writers are particularly fond of contrasting (under different labels) the agitator, the responsible leader, and the boss. The agitator is sometimes called a reformer or a revolutionist, the responsible leader is frequently named the statesman, and the boss not uncommonly passes for the politician (in the narrow sense) or the political manager. Regardless of such divergences, there seems to be no small measure of agreement upon the qualities of each type. Close inspection shows that the constellation of traits which are said to be peculiar to each may be arranged along a continuum, with the agitator and the boss occupying the extreme, and the responsible leader an intermediate, position.

The agitator has come by his name honestly. He is actually agitated about public policy. He is excited, and he communicates his excitement to those about him. He idealizes the magnitude of the desirable social changes which are capable of being produced by a specific line of social action. From the point of view of the responsible leader, being an agitator consists in exaggerating the differ-

ence between one rather desirable social policy and another, much as being in love, according to Shaw, means grossly exaggerating the difference between one woman and another. Some agitators may, as Munro would have it,¹ behave like physicians, recommending new doses of democracy to remove the ills of present democracy; others may be surgeons, anxious to subtract something from existing machinery. In either case they stake much on a single spin of the wheel.

At the other end of the scale stands the boss, indifferent to schemes of social change unless they threaten to intrude upon his own preserves. The boss thrives in democratic society by working a complicated political machinery during those periods when the community is not cleft in twain over issues of communal policy. Electoral crises seldom coincide with major crises of opinion when elections are run upon an astronomical itinerary of two, or four or six years. At all times, however, the distribution of posts depends upon voting, and the man who organizes an active band of followers can run the electoral machinery and parcel out the jobs. This is the rôle of the boss. He is frightened by the emergence of serious issues, since they involve the reanimation of people whose political orbits he cannot foretell. Depending upon the status quo, assiduity in pursuit of his own interest implies indifference or hostility to substantial change. Totally occupied with short-run manipulation, he stares cynically at men who profess to live by principle.

Intermediate between the romanticism of the agitator and the apathy, hostility, or cynicism of the boss is the attitude of the responsible leader. He shares the agitator's faith to the extent of believing that innovations are desirable and possible, but he parts company from the agitator's obsessive preoccupation with particular measures. He thinks there are many roads to Rome and that society is always on the way.

¹ See W. B. Munro, *Personality in Politics*.

It follows from the enormously different valuation which is set upon the consequences of particular social acts that the three types should scale differently in respect of such a quality as patience on questions of policy. The agitator wants instant and all-encompassing results; the responsible leader is more ready to wait until social attitudes have more permanently crystallized, or until financial and other facilitory means are at hand. The boss is blasé or obstructive.

Intolerance is allied to impatience. Expecting good to flow from drastic innovation, the agitators easily infer that he who disagrees with them is in communion with the devil, and that opponents are animated by bad faith or timidity. They are notoriously contentious and undisciplined; many reforming ships are manned by mutineers.

Responsible leaders are more tolerant of dissenting opinion, for they see the world, not as a simple dichotomy, with the forces of good arrayed for one cause and the forces of evil panoplied for another, but as a complicated place where many things are possible and many things are partially desirable. The boss, of course, generally has that tolerance for ideas which goes with contemptuous indifference to them.

The agitator is willing to subordinate personal considerations to the superior claims of principle. The children may suffer while father and mother battle for the cause. But the righteous will not cleave to their families when the field is ripe for harvest. On the alert for pernicious intrusions of private interest into public affairs, they see "unworthy" motives where others see the just claims of friendship.

The responsible leader is disposed to temper principles to the necessities of individual cases and to relax the rigorous enforcement of an unpopular and novel law until sentiment catches up with enactment; but it is the boss who is the great "humanizer."

His are the fundamental, primary, tribal virtues. Ex-Alderman Kenna (Hinky Dink) of Chicago says that the secret of his success is honesty. Harold Zink² has collected the published data on twenty city bosses, and the common qualities of a majority of them were such traits as generosity to the poor, loyalty and obedience as henchmen, persistence, and courage. C. E. Merriam speaks of the boss as the humanizer of such an impersonal and formidable institution as government. The boss operates through a little knot of loyal "tribesmen" who are bound to him by those personal ties which generate in conflict groups.

The agitator, once more, trusts in mass appeals and general principles. Many of his kind live to shout and write. Their consciences trouble them unless they have periodic orgies of moral fervor. Relying upon the magic of rhetoric, they conjure away obstacles with the ritualistic repetition of principles. They become confused and frustrated in the tangled mass of technical detail upon which successful administration depends. Agitators of the "pure" type, when landed in responsible posts, long to desert the official swivel for the roving freedom of the platform and the press. They glorify men of outspoken zeal, men who harry the dragons and stir the public conscience by exhortation, reiteration, and vituperation.

The responsible leader has some respect for direct appeals to public principle and sentiment, but he tempers it with regard for the technical difficulties of administration. The boss sees no sentimental virtue in popular appeals as such; he manipulates public appeal or private lure as the dictates of expediency direct.

The qualities which are commonly assigned to agitator, responsible leader and boss may be arranged on a continuous scale, with the romantic, impatient, intolerant, impersonal, and exhortatory agitator at one end. To avoid misunderstanding it ought to be said

² *Twenty Municipal Bosses*, Harvard Thesis, 1926.

that a personality type is not necessarily to be found where the ordinary usages of speech would point; most modern "reform" organizations have become so highly institutionalized, to cite but one instance, that the true agitator is no more at home with them than in a government job.³

The literature of politics has not contented itself with depicting types. It has offered various reflections upon the rôle played by these types. A political movement, as Robert E. Park has said, may be viewed as a single social act. Developing this idea, it is possible to distinguish successive phases of a completed political act. It begins in unrest. People act upon one another excitedly, but their diagnoses of what the matter is, and their prescriptions about what ought to be done, are notably vague. Then public opinion develops. General symbols are invented into which restless individuals read their private meanings. As discussion and agitation develop, these symbols are gradually arranged in the form of a single, overmastering dichotomy, a "this or that," "yes or no" situation. The community is enabled to pass over from controversy into action. The third phase may be called enactment. Society has a supply of formal procedures for the definition and accommodation of differences which may be bracketed together as various kinds of enactment: legislation, executive decree, and so on. But no political act is complete until it has led to some stable modification in the habits of the

³ Political literature contains more political types than the agitator or the responsible leader. The word "leader" is frequently taken in a much more inclusive sense than here used, and Michels and Merriam have made lists of the qualities which they believe characterize all political leaders. Conway has propounded his familiar trichotomy: crowd-compellers, crowd-exponents, and crowd-representatives. The possibility of defining types on the basis of their characteristically reactionary, conservative, liberal, or radical opinions has often been pointed out. See Robert Michels, *Political Parties*; C. E. Merriam, *American Party System*, and Introduction to H. F. Gosnell, *Boss Platt and His New York Machine*, and *Four American Party Leaders*; Martin Conway, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*; Lowell, *Public Opinion in War and Peace*; Röhmer, *Die Vier Parteien*; A Christensen, *Politics and Crowd Morality*.

community. This final stage may be called that of enforcement. Unrest and public opinion may be regarded as the agitational aspect, and enactment and enforcement as the executory phases, of political action.

Such schematic simplicity is complicated by a multitude of variations, of which the most important is the reciprocal connection between agitational and executory activities. But in bold outline this simplification will do to show how agitators and responsible leaders perform complementary functions in political life. The unrest of a few people must be communicated to many if collective action is to result, and the task of shocking, horrifying, scandalizing, and exciting is the special rôle of the agitator. Since contradictory motives exist in every situation, their reconciliation is a special function. This balancing of the desirable against the feasible is the peculiar province of the responsible leader.

It may be remarked in passing that this general pattern bears a noteworthy resemblance to the processes of individual thinking. The human organism may be viewed as the point of origin for energy impulses which, in case of conflict, define themselves in consciousness with relation to a field of stimuli present in the immediate environment, and which ultimately discharge into overt behavior, exhausting the impulses on a certain level of satisfaction.⁴ Political behavior begins in unrest, proceeds to define alternatives in a public, and comes to an end with enactment and enforcement.

The interworking of the agitator and the responsible leader may be reduced to greater clarity by examining a representative case. A recent volume has told how British slavery was abolished between 1823 and 1838.⁵

Back in 1787 a society had been organized by a dozen Quakers

⁴ This point of view has been admirably presented in L. L. Thurstone, *The Nature of Intelligence*.

⁵ W. L. Mathieson, *British Slavery and Its Abolition, 1823-38*.

to abolish the traffic in slaves, and this crusade finally resulted in the prohibition of the slave trade by act of Parliament in 1807. In 1823 the Quakers were the moving spirits in the organization of the Anti-Slavery Society which had for its purpose the mitigation and the gradual abolition of slavery itself. Yet the actual personnel of this new agitation was in many cases identical with that of the old one. The slavery issue had become a matter of practical politics during the campaign conducted by the East Indian sugar interests against the privileged position of the West Indian sugar interests. The East Indians had excited popular feeling by representing the controversy as one between free-grown and slave-grown sugar. The reformers seized the occasion to organize, and presented their first petition through Wilberforce, who, forty years before, had served in a similar capacity for the antislave-trade petition. Thomas Fowell Buxton carried on as chief agitator.

In response to the drive of the reformers the British cabinet signified its intention of recommending various reforms to the legislative colonies. No sooner was their decision made known in the West Indian colonies than trouble began. The slaves of Demerara, inflamed by the rumor that their masters had concealed an emancipation proclamation from them, rose in insurrection; plots were reported in Jamaica; planters convened in wrath and fear throughout the British West Indies; the nine hundred whites in Dominica threatened to avenge themselves on Parliament by declaring their independence; and in Barbados "a party of respectable gentlemen" demolished the Methodist chapel at Bridgetown and chased "its villainous preacher" out of the island for having contaminated the Negroes. Intimidated by the ferocity of these outbursts, Canning and Bathurst, the responsible ministers, decided to try out their policy of amelioration in a crown colony, Trinidad, and relieve the pressure elsewhere.

The Abolitionists were angered at the submissiveness of the

government, which they considered to be a weak-kneed betrayal of the cause of righteous reform; but lacking effective strength, they were able to do no more than indulge in propaganda. In this they were fortunate. They had been provided with a first-rate atrocity case by the plantation owners. John Smith, a non-conformist preacher who had worked among the Negroes of Demerara, was sentenced to death by the enraged plantation owners after the insurrection. Abolitionists exploited this for all it was worth.

In the years immediately following, those who held responsible positions in the British government sought to invent a formula which would induce the West Indian planters to agree to voluntary ameliorations in the position of the slaves. Obstruction and evasion met them at every step. The Abolitionists became more and more embittered at delay, but men like Buxton and certain of the more experienced leaders, who appreciated the difficulty which beset the government in devising a workable program, advised against agitational excesses.

Parliament finally adopted abolition, but in a form ("apprenticeship") which was designed to minimize the hardship to be imposed upon the planters. The apprenticeship experiment was tried from 1833 on, but it gave rise to conditions which led the Abolitionist leaders to declare that the Abolition Act had been little short of "a practical and deliberate fraud," and that "nothing short of the entire emancipation of the slave" would do. This finally came to pass.

Such an account unmistakably shows the complementary rôle taken by the agitator and the responsible leader. The agitator shocked the unofficial public into action; the responsible leader took cognizance of opposing interests and sought to reconcile the disparate requirements of moral purpose, state unity, and administrative efficiency. Confronted by territorially segregated opposition to state action, progress was necessarily slow, and the frustrat-

ed agitator kept snapping at official heels until permanent results were secured.

Some attention has been given in political literature to the circumstances in which various types of political leaders have a competitive advantage. Bourgeois democracy has been said to favor the prominence of such men as those who ruled England in the heyday of middle-class liberalism. They were men of character and solid worth, safe, sober-judging men trained in quarter sessions, men who knew all about money and credit, and who were sufficiently well endowed to be removed from temptation, and had enough other employments to render them free from all suspicion of being "professional politicians."⁶

Democracy is said to nourish the rhetorical flatterer, the demagogue. Autocracy is supposed to place a premium upon vanity in the rulers and servility in the ruled, and to instigate intolerant fanaticism among an active, subterranean opposition. Aggressive, innovative personalities are favored in moments of social crisis (Lloyd George, Clemenceau); conciliatory, undramatic persons rise to prominence in the aftermath of crisis (Harding). Social chaos puts a premium on the cruel, arbitrary and unscrupulous.

The effect upon personality of the performance of political functions is usually discussed in connection with such official activities as those of routine administration and diplomacy. The bureaucrat and the diplomat have been delineated time after time with remarkable consistency. A description of the bureaucrat by Rabany and of the diplomat by Mousset may be selected as representative of such writing.⁷

Special qualities of the functionary are summed up in four expressive words: he is punctual, methodical, prudent, and disci-

⁶ J. A. Spender, *The Public Life*, I, 27.

⁷ Ch. Rabany, "Les types sociaux. Le Fonctionnaire," *Revue Générale d'administration*, LXXXVIII (1907), 5-28. L. D. White brought this to my notice. Albert Mousset, *La France vue de l'Etranger*, opening chapters.

plined. He has the defects of his qualities, for he is timid, he lacks initiative, and he has no taste for innovation. *Homme de pratique*, he is suspicious of everything he hasn't tried out. In the lower ranks of the civil service this spells an enfeebled will; in the upper branches this becomes fear of responsibility. The two commonest maxims are *Pas d'affaires* and *Pas de zèle*, by which is understood that no one is to do any more than asked. An assured future gets him out of the habit at an early age of pondering about risks. Private life strikes the functionary as extremely hazardous and he evades the rough-and-tumble of active competition. Ambition to improve is almost unheard of. The functionary speaks disparagingly of those who try to push up the line, and misnames any energetic striving for larger means of expression the *esprit d'intrigue*.

Overconfidence in their efforts and their methods leads to a repellant and rigid professionalism on the part of the functionary which, says Mousset, the diplomat, skeptic by vocation and disillusioned by experience, does not possess. The practice of diplomacy teaches that resources are few and attainable results are restricted. When things go according to schedule, the diplomat knows that it is because his plans are favored by a suitable conjuncture of uncontrollable forces.

Except in the advanced posts, the functionary is devoid of general ideas or has lost his taste for them. The diplomat is not a specialist in the sense that the civil servant is one, for his reputation depends, not upon the mastery of a specific technique, but upon the perception of general interests and the choice of rather general means of reconciling them. The diplomat lives in a world of general ideas with which the civil servant may dispense and yet succeed.

The diplomat trusts suavity rather than officiousness. He is averse to passion and accustomed to patience in handling people for whom he cherishes a concealed disdain. The diplomat

learns to dissociate sincerity from most of life's relations. Thus he uses conversation, the ordinary domain of careless expansiveness, for professional ends. This gives rise to a double reaction: a conversation miserly in meanings and profligate in words. Diplomatic indirection of statement is notorious, an occupational disease. To repeat a famous paraphrase, "If a diplomat says no, he means perhaps; if he says perhaps, he means yes; if he says yes, he is no diplomat."

Enough has been said to suggest that students of government are willing to subscribe to the proposition that office has its children as well as men. In fact, the calming effect of responsibility upon ardor is a commonplace: "You may make a Socialist a minister without making a Socialist minister." The exceptions are furnished by the "pure type" agitator, whose temperamental qualities are so difficult of obliteration.

As matters now stand, political writers are willing enough to recognize that types are functions of heredity, of physiological factors relatively independent of heredity, and of childhood and adult experience with culture-patterns. For the means of assessing the relative importance of these diverse elements we must look hopefully to the future.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL

"GROUP" AND "INSTITUTION" AS CONCEPTS IN A NATURAL SCIENCE OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

THE NATURAL SCIENCE APPROACH

The possibility of reducing the complexity of social data to a natural science has been frequently called into question. Some scholars hold that social scientists should employ the same rigor of method and should strive toward the same objectivity and precision which characterize scientific work in general. Others assert that there exists between social science and natural science an intrinsic difference of aim and methodology, and that the work of social scientists should be not the discovery of laws, but the technique of applying scientific knowledge to the satisfaction of human needs. We are dealing, they say, not with objective units, but with the psychic activities of individuals in interrelation, and with values. Social science, according to some adherents of this school, is pre-eminently telic in character. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the position of those who make this latter claim, in so far as they assert that a natural-science perspective toward social phenomena is impossible. Two methods of attack are here open: either we may endeavor to state some actual formulations of social data in natural-science terms, or we may examine some of the substantive concepts of those who take the telic position, to see whether they may have defined them in such a manner as to preclude the natural-science approach. The writer has chosen the latter, and less direct, line of attack.

A few preliminary definitions are here in place. The term "natural science" is used to indicate the field studied by physicists, chemists, geologists, physiologists, psychologists, and students of related disciplines. By the "natural-science method" the writer

means simply the way in which these scientists seem to him to work, that is, to select and to approach their objects of study. The term is here used in a restricted sense and includes but a portion of the activities of the natural scientist. We would exclude for our present purpose all applied science, all mere classification of natural objects where no new principle is discovered, and also the explanatory phases of geology and other disciplines involving a historic treatment. By natural-science method we indicate merely the kinds of objects selected (or definition of units) and the general manner in which they are treated. We mean that the investigator looks at or into his material to see *what is there* and to discover *invariable sequences* between one identifiable happening and another. Such sequences as are found always to occur so long as other conditions can be kept constant are known as natural-science generalizations, or "laws."¹

If one follows strictly the approach just described, the environmental objects one confronts will be found to have more than one level of complexity. A behavior psychologist, for example, looks at the human organism at first as a whole. He is interested in what people do and say, in other words, in behavior at the integrated, "human" level. If he looks more closely, however, with the purpose of discovering certain generalizations as a basis of understanding or prediction, he begins to see the parts of which the

¹ Such laws are merely statements of a high degree of probability that a given phenomenon will recur under the stated conditions. More careful observations usually disclose exceptions; and these exceptions lead to further analysis and the making of altered and more widely applicable generalizations. Scientific laws are in no way forces or agents *causing* the particular phenomena which are said to illustrate or embody them. They are merely summaries of the experience of careful observers. We mean by the "natural-science approach" the *taking of an attitude toward the material studied such as to yield these new generalizations*. The moment such a generalization is secured, if one dwells upon it, makes deductions from it, or applies it to human purposes, the natural-science attitude, as we have defined it, at once disappears and a different attitude takes its place.

organism is composed, or at least to think in terms of these parts. He begins to interpret behavior through the generalizations which can be given him by the neurologist and the general physiologist. The physiologist, in his turn, describes the action of nerve and muscle fibers and then analyzes the cells of which they are composed, either actually or conceptually, into their organic, and finally into their inorganic, components. By the aid of generalizations in the fields of organic chemistry and physics the nerve impulse and muscle contraction are interpreted in the simpler and more universal terms of chemical dissociation, electrical polarization, and the like. The physical chemist, in his turn, peers into such phenomena as electro-magnetism and "ether conduction," seeking to identify a still more elementary plane upon which even broader generalizations can be discovered.²

Ascending this hierarchy to the field of the sociologist, the question is naturally raised whether we have not in societal phenomena, as the sociologist defines them, a level of experience fitting into the natural-science approach at the upper limit of the scale, and offering a logical starting-point for the analytic process. Is society, which is the most complex level of organic existence, still a natural object, and, as such, material for natural-science investigation? We shall return to this question presently.

It is well, in passing, to answer the possible objection that in explaining the more complex level in terms of its constituents we thereby explain it away. According to the *Gestalt* theory the whole is not fully explicable as the mere sum of its parts; it has a unique existence which is not discoverable through analysis. With this position we readily agree. But it should be observed that when the natural scientist looks further into his phenomena, passing from

² An earlier and more detailed statement of this multi-level theory of natural science will be found in an article entitled "The Group Fallacy in Relation to Social Science," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XIX, 60-73, reprinted by the Sociological Press, Hanover, New Hampshire.

the more complex to the simpler level, he is in no sense denying the reality of the more complex level. He does not maintain that because he passes in study from the animal to the tissue and cell, and from these to the atom, that he has fully accounted for the animal as a combination of these elements. He makes only two assertions: (1) The cellular and other organic and inorganic constituents of the animal are the only facts which are present to his senses when he makes his analysis; and (2) from a knowledge of the laws of these components he is able to make predictions, otherwise difficult or impossible to attain, regarding the vitality and behavior of the animal conceived as a whole.

This again is not *explaining* the organic level in terms of the inorganic, but merely expressing a probability of concomitance, based on experience, between certain occurrences at the two levels. Nor is the comparative reality of any two levels called into question. So far as human knowledge is concerned, a table is just as real as the various particles of wood which make it up, and these particles of wood are as real as any molecules, atoms, or electrons to which they may be conceptually reduced. There is, therefore, no reason for going any further downward in the hierarchy of natural-science levels than the practical need of prediction upon the level of our main interest requires.

THE CRITERIA OF NATURAL-SCIENCE OBJECTS

Having defined what we mean by a natural-science approach, we shall now consider certain terms which are conspicuous in the social literature to ascertain whether they denote objects or situations capable of being studied by the natural-science method. In particular, we shall take the concept of the *group* in its several varieties, and shall add a brief analysis of the concept of *social institution*. For the purpose of testing such notions, the writer has attempted to find a number of criteria by which entities to which

it is possible to apply natural-science method can be identified. Those which were finally chosen he believes to be fairly characteristic and definitive. Broadly speaking, no natural-science material is without them; and any material possessing them may become the object of natural-science study. To these criteria we have given the following names: explicit denotation, reciprocal action of parts, uniqueness of formulation, dependent viability, and total inclusion.

a) *Explicit denotation*.—In order to understand our first criterion let us recall a distinction made by psychologists between explicit and implicit behavior. Explicit responses consist, for our purpose, of skeletal movements which are capable of manipulating or modifying things in our environment. Implicit responses, on the other hand, consist of *abridged* skeletal movements, verbal reactions, and postures which we substitute in our thinking process for explicit contacts with objects. The phenomena studied by the natural-science method are characteristically things toward which one can make some sort of explicit reaction. They are stimuli for our responses of denoting, manipulating, measuring, weighing, and other discriminatory and graded reactions. There occurs the possibility of some explicit response to a natural object *as a beginning of every natural-science investigation*. Such investigations never begin from purely implicit responses. Something, in other words, always obtrudes itself upon our experience and presents to us a problem for study. Natural-science material is thus more than that which we can see, hear, touch, or smell. There is also the possibility of doing something to it and thus altering and refining our impressions from it. This means, in the last analysis, that we can obtain from the situation a *kinaesthetic* (or motor) experience arising from our manipulation of the object of study. Connected with explicit denotation is the important factor of verification of our experience by others, a check which guards against hallucination in

the sense fields already named, and which is made possible only by our capacity for explicitly denoting the phenomena concerned.

One may object here on the ground that scientists often seem to be concerned with *implicit* activities, or mere conceptualization. The chemist speaks of atoms, yet he never saw one or responded explicitly to one. We cannot manipulate the planets, and yet we have a science of astronomy. The physicist is not explicitly responding to a “rise in temperature” when he takes readings from his thermometer. To this we reply that no matter how much the natural scientist may conceptualize his experience, there were at the outset certain phenomena which *were* explicitly responded to, and which remain, moreover, as a permanent possibility of explicit response in the work of repeating the experiment, checking predictions, and verifying conclusions.³ There is on the whole good ground for believing that the efforts of natural scientists universally begin and are verified by reference to an explicitly denotable situation.

Let us now inquire whether the notion of the *group* will satisfy the criterion of explicit denotation. Suppose that a behavior psychologist, a physiologist, and a physical chemist were out walking together upon a dark night. Let us further suppose that each is incapable of experiencing or understanding the immediately simpler elements into which his proper field of study can be reduced. In other words, the behaviorist cannot look beyond the level of the entire organism; he cannot see nor conceive of nerve cells, synapses, glands, receptors, or motor organs. The physiologist, in

³ Although one never reacts to an individual atom, one can put a piece of iron in the fire or subject it to electric disturbances, thus manipulating atoms *en masse*. Although one cannot respond explicitly to temperature, one *does* respond to stimuli from explicit experiences, such as a vessel of heated water, from which the implicit notion of temperature has been derived. As for the astronomer, although he cannot manipulate the heavenly bodies, he can react explicitly to his instruments as they show a star crossing meridian, and make finer motor determinations as a result of this experience.

turn, can view such structures and the cells of which they are composed, but he understands no principles of organic chemistry or electro-chemical action. The physicist sees only the phenomena of the latter field, and he in turn cannot try to analyze these phenomena further. Now let us imagine that these three companions encounter, without seeing him, a man stretched out upon the path. It is a safe assumption that all three will stumble over him. In spite of their peculiar limitations of scientific perspective, the body across the path would intrude upon the experience of all three, would become a stimulus for explicit denotation, and might become the subject of a natural-science investigation by each upon his own level.

Now let these three men be joined by a fourth, a sociologist, suffering from the same inability to penetrate below his own level. Assuming that level for the sociologist to be phenomena conceived in societal terms, such as culture patterns, customs, groups, and institutions, we should have the parallel condition that he would be unable to experience *individual human beings*, the components of groups and institutions at the immediately simpler level of analysis. We should now observe a strange result. Whereas his three companions would "bump into" the man in the path and would start on their respective methods of studying him, the sociologist would never encounter him at all. Nothing would have intruded upon his experience.

We may even suppose that the man on the path is an integral part of some societal relationship. For example, he may be an Indian youth fasting and dreaming of his totem in the forest, according to tribal custom; or he may be a sentry on the frontier in war time who is sleeping at his post. In this case our sociologist would remain entirely ignorant of the societal pattern. He could not discover tribal folkways, or the national group at war, because no phenomena would have intruded upon his experience to set him

off by explicit behavior upon a course of investigation. He would be unable to develop any sociological formulations or laws. Should he set out to encounter and study a family, a chamber of commerce, a gang, or a church, he would be able to find none of them. Without the capacity for experiencing its components (individuals) there would be no starting-point from which he could begin to discover and describe the phenomena of his own level. We thus see that groups, customs, and institutions lack the criterion of explicit denotation which is characteristic of other levels of natural-science investigation.

In order to clarify this illustration a little further it is necessary to consider the following objection. Suppose, the sociologist might argue, that we keep the limitations of one-level experience for the four scientists the same, but place upon the path a single cell, rather than an entire man. In this case the physiologist and physicist with suitable microscopic technique would be able to observe it and react explicitly toward it. The behavior psychologist, on the other hand, would by hypothesis never encounter it, and hence would be no better off than the sociologist. To this we assent. But we answer that it is within human power to take the cell away, and put back an entire organism, thus bringing back to the psychologist the possibility of explicit denotation. It would be impossible, however, to remove the sociologist's limitation, in a corresponding manner, by substituting something else for the individual organism, for the question at once arises, What shall we substitute? Even supposing that some superhuman agency could place before him, not individuals, but a group or institution, the sociologist, unless superhuman, would be unable to see or react to it in the absence of the experience of individual organisms. It would be possible of course to place before him cultural objects, material equipment, etc.; but these could never be understood by him, in the absence of individual human behavior, as expresions of group

or institutional life. Cultural objects are not identical with societal groupings, a point which will be discussed later. The criterion of explicit denotation as we have now applied it reveals itself, not as direct intrusion upon experience, but through the possibility of so manipulating the environment as to set the conditions whereby some phenomenon *will* intrude.⁴

Our one-level sociologist may attempt to escape from his dilemma by turning the tables upon the natural scientist. He might argue that only through the concept of the nation can we understand the rôle or specific function of such an individual as a sentry. We answer that if one could not encounter the sentry there would be nothing for one to understand or explain. But his assumption itself is unwarranted. It is quite possible to understand the sentry's behavior while still keeping upon a level of a purely explicit denotation. We should in that case pass from one individual to another in the environing population and examine the habitual attitudes and motivation, not only of the sentry, but of other individuals whose words he obeys, and behind them the behavior of the individuals called the "president," "congressmen," "newspaper editors," "journalists," and the like. We should find, no doubt, that each of these was using certain verbal symbols signifying a "nation," but such a term may be considered merely as the manner in which they conceptualize their own behavior. Our problem is not the most convenient form of conceptualization for human control, but the determination of phenomena which so intrude upon experience as to admit of explicit denotation. And in this qualification we find the notions of group and institutions to be completely lacking.⁵

b) Reciprocal action of parts.—Philosophers have defined an individual as an object in which the various parts exhibit a recip-

⁴ In connection with developing this portion of the argument the writer wishes to acknowledge a helpful criticism made by Mr. Dale A. Hartman.

⁵ In connection with the criterion of explicit denotation, see footnote II, p. 99.

rocal action. In other words, it is a unity. Taken in a general sense this definition becomes our second criterion of natural-science objects. At the simpler levels, beginning for example with electrons and atoms, this theory would amount to a statement of the interdependence of all natural phenomena. In solid bodies of appreciable size it is theoretically manifested as the cohesion of molecular units. At a different level it takes the form of chemical combination, of agent and reagent. Processes within protoplasm and minute organs within the cell show this interdependence of action. It is clearest perhaps in the metazoa, and especially in the higher organisms. The action of each part or organ can be understood only in reference to the behavior of other parts.

When we survey the phenomena which are called groups, we must recognize that they display the criterion of reciprocal action often in a striking degree, though never perhaps as fully as zoölogical organisms. There is, moreover, a wide difference in the degree to which this criterion is present in different types of groupings. In a pioneer community in which responses are of the face-to-face sort, and in which each individual provides some unique service for the benefit of all, the reciprocal action may approach that of a biological organism. In the so-called derivative groups, however, at the other end of the scale, such, for example, as a professional association or a trade union, the behavior, being mainly of the common-segment type, is unadapted to the give-and-take of reciprocal activities. When we pass still further to classes, races, and sex groupings, we find that reciprocal action is either absent or present only in sporadic form, and not at all characteristic of the grouping in question.

*c) Uniqueness of formulation; (d) dependent viability.*⁶—Our third criterion refers to the fact that objects at different levels of

⁶ The criterion of dependent viability is here omitted owing to lack of space. It will be dealt with in a later paper. See footnote 11, p. 99.

natural-science study are unique both in descriptive properties and in the terms in which their laws are formulated. Take, for example, a river. We may study the river bed and channel, and note the laws describing the action of flowing water upon the rock and soil. Approaching at another level, we may take a vessel of water from the river and study it. We should here describe such laws as fluidity, evaporation, and crystallization, conceiving the phenomena upon the plane of molecular action. Again we may pass to the level of conceptualized atomic motion and consider the properties of the gases, hydrogen and oxygen, into which the level of hydraulic phenomena may be analyzed. The laws upon this plane are those of combustion and chemical combination. Beyond this may be conceptualized still another plane in terms of etheric motions and having to do with such unique phenomena as electromagnetic waves, heat, and light. In each of the levels considered we are dealing with an entirely unique set of laws and descriptive terminology. The phenomena of radio-activity, combustion, fluidity, and gravitation are in different realms of our qualitative experience. When we pass on still further to the organic levels the uniqueness is even more striking. The colloid substances, the phenomena of cell division, reproduction, and growth by assimilation are different from anything encountered in the inorganic series. Entering into the field of psychology and describing the organism as a whole, we have again a distinct form of experience in animal behavior and its modification.

Turning now to the sociological plane, we have to inquire whether it is possible to characterize such entities as group and institution in terms which are unique, which are distinct, that is, from all formulations of the behavior of individuals. There are two broad types of theory regarding social entities which must be considered from the standpoint of this criterion. The first is the notion that the group or society is *not* upon a plane above the objects of

psychological or biological study; it is itself an organism among other organisms. The second view is that societal entities are not organisms, but are upon a level above, or more complex than, the organic. Professor Kroeber's theory of "the superorganic" falls within this class.

Now it is obvious that our requirement of uniqueness does not apply to the first type of theory, since a distinct level for societal phenomena is not postulated. But it does apply to the second. The advocates of the latter view are faced with the problem of describing the superorganic and stating its laws in terms wholly different from those of any of the infrasocietal levels. Professor Kroeber and others have made ingenious attempts in this direction. They have dealt, however, not with actual groups, but with cultural objects. Such objects have been conceived by some as an indirect index of a possible superorganic level. A number of laws have been tentatively worked out, such for example as Kroeber's and Chapin's notion of culture cycles, Ogburn's laws of culture growth, Park and Burgess' law of zone-distribution in the growth of cities, Gresham's law in economics, and the law of business cycles. These laws, which are cast in terms of explicitly denotable phenomena, do tend in a sense toward uniqueness of formulation. They must, however, be stated in purely volumetric units of size, number, and the like, in such a way as to eliminate all factors of human use and custom. One may also admit the possibility of natural-science laws in this field without being required to conceive them as laws belonging to a superorganic realm of being. Such an interpretation is possible; but it is also convenient to regard them merely as laws of human behavior stated, through behavior products, in terms of quantity, distribution, and change of such behavior. This view would perhaps be acceptable to some of the culture-sociologists mentioned above.

When we turn from these cultural formulas to frank postula-

tions of the group as a datum of scientific study we see a clear failure to achieve a formulation which is both explicit and unique. LeBon's descriptions of the crowd, for example, are drawn in terms of individual psychology, as is shown by such words as "emotionalism," "credulity," and "intolerance." Tarde's law, stating that imitation proceeds from the higher social class to the lower, depends for its intelligibility upon our being able to distinguish between lower and higher classes. This distinction cannot be discovered in a groupwise approach, but only through observing the attitudes of submission or domination among the individuals. Mr. B. Warren Brown, in his *Social Groups* (pp. 134-35) announces twenty-two tentative statements which he considers to "serve as a starting-point" for a series of social laws. These statements are drawn in terms of what their author considers to be the elements of social groups. As soon, however, as we try to get some explicit connotations for Mr. Brown's terms, that is, to understand what such words as "structure," "contact," "homogeneity," and "membership" really mean, his laws descend to the realm of human behavior as exhibited by individuals.

The same type of criticism applies to the notion of "social control." Society is said to control individuals through folkways or institutions in the direction of conformity to a given type. But "power" and "control" are terms borrowed from the human plane of experience. Their use at the superorganic level fails to establish unique formulation at that level. These expressions are therefore tautologous; that is, they tell us nothing new as applied to groups.⁷

⁷ Cf. The following quotations: "An institution is a set of activities which society adopts as its deliberately accepted method of attaining a deliberately approved end" (E. C. Hayes, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, p. 405). ". . . The power of the derivative groups, especially of the great abstract and relatively constant ones, such as the state, industrial, religious, educational, and scientific associations, is very great" (L. L. Bernard, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 422).

Power, control, social continuity, and social change are misleading if taken to

The matter of social control may be presented in another way. Let us state the influence of a group (B, C, D, E, F, etc.) upon an individual, A, as the fact that A responds to (is controlled by) B, C, D, E, F, etc. It may be true that he responds more quickly and vigorously to B and C, who, for example, may be judges or policemen, than to the other individuals; and that B and C derive their special ability to make A respond by the support of the attitudes of all the rest (A, D, E, F, etc.). So far we are on a purely individual-behavior level. Suppose, however, we draw a circle around B, C, D, E, F, etc., and say that it is not these individuals, but the group as such which is controlling A. In this case we violate both the criterion of explicit denotation (for it is impossible, *vide supra*, to show how one explicitly responds to a group as such) and the criterion of uniqueness (for any statement of the controlling action exerted by B, C, D, E, F, etc., as a group seems to be intelligible only as the acts of individuals).

The reason for this failure to achieve for social groupings the uniqueness characteristic of natural-science data probably lies in the limitation of our point of view. We are, ourselves, the components of which our groups are made; hence we cannot detach from them our own attributes and purposes. Our appreciation of groups is therefore subjective and telic. Then, too, our receptors are too fine and our distance too near to receive impingements from so vast an entity as society, or even from special groups.

e) *Total inclusion*.—Our final criterion is closely related to those preceding. In any object studied by the natural-science method the parts are entirely included within the whole. In a drop of water, for example, there are, to our knowledge, no atoms of hydrogen or oxygen which are not used up in their combination into

indicate agent, or any conception other than mere description of phenomena. Natural scientists have long been hampered with anthropomorphic "forces" as principles of explanation, and have only recently begun to clarify these notions.

water. They seem to be totally absorbed in the phenomenon of water or not present at all. When we use the concept "water," moreover, we do not mean anything *less* than the integration or combination of these parts; nor do we include anything *more*. Similarly, the liver, stomach, skin, or other organs are entirely present in any organism where they are found at all. The organism includes them all, and it does not include any organs which are elsewhere or within other organisms.⁸

Turning now to the social groupings, we find almost no instance of a perfect or total inclusion of the parts within the whole. One may picture certain primitive, face-to-face groups as having practically all their activities in common and interdependent. Even such a grouping, however, does not include the individual's visceral responses of pleasure in taking a cool bath or viewing an impressive landscape. One may, of course, arbitrarily put a certain number of individuals together and say that we have a group including these entire individuals, together with all their activities, and nothing but them. But this is not what the sociologist means by a group; for in that case ten individuals, for example, selected at random from various parts of the world and suddenly placed together would answer as well as the most closely knit family or community. In almost every social group it must be recognized that the individuals have many interests and habits which are entirely without the scheme of the group life or organization. In closely knit community groups these activities may be relatively few; but in the so-called "derivative groups," such as a scientific association, a chamber of commerce, or a political party, more of the individual lies outside the group than within it.

In order to make the error of false inclusion clearer let us consider as an example the various connotations of the term "nation."

⁸ There are a few exceptions to this rule, such as periods of conjugation among protozoa and certain cases of Siamese twins.

We can derive from this word a suggestion of substantiality by thinking of one hundred million actual and entire individuals, completely or potentially interdependent, and reciprocal in their behavior. Our concept thus tends toward the ideal of total inclusion. Yet when the nation is thought of in any direct or functional sense we frequently find that the meaning has shifted, so that it is now regarded, not as the *totality* of the *entire* individuals acting reciprocally and in a face-to-face manner, but as a concurrence of certain limited, similar interests and feelings, or common segments of behavior, such, for example, as patriotism, directed toward some common symbolic object by millions of individuals who may in other respects be quite unco-ordinated. This altered concept, however, we still endow with properties characteristic of an organism at the level of total inclusion. We speak of the acts of our officials as representing the "policy" or "will of the nation." We state that the nation "wages war," "concludes peace," and has certain "virtues," "ideals," "purposes," and "feelings" strictly human in character. Imperfect inclusion is here combined with tautology in giving substance to the notion of a super-individual being.

CONCLUSIONS

Looking backward over this analysis we must remark a wide discrepancy between the materials with which natural scientists begin their investigations and the entities implied by the terms "group" and "institution." The concept of group (if limited to certain primary forms) and of institution (if we conceive of all the institutions within society as a whole) tend, it is true, to fulfil the requirement of reciprocal action. Neither notion, however, satisfies the criterion of total inclusion; while the idea of the secondary group is peculiarly misleading from this standpoint. With the questionable exception of objective culture phenomena, these concepts fail to meet the test of uniqueness of formulation at their own

level. Most significant of all is their complete failure from the standpoint of explicit denotation.⁹ If group and institution are the only sort of concepts through which social phenomena can be defined, then we must conclude that social science is indeed in a sphere by itself, and that a natural science of social phenomena is impossible. The present writer, however, believes that a different approach, one which will fulfil natural-science conditions, is conceivable. There is no opportunity in the present paper for the development of this thesis.

While the group notion lacks the explicit character necessary for an object of natural-science investigation, may it not serve, as some have suggested, in the rôle of a hypothesis for explaining the social behavior of individuals? Other hypotheses, such as the atom and the ether, also depict entities which lie well beyond the range of our perception. To this we reply that the group theory does afford a consistent logical system into which certain aspects of human behavior may be conceptionally fitted. It seems to the writer, however, to be a rather sterile hypothesis from two standpoints. First, since it cannot be approached explicitly, there is no possibility of discovering *how it operates* in producing its control over, or conditioning of, individuals; or, to speak more exactly,

⁹ Certain writers⁴ have argued that the social group has as much reality as other compounds, such as a human personality, a drop of water, or a molecule, which appear upon analysis to consist merely of simpler elements in a particular relationship. Cf. W. D. Wallis, *An Introduction to Sociology* (pp. 150-55). Such an argument, however, is based entirely upon the criterion of reciprocal action of parts, and ignores the discrepancies of the group from the standpoint of explicit denotation, uniqueness, and total inclusion. If such writers are to prove the objective reality of the group they must therefore draw their evidence from some other source than analogy with natural-science objects. It should be understood, however, that the present writer is passing no judgment upon the question of whether groups are *real*. They may be quite as real as individuals. We are here concerned solely with their possibility of serving as objects upon which one may begin a natural-science investigation. We furthermore hold no brief for the future. We are dealing only with the present forms of human groupings and sociological concepts.

how its laws are related to the remainder of our scientific conceptions. Secondly, there is no possibility of progress toward its verification or refutation. The group remains upon an implicit, meta-physical plane, assailable only by the tools of logical definition. We *can*, on the other hand, approximate a verification or refutation of the atomic hypothesis; and it is this process which continually enriches our knowledge of the world we live in.

A connotation of the terms "group" and "institution" which the writer would suggest as fruitful is that of subjective guideposts, directing the observer toward the interactive and distributive aspect of human phenomena, a phase which the biologist and psychologist, concerned mainly with a single and typical individual, would miss. These terms would thus serve as a kind of directional map, or concept, which, though not a natural-science object in itself, would produce in the investigator an orientation toward a special aspect of natural-science objects. A great deal of useful sociological investigation has already been carried out in this spirit.¹⁰

There remains to be mentioned a prevalent viewpoint referred to at the beginning of this paper, a usage which accounts largely for our present methodological confusion regarding the group. The group notion has often been used in a *telic* sense under the illusion that the sphere of discourse was that of natural science. In much of the literature of social science the group represents the manner of approaching ends to be achieved with a plurality of individuals as our working tools. To conceive of human beings as a group, and to have them so conceive themselves, is for this purpose a more efficient procedure than to view them as individuals and as material for analytic study. We do things *with* a group, but we do not do things *to* it in the sense of overt or explicit action. But here we

¹⁰ The possibilities of this viewpoint are well presented by Professor C. H. Judd in his *Psychology of Social Institutions*.

reach a parting of the ways. We must decide whether our aim is one of teleis or of natural science. If we decide upon the former, our concepts of group, institution, social control, and the like are valuable; and, providing we keep within their limitations, the natural scientist has no ground to challenge them. But the telic thinker in his turn must refrain from restricting the scope of social science to a method compatible with his own conceptualization. He must acknowledge a sphere in which his terminology may be useless and perhaps even an obstacle. For there are some who believe that, methodologically, all science is one, and thus commit themselves to a view harmonious with natural-science method. There remains for these the task of developing a consistent approach and of reviewing critically some of the earlier formulations.¹¹

¹¹ Since this article has gone to press, there has been brought to the writer's attention a valid objection to the criterion of explicit denotation as used in our illustration of the man upon the path. The writer is, therefore, preparing a restatement of his thesis which, though retaining the importance of explicit denotation, will present this criterion in a different light. This restatement, together with certain amplifications which could not be included in the present article, will be published in one of the sociological journals in the near future.

FLOYD H. ALLPORT

CASE STUDY OF SMALL INSTITUTIONS AS A METHOD OF RESEARCH

All science, I suppose, proceeds by analysis, that is, by intensive study of what appear to be the more essential and lasting constituents of nature, by penetrative observation of limited, manageable, representative phenomena. If we can understand these we may hope to extend our knowledge to larger wholes.

Now in the realm of life the representative phenomena are themselves life-processes. What else can they be? Life is always life, not an assemblage of other things. If we study facts of mere structure it is always in the hope of getting light on the life facts to which they are related. In sociology we do much work whose relation to vital process is indirect and may not be apparent, but is there if the work is worth doing. It is back of our study of attitudes, for example; a research concerning the attitudes of immigrants has in view, I suppose, a better eventual understanding of the life-changes which come with the mingling of races, nationalities, and cultures.

Another way of putting what I have in mind is to say that the object of our study is always behavior, not forgetting that it may be an indirect object, and that groups and institutions *behave* as well as individuals. A common-sense meaning for behaviorism would seem to be *the study of life from the standpoint of organic process*, and in this sense we are all, I suppose, behaviorists. We see life as adaptation, survival, evolution, and are interested in acts as they bear on these processes. That some behaviorists desire to exclude consciousness from such study is a notable fact, but hardly gives them the right to monopolize an expressive word.

It seems to me that this organic or behavioristic point of view

involves some revision in our criteria of scientific knowledge. We are accustomed to think of scientific exactness as a matter of measurement in small units of space and time. But behavioristic knowledge is essentially organic, must exist in wholes or it does not exist at all. Even in its simplest forms it deals with conformations, patterns, systems, not with mechanical units. For this reason the phenomena of life are often better distinguished by pattern than by quantity. Those who are striving to make sociology an exact science might well give more attention to the method of pattern comparison. Starting, perhaps, from the use of finger prints to identify criminals, it might conceivably be carried, by the aid of photography and phonography, into very subtle regions of behavior. Measurement is only one kind of precision. What could be more precise, as a record of visible behavior, than a motion picture? Yet it is not quantitative. Its precision is total, not incremental, a matter of patterns rather than of minute differences in space. Our instruments of precision should be such as record living wholes, not such as reduce them to lifeless units. If we had a film of George Washington, with phonograph accompaniment, taken when he was conducting the raid on the British at Germantown, it would add more to our precise knowledge of him than all the measurements imaginable. The insistence on the quantitative where it is out of place is one source of that laborious futility not uncommon in certain lines of research.

And yet I would not wish to abate that ardor for measurement that is so healthy a trait of recent work. Many kinds of observation must be quantitative in order to be precise, and the statistical processes by which we ascertain whether an observed act is typical or not are quantitative in their nature. We must use discrimination.

The statistical method cannot take us very far in subjects like education or criminology, where understanding of persons is the

main thing. It does not deal with the organism as a whole, but with traits or functions of some sort which are artificially separated and treated as numerical units. What *is* a trait apart from a man? Does it not get its reality from being an aspect of a concrete human organism? And if you take that away, what is left? Statistics of traits are useful as an indication of mass tendencies, but they give us no human reality, and should, in such fields, be subsidiary to the study of whole persons.

What, then, is the aim of behavioristic science? I take it to be the complete perception, record, and understanding of fundamental acts, with the consequent ability to foresee them.¹ This calls, first, for an exact and comprehensive technique of observation and comparison, and then for all the constructive imagination we can bring to bear. How would this apply to animal life, to the behavior, let us say, of mallard ducks? I suppose that adequate science must require, for one thing, a moving-picture record of all the essential functional acts of the species, their modes of feeding, of coition, of nesting, brooding, concealment, attack, defense, and so on. When our technique permits, this should include the functioning of colors and cries, and should embrace, not only the birds themselves, but what is essential in the environment. One must also, no doubt, make records of weight and dimensions, of the number and length of the wing feathers, and other details having some bearing on function. Statistical inquiries regarding the numbers and movements of the birds may well be undertaken, because these reveal large-scale functional activities. If we had all this observed, recorded, and digested, not merely in detail, but as a living whole, so assimilated by the imagination that we could understand how the species adapts itself and has adapted itself to the conditions of life, and could predict what a given member of it will do in a given sit-

¹ I have found stimulating the discussion of behaviorism by Grace A. de Laguna in her work on *Speech*.

uation, we should perhaps know as much about the behavior of mallard ducks as a mere man can expect to.

In the case of a more intelligent and social species, like the chimpanzees studied by Köhler, the behavior record will embrace the social and intelligent acts, including the rudiments of language. There may be people so devoted to the statistical idea who, watching the wonderful motion pictures of Köhler, will say, "This is interesting, but it is not exact science. It wouldn't do at all for a Doctor's thesis." I would think that it compared well in scientific quality with the best statistical work, and is an example of the organic or total way of recording behavior which we need also in the study of human life.

I take it that the ideal for sociology is to extend the behavior record to all the essential acts of man, making them intelligible, imaginable, predictable. We aim to see human life as an actual dramatic activity, and to participate also in those mental processes which are a part of human function and are accessible to sympathetic observation by the aid of gesture and language. We must see it not only from the standpoint of individuals, families, and nations, but also from that of the functional groups and processes into which human life is differentiated. Conceived in this way the technique of sociology will consist partly in some sort of description, at once exact and dramatic, analogous to the motion pictures of Köhler. Perhaps much may be done with actual pictures. Professors Odum and Johnson have already taken photo-phonographic records of Negro singing,² and one can readily think of other directions in which research of this kind would be in order, in child study, for example, or in recording the proceedings of a mob. The social behavior of man is, however, for the most part so subtle, so complex, and so little confined to time or place that the only technique adequate to describe and record it is that of language.

² See *Negro Workaday Songs*, chap. xv.

Language is itself a form of social behavior, one of the latest achievements of evolution, and as indispensable as the brain itself to the higher kinds of life. Its function is to define, record, organize, and guide the subtler forms of human activity, and it is natural that social science, which aims to extend and perfect this function, should find in language its main instrument.

A language record may be used as objective data for the study of personal and group behavior, as are the letters printed by Thomas and Znaniecki in their study of *The Polish Peasant*. Or language may be used as the instrument by which qualified observers define and record traits of behavior which could not be otherwise preserved.

It has been customary, under the influence of physical science, to think of scientific and literary as antithetical terms. I believe that we shall have to get this idea out of our heads, and come to see that a literary technique, exact, disciplined, responsible, and yet vivid and imaginative, is indispensable to social description. Even in the sciences and animal behavior the literary powers of such naturalists as W. H. Hudson and William Beebe are not merely ornamental, but a part of their scientific equipment. In psychology some writers, notably William James, have made use of dramatic passages, original or quoted, to describe typical human conduct; and we have in sociology a growing output of serious descriptive literature which is not less scientific because the animal whose habits it describes is man. Such work cannot be done well without mastery of the instrument.

Much of the prevailing skepticism regarding the possibility of a science of human life arises from a conception of science which would exclude those vivid and dramatic aspects without which life would not be human. Behaviorism promises to put the dramatic where it belongs, at the center.

The behavior processes that we study may be vast, complex, and difficult of access, like the procedure of our government in levying and collecting taxes, or they may be on a small scale and rather easy to get at, like those of many individuals and families. In the latter case it is possible for a student to comprehend them, to identify himself with them, and to present them to others in a fairly complete and lifelike biography. This is what I understand by case study: a direct and all-around study of life-histories, as distinguished from the indirect, partial, and somewhat abstract information bearing upon such histories with which we often have to be content.

We all feel, I think, that there is something peculiarly real and stimulating about case study, even when its contribution to theory is not apparent. It deepens our perceptions and gives us a clearer insight into life. It is truly behavioristic in that it gets at behavior directly and not by an indirect and abstract approach. If we can have enough of it and of sufficiently varied types to be representative of the social process, it will go far to enable us to understand that process, and perhaps to foresee its course.

While persons and families are the usual objects of case study, the method may be extended to other constituents of the social process, to the life-histories of groups and institutions not too large to be treated in this direct and total fashion. These also are live things, and offer a field of behavioristic study which, though by no means unknown, has been relatively neglected. Nothing else can take its place; it is a distinct and indispensable method.

Perhaps I should explain the difference, as I see it, between an institution and a group. It is largely in the point of view. A group is primarily an aggregation of persons, like a family, a regiment, a congregation, a board of directors. A group may or may not be participating in an institution, that is, in a continuous organic activity with a social heritage of its own and with methods of co-

operation which it imparts to the persons who enter into it. Even if they are so participating, much of their personality may have little to do with the institution; they belong to it by certain habits and interests; and on the other hand, the institution is more than a group; its vitality consists in an organic whole of transmitted ideas which has the power to enlist the activities of a group, but does not, for the most part, originate with the group, and cannot be explained as a mere product of their personalities. It must be seen as a distinct organic process.

Anyone who has tried his hand at social research will be likely at this point to ask how far it is possible to pick out for analysis simple, distinct, and representative institutional processes. Is it not a fact that the whole institutional complex is so intricately interlaced that you cannot separate anything from the rest without destroying its reality? Can you hope to understand such a whole by building it up from supposed elements? This is quite just, but applies to the study of persons as well as of institutions. No analysis of a personality is possible apart from that social complex of which it is an aspect. What the analyst does is to get such knowledge of the social complex as seems to be most pertinent, and with this background to go ahead with intensive study of the person, perhaps seeking more knowledge of the complex as the need for it arises. And so with our analysis of the institutional process: we must select for study elements that are as distinct, typical, and manageable as we can hope to find, and subject them to intensive study in a setting of such knowledge of the milieu as we can get, expecting that an increase of this knowledge will be one result of our study.

But just what is it that we want to know about the behavior of small institutions? Suppose that we have captured one and have it under observation; What shall we observe? I presume that our aim is to understand what part the form of life we have before us

plays in the social process, and also, perhaps, to foresee its operation, know how to influence it, and, by comparison, extend our knowledge to other forms more or less similar. A mature science of such forms should apparently include the ascertainment of types and an intimate knowledge of the distinctive working of each.

I suppose that every institution holding its own in the world must have a special character and function which explains its power to live. Perhaps our first aim should be to ascertain this character and function, to find out how it appeals to human nature and is enabled to enlist a share of human vitality in its service. Commercial institutions, for example, have in general obvious functions, but an adequate characterization of a successful institution of trade would have to include also those subtle traits of organization and spirit which explain just how and why this institution is viable while others, if they are viable, are so in a different way. I have had to do, for instance, with several publishing concerns, and am of the opinion that their distinctive behaviors would make an instructive study. And even general functions are not always obvious. In the case of the Ku Klux Klan research might be required at the outset to see why such an institution should exist at all. Or consider college football, an institution that has had a rank growth under our own eyes. There is something more in it than the obvious athletic functions; you could not explain it without going into crowd psychology, its exploitation by an organized athletic interest attached to the educational system (a "cancerous growth" as some hold), and the use of the game by college officials as a means of mobilizing alumni. And so patriotic institutions, like the National Security League; political, like Tammany Hall; religious, like the Salvation Army; juvenile gangs, already an object of notable studies—these and many others would probably yield curious fruits to the searching investigator.

This intimate and distinctive character of an institution might

be compared to the theme of a symphony, continually recurring, and of which the whole organism of the music is a various unfolding. Like that it is a pattern running through the web which this particular loom turns out. To ascertain this and set it forth may call for as much imagination and insight as to distinguish and describe the ego of a person. And like that it becomes, when we have grasped it, the focus of our study.

After ascertaining its character or theme we may, I suppose, go on to inquire just how the institution develops and works under various conditions, how it acts and reacts and is modified, how its character may, in time, come to be transformed. It will have mechanisms of attack and defense, methods of recruiting and training, and, so far as its processes are conscious, some provision for investigation, discussion, valuation, planning, and propaganda. There will also be interactions within the institution between its heritage and the persons who carry it on, as in the case of leaders and experts; also discipline and an equipment of suitable mores. All this the student must enter heartily into if he is to understand how the life of the institution is sustained and enhanced.

It so happens that without any plan on my part, but on the initiative, chiefly, of the students themselves, there have recently been carried out at the Michigan Graduate School several investigations more or less of the sort I have indicated. Among these the best example of a completed study is the dissertation of Read Bain, presented in 1926, entitled, "The Growth of an Institution: A Sociological Interpretation of the Tillamook County Creamery Association of Tillamook, Oregon." This is a whole-hearted study of the life-history of a farmers' organization old enough to have had a well-defined and successful institutional development. Dr. Bain writes in no abstract or merely academic spirit, but with a hearty participation in his subject, manifest in the descriptive

parts, which include a sympathetic chapter on "The Cow." The specific character, life-processes, and transformations of the institution are convincingly set forth and illuminating comparisons made with other institutions of somewhat similar type. The whole subject of producers' co-operation is brought into clearer view, and this view extends, in some measure, to the wider theory and practice of co-operation and to its probable future. A consideration of this cheese-producing association has suggested to Dr. Bain the possibility of a rural county becoming an integrated social organization built around the dominant agricultural interest. This may or may not be practicable, but to suggest such possibilities and investigate their practicability is surely one of the higher aims of research.

Another completed study of somewhat similar nature is the investigation of student association at Michigan by Robert C. Angell, which will appear as a book, under the title *The Campus*, during the present winter. This is a study, not of a single institution, but of a limited institutional complex, of very recent growth, remarkably open to observation, and of much significance for education and for the social process at large. The author may be called a "participant observer," to use Mr. Lindeman's term, relying quite as much upon his own recent familiarity with campus life as upon the statistics he has collected, and so is able to animate his facts by authentic interpretation. When we have a number of such studies, as we doubtless shall have, they will considerably illuminate American education.

A third study is still going on; and of studies still going on the less said, perhaps, the better. They should be allowed to retain that embryonic seclusion and indetermination which a premature publicity would impair. But probably no harm will be done by saying that it is concerned with an institution devoted to a specific

social reform, and presumably more or less typical of institutions of that sort. Such a study, if competently carried out, should give us some insight into those processes of social leadership and control with which such institutions deal.

The type of research which I have been discussing seems to me to be quite as promising as others which are more in favor. At least it is one way by which we may hope to extend our knowledge of what is going on in the world and our power to control the process.

CHARLES H. COOLEY

STEREOTYPES

The term "stereotypes" was coined by Lippmann to designate those pictures in our heads which represent the supposed appearance of individuals of certain races, classes, occupations, and social groups. The notion had of course had a long history prior to Lippmann. It must suffice to note here that the idea of stereotypes calls to mind that of collective representations; also that in discussing stereotypes one is compelled sooner or later to use the language of the *Gestalt* psychologists.

Dr. Rice devised a technique for the statistical study of stereotypes. He published an article on the subject in a recent issue of the *Journal of Personnel Research*. New material has now been gathered and certain improvements in the statistical technique have been arrived at by applying it to a larger number of cases, which is the reason for the present paper.

Three propositions can be put forward: (1) The existence of stereotypes can be demonstrated and their action measured statistically. (2) These stereotypes have a relation to occupational classifications. (3) The action of stereotypes is bound up with our estimates of personal traits such as intelligence and craftiness.

For these I shall give statistical evidence, going into detail as much as possible concerning the method.

The material presented was obtained by an experiment in which 258 students of Dartmouth College (male), 31 members of the Norwich Vermont Grange (mixed), 158 Wharton School students (male), 75 girls of the Southern Illinois Normal University, and fifty girls of the School of Education of the University of Pennsylvania participated. All of these were in small groups and constituted a total of 572 persons.

In the *Boston Herald* for December 15, 1924, were found nine portraits of persons represented in the day's news. The reproductions were unusually clear and were uniformly about 2×3 inches in size. They were placed without identification upon a sheet of paper and were lettered from A to I. In the first part of the experiment the subjects were informed that the sheet contained the pictures of a bootlegger, a European premier, a bolshevik, a United States senator, a labor leader, an editor-politician, two manufacturers, and a financier. Suggestions as to identity were carefully avoided. The job set was that of identifying these individuals by letter and of arranging them in order of rank,

first with respect to intelligence, second with regard to craftiness, the latter trait being defined as that characteristic which would lead one to take an unfair advantage in a business negotiation. In case an individual was recognized, he was to be left out of the identifications and the ratings. After an interval of one week those participating in the experiment were given the correct identifications and asked to rank the individuals again in these two qualities, without reference to previous estimates. It was then divulged that the individuals to be identified were: Premier Herriot, labor-leader Duncan, soviet-envoy Krassin, financier McIntosh, editor-Governor Glynn, bootlegger Max

TABLE I

	*1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Premier Herriot . .	36	17	75	1	1	8	1		139	15	162	1.16	1
Labor-leader Duncan .	21	19	20	35	11	6	39	4	155	17	62	.4	7
Soviet-envoy Krassin .	70	4	17	20	7		17	22	157	17	118	.75	3
Financier McIntosh .	4	23	12	12	25	32	29	21	158	18	62	.39	8
Editor-politician Glynn	3	22	5	25	36	3	53	8	155	17	100	.64	5
Bootlegger Agel . .	1	14	4	9	24	83	23		158	18	146	.91	2
Manufacturer Schwab		27	2	13	22	4	69	16	154	17	101	.65	4
Manufacturer Heinz .	3	18	11	31	20	12	51	10	156	17	61	.39	9
Senator Pepper . .	1	14	7	7	11	10	32	30	112	12	52	.46	6
Total	139	158	153	153	157	158	314	111
Chance	15	18	17	17	17	18	35	12
Departures	160	42	122	86		162	145	79
Index of departure .	1.15	.26	.80	.56	.51	1.02	.46	71
Rank	1	9	3	5	8	2	6&7	4

*Key to columns: 1, premier; 2, labor leader; 3, bolshevik; 4, financier; 5, editor-politician; 6 bootlegger; 7, manufacturer; 8, senator; 9, total; 10, chance; 11, departures; 12; index of departure; 13, rank.

Agel, manufacturer Schwab, manufacturer Heinz, and Senator Pepper. The pictures were shown for the second time and the entire rating was done *de novo*.

The identifications made by 158 Wharton School students are shown in Table I. The names of the individuals are given in the rows. The columns may be read straight across as shown in the key. You will notice that 36 students identified Herriot as premier; 17, as labor leader; 75, as bolshevik; 1, as financier; 1, as editor; 8, as bootlegger; 1, as manufacturer; and none, as senator. Others recognized him and left him out of their identifications and their ratings. Bootlegger Agel was identified 83 times as bootlegger, no doubt because of his outdoor costume and the pose with the turned up collar and the cigar. This

is the largest number of correct identifications. The numbers in the column headed Manufacturers are larger than the others; it should be remembered that the students were asked to find two manufacturers.

The principle of probabilities underlies the interpretation of this data. It is not the correctness or incorrectness of the identifications that is significant. It is the degree of concentration of identifications which indicates the existence of stereotypes, and of stereotypes having a considerable degree of similarity. (If stereotypes were different in every different mind, their existence would not be revealed by this method.)

As an inference from the principle of probabilities, if the distribution of these identifications were governed wholly by chance, we should expect a fairly smooth distribution, about the same number in each space. A glance at the table shows that this is not the case. There are bunchings of as high as 83, 75, 70, and 69. This is not at all the sort of distribution we should expect to get by chance. The theoretical chance distribution is obviously biased by something; we assume that it is biased by the action of stereotypes. Since some measure of the amount of concentration was desirable, Dr. Rice devised the index of departure from expectation, a modified form of coefficient of variation. Following the column of totals is a column headed chance. In this is given the number of identifications we should expect to find in each space if the distribution were governed wholly by chance. It is obtained by dividing the total by nine; the column headed Manufacturer has a double weight. The number is the same as the mean.

Following the column headed Chance is a column headed Departures, which contains the total numbers of departures from expectation in each row. Thus in the first space we have 36 identifications; we should expect 15; the number of departures is 21. In the third space we have 75 identifications; the number of departures is 60; the total number of departures for the first row is 162. The index of departure from expectation for any row is obtained by dividing the total number of departures from expectation for that row by the total number of identifications in that row. This index measures the amount of bunching in the distribution of any row or column. A high index shows a high degree of bunching. The indices are here computed by both columns and rows, which was not done when the method was used previously. They seem to be equally significant. The indices for rows show that the individuals shown in the pictures conform to prevalent stereotypes, so that the distribution of their identifications is not smooth. The indices for columns show that stereotypes for certain of the occupations mentioned exist, and that some of the individuals in the group conform to these stereotypes.

The indices of departure from expectation for individuals and for occupations are given in Tables II and III. The three individuals who usually show the highest indices are: Herriot, Krassin, and Agel. The indices for occupations are also interesting. Notice that the following four are the four high indices in the Dartmouth, Wharton School, and Normal School distributions: the premier, the bootlegger, the bolshevik, and the senator. In the figures for

TABLE II

INDICES OF DEPARTURE FROM EXPECTATION FOR INDIVIDUALS

	Dartmouth	Grange	Wharton School	Normal School	School of Education
Premier Herriot	1.20	1.36	1.16	1.34	1.08
Labor-leader Duncan35	.71	.4	.70	.36
Soviet-envoy Krassin84	1.42	.75	.78	1.12
Financier McIntosh30	.71	.39	.30	.44
Editor-politician Glynn48	.63	.64	.65	.52
Bootlegger Agel	1.02	1.50	.91	1.09	.96
Manufacturer Schwab57	.80	.65	.86	.60
Manufacturer Heinz47	.71	.39	.57	.44
Senator Pepper27	.46	.46	.57	.52

TABLE III

INDICES OF DEPARTURE FROM EXPECTATION BY OCCUPATION

	Dartmouth	Wharton School	Normal School	School of Education
Premier92	1.15	1.24	1.12
Labor-leader44	.26	.38	.44
Bolshevik63	.80	1.29	1.04
Financier38	.56	.46	.60
Editor-politician33	.51	.52	.48
Bootlegger	1.17	1.02	1.24	.84
Manufacturer39	.46	.53	.51
Senator70	.71	.70	.56

the School of Education the financier crowds out the senator for the fourth place. The labor leader is always low in the scale. This suggests the possibility of research as to the type of person concerning whom we have stereotypes. The present distribution is of course partly due to the choice of pictures.

We thus find when this experiment is repeated with different groups that the same sort of distribution is repeated. There are differences, and these also should be enlightening; but the uniformity may be taken as evidence of the validity of the data. We find the same high indices for persons, indicating that

these persons correspond more or less to prevalent stereotypes, and the same high indices for occupations, indicating that there are stereotypes corresponding to those occupations.

My third proposition was that these stereotypes are connected with estimates of personal traits such as intelligence and craftiness. You will remember that those taking the test were asked to rank the individuals in intelligence and craftiness. A chart was prepared showing the ranking in intelligence according to the supposed occupation. (Unfortunately this chart, on account of its complexity, cannot be reproduced here.) Thus, Duncan was identified as

TABLE IV
INTELLIGENT SCORES

	Wharton School			Normal School			Education		
	*1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
A. Herriot49	.72	.75	.28	.46	.66	.51	.71	.70
B. Duncan52	.32	.45	.55	.51	.30	.55	.51	.56
C. Krassin69	.44	.37	.67	.44	.26	.74	.48	.44
D. McIntosh50	.62	.74	.40	.68	.69	.44	.58	.63
E. Glynn65	.66	.54	.59	.61	.59	.58	.57	.47
F. Agel30	.12	.18	.22	.10	.12	.29	.13	.20
G. Schwab52	.54	.52	.69	.53	.48	.54	.54	.47
H. Heinz58	.45	.52	.62	.55	.48	.54	.50	.47
I. Pepper44	.56	.68	.50	.62	.82	.43	.61	.61

*Key to columns: 1, individual scores—first test; 2, individual scores when correct identification was given; 3, occupational scores.

premier 31 times, by those who so identified him he was ranked first in intelligence four times; second, seven times, etc. The dependence of the estimate of intelligence upon the occupational identification may be shown roughly by this chart, which must also be studied both by columns and by rows. The distribution of ranks looks more like a random distribution when studied by rows than when studied by columns. Thus the real United States senator got seven firsts, seven seconds, seven thirds, nineteen sixths, seemingly what might very well have occurred by chance. But the senator column got thirty first places.

In order to treat this material statistically, a scoring system was used, giving a weight of eight points to every first place, seven to every second, etc., down to the ninth place, which carried no weight. Percentages of possible scores are shown in Table IV. In parallel columns are shown scores of individuals on the first test, where the occupation is unknown, scores by individuals where the occupation and identification are given, and scores by occupation.

Which is the more important in determining the final estimate as given in column 2—where the correct identification is known—the appearance of the individual, or his occupation? If the appearance is more important, columns 1 and 2 will show a closer correlation than columns 2 and 3. The degree of correspondence in these columns, in terms of the Spearman rho, is as follows:

Columns 1 and 2: Wharton School, .035; Normal School, .1; School of Education, $-.2$ (minus two-tenths).

Columns 2 and 3: Wharton School, .925; Normal School, .825; Education, .925.

The estimate of intelligence when the correct identification is given thus corresponds very closely to the estimate of intelligence already expressed for the occupation. It would thus seem that, given a pictorial impression of a person, we classify him as to occupational or social group and then supply the estimate of personal qualities from this.

The subject of stereotypes seems likely to prove an interesting and fruitful topic of research. Dr. Samuel Fernberger, of the department of psychology of the University of Pennsylvania, had put in my hands a manuscript giving the results of an investigation of the relation of suggestion to stereotypes. Using the standardized Piderit models as a basis for his experiments, and employing two degrees of suggestion, he finds that the identification of facial expressions is greatly influenced by suggestion. A moderate degree of suggestion is about as effective as a greater degree. The implications of Fernberger's study are far-reaching and should be noted by all students of public opinion and political action.

A number of questions concerning stereotypes seem worth mentioning. Of whom do we have stereotypes? How are they formed? Do they disappear upon intimate acquaintance with members of a particular group? How do they enter into the formation of political attitudes? Are stereotypes really representative of social types? Do we have stereotypes of pictures, or of rôles? Photographic, or dramatic, stereotypes? What is the relation of pictorial stereotypes of stereotyped ideas?

STUART A. RICE
WILLARD WALLER

SPECIAL-INTEREST GROUPS IN RURAL SOCIETY

The transition from locality to interest group arrangements on the part of country people is one of the keys to an understanding of organization movements in rural society at the present time. Fundamental changes are taking place in rural group relationships. Locality no longer holds the farmer and his family to such restricted social or business contacts as formerly. They are more free to make associations on the basis of special interests and particular desires. Greatly increased facilities for transportation and communication have made this possible.

The special interests about which such rural groups form, as shown by a case study of 351 local organizations in five Wisconsin counties, are many and varied. Twelve were isolated and seven were fully analyzed. The terms used by the people themselves as they told the story of their organizations are the terms used to designate these interests, as follows: social enjoyment, better farming, help school and teacher, better business, young people's interests, health and social welfare, home improvement, public and civic affairs, general community betterment, unite locals, mutual improvement, help church and preacher.

The professional names and forms which these organizations took will be recognized from the following which may be cited as typical: Geneva Parent-Teacher Association, Fish Creek Horticultural Society, Lake View Community Club, LaGrange Horseshoe Club, Treadwell Women's Sewing Club, Campbell Library Club, Scott Sheep Club, Mormon Coulee Gun Club, County Holstein Breeders' Association, Browns Valley Home-Makers' Club, May Glee Club, and Waterford Poultry Association.

It is important to know that such trade or professional names give very little if any clue to the real purposes or interests involved. For example, the Sylvania Community Club is a woman's club; the French Island Community Club is a cemetery association; the Grantsburg Equity Farmers Co-op Association is a farmers' grocery store; the Perida Willing Workers Society is a women's club; the Chipmunk Coulee Lecture Club is a young people's school club; the May Glee Club is a farmers' community club.

Therefore it became necessary for classification and analysis to resort to the functional basis. From this procedure it became evident at once that

such groups are not single in their interests, in fact, only 34 per cent of all the organizations were found to be mono-functional, that is, centered about a single dominant interest, while 41 per cent were bi-functional and 24 per cent had more than two central interests. The analysis of the various combinations which these functions assumed told an exceedingly interesting story. Some harked back to the old general type of locality organization on the neighborhood scale; others had moved on to a high degree of specialization.

In summary, by way of statement of the problem, it may be suggested that these groups, the analysis of which is next to be presented, are more largely determined by the interests, the deliberate intent, the purposive action of people than by locality relations. Locality groups have lateral or geographic dimensions. Interest groups have perpendicular or psycho-cultural dimensions. Locality groups depend upon *common* life, proximity, residence in a recognized physical area. Interest groups depend upon polarity, promotion, *special* concerns, leadership, deliberate effort. This polarity implies fields of magnetic influence. When thus released from locality restrictions certain people are attracted to certain of these poles of interest.

In these voluntary associations, therefore, one person allies himself with others of like interests and is often identified with many such groups at the same time. Obviously, not all these group associations can have like meaning for this one individual. Some will have personal or primary claim on him; others will be impersonal and indefinite. Thus arise problems of overlapping or conflicting loyalties and questions of the organization of rural society as a whole.

The method employed for the analysis of these groups was, first, a classification on the basis of the various interests. This classification could not be exclusive, as was pointed out before; that is, one interest for each professional form of organization. The outstanding characteristic of these groups is that they are not simple or single in their interests. Therefore some organizations fell into two or more of the interests or functional classes.

The next step was to determine and then to chart the various modal characteristics of all the organizations and of each of the interest classes. Space will not permit even a summary of this modal analysis. General modal characteristics of all organizations were placed in contrasting position with the distinguishing modal characteristics of the different interest classes. This included detailed charts for each of the following main headings: Origins and purposes, leadership and promotion, membership and participation, programs

and activities, policies and problems. Some of the important variable factors were compared by simple correlations to show their relationships, and finally the characteristic processes were described.

The last step in the analysis was the presentation of case studies of individual groups and of intergroup movements.

Finally, but three of the more interesting and important findings can be suggested here. Probably the most interesting discovery was the cycles in the natural history of such groups. These cycles may be designated as periods of stimulation, rise, carrying-on, and decline. Each period has its own characteristics and its own modes of behavior. The oldest were the "better business" groups and the youngest the "young people's interests."

This cycle may be presented diagrammatically. Following a period of rather hurried stimulation comes a rapid rise when the organization starts quickly and grows rapidly. Then follows a rather lengthy carrying-on period in which the intensity of interest and support may be indicated by a hill and valley curve. Then follows the decline, which occasionally may be rather abrupt, but which most frequently is rather gradual, resulting in inactivity. Superimposed upon this picture might well be the stimulation and rise of other groups coming up at almost any time. Particularly can another be expected to appear on the scene as the first shows a tendency to decline.

Secondly, interesting correlations were found between the more important variable factors. For example, between length of life and activities and between participation and adaptability. A summary chart was made so that these comparisons of relationships could be read either vertically or horizontally. Perhaps the most significant set of factors within control of the local group is connected with change. Reading from this chart vertically it is found that the organizations that have made changes have the larger membership, have the larger attendance, plan their meetings longer in advance, have a greater number and variety of projects, have more social activities of all types, have the more definite future plans, have the more program and membership difficulties, but less leadership and community troubles, and that they live the longest. If organizations wish to do these things, and most of them do, this becomes a strong argument for adaptability.

Thirdly, these interest groups do not exist for long by themselves; they are dependent upon other sources for stimulation and motivation. When one type or professional form of local organization is found, usually several others can be found nearby or at least within the same county. This coexistence

and interrelation soon results in a sort of movement. Two prevalent ways for intergroup movements to start were found. The first and most frequent was the professionally promoted with a ready-made pattern. The second was the locally initiated or indigenous type. Such movements frequently became councils or federations of locals with rather widely different forms and interests. In either case these intergroup movements produced characteristic processes and in turn followed characteristic life-cycles.

J. H. KOLB

CASE STUDIES ON THE RÔLE OF RELIGION IN THE DISSOCIATED FAMILY

The case-study method is one of particular value in the study of family dissociation. As Mowrer and Groves have demonstrated, a fundamental element in dissociated family life is failure in personality response, and it is only by detailed consideration of the personality relations involved in a number of families that an understanding of their significance can be reached. Certain difficulties are, however, involved in the procuring of cases for such studies. Social-agency records suffer from the selective influence necessarily involved in their making, namely, poverty, delinquency, psychopathy, and the like. Divorce and marriage-annulment records represent a fairly general sampling of the population, but are often distorted by their necessary conformity to the formal, and often artificial, requirements of legal processes. Moreover, such cases often do little more than register the terminal stage of family dissociation, giving little of the diffuse processes that have preceded the final débâcle.

There is needed a body of case studies based on an average cross-section of the population, suffering no more from poverty, illness, physical difficulty, conflict with the law, and psychopathic trouble than any random sample of the population, and representing family conflict in all stages, from the partially masked cleavages in a superficially close-knit family to the definitely disrupted family unit.

An attempt has been made to secure such case records at the University of Buffalo, and at a summer session of the University of Colorado, by requiring advanced students in sociology to present accounts of family situations that have come under their direct observation. This plan has been in operation over a period of three years, and has resulted in the securing of some one hundred cases.

Although no attempt has been made to arrange these cases according to any formal scheme of classification, nevertheless certain of them have exhibited such similarities in respect to certain feature as to make them fall naturally into various type-groups. One such group is composed of those cases in which religion has taken a prominent place in the life of some member of the family constellation. Three of these cases are presented herewith.

Case A is concerned with a man and woman now well advanced toward old

age. Although the husband and wife are markedly contrasted in temperament, the wife being aggressive, dominating, and society loving, while the husband is retiring, physically ineffective, and "unworldly," there was no serious break in the family until two catastrophes overtook it. The first was the husband's failure in business; the second was the wife's discovery that she could have no children other than the son born shortly after her marriage. Before this both husband and wife had been moderately active church members. After this the wife gradually withdrew from the church and devoted herself to her son, while the husband gave more and more time to his religious interests, took a less and less active share in the direction of his family affairs, and made an increasingly feeble effort to support his family.

His son is now approaching middle life. Since his first entry into business he has succeeded to an unusual degree, and now supports his father and mother as well as himself. Though personally attractive, he has not married. His mother's interests and affections are almost completely absorbed in him, her fond admiration for her successful son being sharply contrasted to the good-natured disdain and petty tyrannizing which she bestows upon her diffident and incompetent husband. The latter has entirely given up his business connections and directs all his energies into the one religious channel. During the week he is an assiduous reader of religious journals. On Sunday he zealously assumes his position as leader of a large Bible class of "young" women, a position and a class at which his wife delights to poke fun upon any occasion.

Case B is that of a family which was definitely broken by the desertion of the husband over a decade ago. He continued to contribute to the support of the family, which includes three sons, although this support was hardly necessary in view of the fact that his wife possessed a large private income. The management of her property and her children, however, has engaged her only sporadically. A recurrently dominant interest has made a greater appeal during the years, and has now resulted in the dissipation of her fortune and in a situation which finds her children full-grown, without the money to which they were accustomed during childhood and without the equipment to earn their own living in a systematic way. Their mother, originally from an old southern family, found herself, at the beginning of her marriage, in a western coast city noted, among other things, for its hospitality to religious charlatans. After her husband left her she devoted herself and her money to a curious succession of dispensers of salvation: an advocate of laughing exercises for mental and physical ills, an Oriental mystic preaching strict adherence to a diet of uncooked vegetables as a means of attaining spiritual perfection, an esoteric philosopher

with a formula for eternal youth and lasting peace, as well as the general run of teachers of New Thought and of various forms of mental healing. But the gracious thanks for her devotion and financial support, the fluttering odds and ends of creed and ritual that comprise her religious philosophy, are not the only products of her religious career. There is the remembered glow of devotion in company with fellow-believers, and, when these companions in worship have been of the other sex, there has been the warmer glow of assurance that they were pursuing, not only a common religious ideal, but her personal attention and esteem as well. And she cannot understand, now that her children have left behind the years of a childhood during which their mother's attitude alternated between domineering severity and lavish displays of affection, why they, too, are not drawn to the succession of religious dramas in which she enthusiastically plays her part.

Case C has to do with a man of middle age who has been identified since boyhood with a church of rigid puritanical traditions. Although it was at a church social that his wife met him, she quickly dropped out of church activities after her marriage, giving the bulk of her time and slender strength to the care of a rapidly growing family. The husband gradually forged ahead in church affairs, to become at last a trustee and superintendent of the Sunday school. In this position he began to devote considerable attention to young women choir singers, Sunday school teachers, and so forth. When it was suggested that this conduct in a man of his standing was causing comment, he affected helpless indignation at the pursuit the young women made after him, and in all virtue passively permitted their ejection, one after another, from the church.

Recently, however, his marked attentions to the soprano soloist aroused so much gossip that the minister and his wife made a point of verifying certain stories to the effect that they were meeting together surreptitiously. The board of trustees had a hurried meeting, and as a result the man was forced to resign from all his church offices. The girl, the only daughter of an unhappily mated couple, met the various reports of their meeting together with a futile combination of defiance and equivocation. She and her parents remained in the church only a short time, and then transferred to another, more cordial, congregation. Her mother steadily ignored certain aspects of the situation, and has indeed at times mildly encouraged the man's attentions to her daughter. After his demotion in his own church the man began to attend another of the same denomination, and now, unaccompanied either by his wife or the choir singer, takes an unobtrusive part in the services.

As may be seen, religion has played a positive and constructive rôle in none of these cases. In Case A, the church appeared to the husband as a source of solace and compensation at a time of serious crisis in his family affairs. Instead of attempting to solve this crisis he fled from it into the welcoming haven of his church activities and associations, allowing this critical situation to become stabilized into dissociation. In Case B, the mother's mystical meanderings have not only deprived her children of resources necessary for their support and education, but have also taken from them a large share of her time, energy, and interest. In Case C, church activities have not only widened the cleavage between husband and family, but have also built up a set of associations directly inimical to the integrity of the family itself.

It is to be noted that these cases deal only with disorganized families, and it may be that, in a study of well-integrated families, religion would appear to play a constructive and positive rôle. It must, nevertheless, be said that so far as concerns the series of cases from which these three families have been drawn, religion and the church seem to have played no vital part in reinforcing family life.

NILES CARPENTER
GWENDOLYN DOUGHTON

CORRELATION OF RATE OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY WITH CERTAIN INDICES OF COMMUNITY OR- GANIZATION AND DISORGANIZATION

During recent years there has been an increasing emphasis placed upon the study of juvenile delinquency from the point of view of its relation to the community situation in which it occurs. This growing emphasis upon the study of the community is clearly manifest in the published works of Dr. William Healy, whose studies, probably more than those of any other single student, reflect the general trend in the field. Healy's first studies, published in *The Individual Delinquent*, emphasized particularly the medical and psychological aspects of delinquent behavior. In his latest book, *Delinquents and Criminals; Their Making and Unmaking*, he stresses the community background as a causal factor in delinquency. This opinion is clearly expressed in the following quotation: "We have long been thoroughly persuaded that one of the most important phases of the situation with regard to delinquency anywhere is the spirit of the community, difficult as this is to define. This spirit is itself evolved from many forces in the life and cultural history of the community. . . . The moral spirit of the community is easily reflected in the conduct of its children."

From the study of a large number of male juvenile delinquents in Chicago we have been impressed by the great influence which social contacts outside of the home, in the community, seem to have upon the development of delinquent trends of behavior. The decided concentration of delinquents in certain areas of the city, the geographical localization of certain kinds of delinquencies, the extremely high frequency of instances of stealing by groups of two or more boys (91 per cent of 6,466 unselected instances of stealing involved two or more participants), and the large number of cases in which the influence of older and more experienced offenders appears as an important factor are findings which seem to reflect community influence. At present, our knowledge of community influences consists of little more than such general impressions as the foregoing ones. There is, therefore, urgent need for a more objective method to evaluate community factors in relation to the development of delinquent careers.

In our general study of male juvenile delinquents in Chicago, we have found that the rate of delinquency is in many respects a valuable quantitative

device for studying the community background of the delinquent. This rate is simply the percentage of male juvenile delinquents in the total male population between 10 and 16 years of age, computed upon the basis of the mile-square unit area. It is the purpose of this paper to briefly illustrate the application of this method to the study of male juvenile delinquency.

The first step in the computation of the rate of delinquency was to make a spot map showing the distribution of places of residence of the 9,243 alleged delinquents (10-16 years of age) who were brought into the thirty-seven police stations of Chicago during 1926. The cases in each square-mile area were counted and tabulated. From the Local Community Research Committee of the University of Chicago, which had previously tabulated the 1920 federal census population data of Chicago by one-quarter-mile tracts, we obtained the total 10-16 year male population in each of the 499 tracts of the city. These data were then tabulated by mile-square areas. Thus, having tabulated the number of delinquents and the total 10-16 male population, the rate of delinquency was computed for each of the 181 mile-square areas of the city.

The rate of delinquency, computed by geographical units of uniform size, provided an objective basis for the comparative study of the number of arrested juvenile offenders living in different areas. When such comparison was made (see Map I) it was discovered that a disproportionately large number of delinquents were living in the areas immediately surrounding the Loop—the central business district of Chicago. In these areas approximately 37 per cent of the males between 10 and 16 years of age were brought into police stations on delinquent complaints during 1926. It was found also that the rate progressively decreases toward the boundary of the city, ranging from 37.0, in the areas contiguous to the Loop, to less than 1.0 in the areas near the city limits. The rate was found to be relatively high in areas adjacent to such industrial properties as the Union Stockyards and the steel mills of South Chicago (see Map I, radials V, VI, and VII).

The rate of delinquency has been computed in two large series of cases of male delinquents brought into the Juvenile Court of Chicago. In each of these series the rates correspond very closely to those presented on Map I. The decided concentration of cases of delinquency in particular areas of the city, as revealed in each of the three series of cases studied, seems to suggest the probability of a close relationship between certain community backgrounds and the formation of delinquent patterns of behavior.

The method used in this study is that of the utilization of the Pearson correlation coefficient and correlation by ranks. As an illustration of the appli-

cation of this method to this kind of study we will present the correlation between rate of delinquency and (1) rate of family dependency (Series 1, 2, and 3), (2) percentage of families owning their homes, (3) percentage of foreign-born, (4) rate of increase or of decrease of population, and (5) percentage of aliens in the population.

Three series of cases were studied to determine the rate of family dependency, namely, the total number of families (6,000) that received financial aid from the United Charities and Jewish Charities during 1920 (Series I), the total number (1,700) of families that received financial assistance in the Mother's Pension Division of the Juvenile Court of Chicago in 1926 (Series II), and the families (900) represented by the 2,500 dependent children who appeared in the Juvenile Court of Chicago in 1926 (Series III). The cases in each series were plotted on a map of Chicago and tabulated by square-mile areas. The percentage of dependent families in the total number of families in each square-mile area was then computed.

The percentage of families owning their homes, the rate of increase or of decrease of population, the percentage of foreign-born, and the percentage of aliens in each mile-square area were obtained from the 1920 United States census report.

Table I shows a comparison of rate of delinquency and rate of family dependency (Series 1 and 2), percentage of families owning their homes, percentage of foreign-born, rate of increase or of decrease of population, and with percentage of aliens in the two series of mile-square areas along radials II and V (see Map I). Because of limitations of space, similar data for the other five radials cannot be presented. Radials II and V are presented because they yielded the highest and lowest rank correlations of the eight radials studied. The rank correlations in the last perpendicular column of Table I were computed upon the basis of the 36 one-quarter mile tracts comprising the 9 mile-square areas along each radial.

The data presented in Table I cannot be adequately discussed in this short paper. It should be pointed out, however, that the rate of each of the variables studied shows a marked tendency to vary with the rate of delinquency. This marked tendency is definitely indicated by the very high rank correlations. The variations in the rate of delinquency, rate of family dependency, percentage of families owning their homes, percentage of foreign-born, percentage of aliens, and rate of increase or decrease of population show a definite relationship to the types of areas that have resulted from the radial expansion of the city from the central business district.

Table II shows the coefficient of correlation between the rate of delinquency and family dependency (Series 1, 2, 3), rate of increase or decrease

TABLE I

RELATION BETWEEN RATE OF MALE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND RATE OF FAMILY DEPENDENCY (SERIES 1, 2), PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES OWNING THEIR HOMES, PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN-BORN, RATE OF DECREASE OR INCREASE OF POPULATION, PERCENTAGE OF ALIENS BY MILE-SQUARE AREAS ALONG RADIALS II AND V (SEE MAP I)

	RADIAL II									
	1st Mile (Ad- jacent the Loop)	2nd Mile	3rd Mile	4th Mile	5th Mile	6th Mile	7th Mile	8th Mile	9th Mile	Rank Cor- rela- tion
Rate of delinquency....	37.0	15.6	7.2	2.6	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.0
Rate of family depend- ency (Series I).....	4.7	2.4	1.5	0.25	0.30	0.07	0	0	0	+ .90
Rate of family depend- ency (Series II).....	3.9	0.8	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	+ .92
Percentage of families owning homes.....	4.5	11.3	25.5	33.0	41.0	47.0	53.5	53.5	70.0	- .82
Percentage of foreign- born.....	51.5	40.3	38.3	27.5	25.5	24.0	28.0	28.0	19.0	+ .92
Rate of decrease or in- crease of population..	-48.0	-24.2	-9.5	+26.6	+94.6	+74.3	+135.6	+135.6	+83.7	- .89
Percentage of aliens....	20.0	19.3	7.2	3.5	2.7	4.3	8.1	3.4	3.4	+ .88
	RADIAL V									
	25.0	14.0	12.7	13.3	15.1	6.0	0.3	0.7	0.8
Rate of delinquency....	25.0	14.0	12.7	13.3	15.1	6.0	0.3	0.7	0.8
Rate of family depend- ency (Series I).....	5.7	1.2	1.6	2.5	3.0	1.0	0.2	0.4	0.0	+ .79
Rate of family depend- ency (Series II).....	1.2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.4	0.1	+ .57
Percentage of families owning homes.....	8.0	14.0	28.0	27.0	22.0	39.0	63.0	70.0	70.0	- .60
Percentage of foreign- born.....	45.0	51.0	31.0	37.0	52.0	39.0	23.0	21.0	29.0	+ .50
Rate of decrease or in- crease of population..	-60.7	-44.7	-11.7	+ 1.8	+25.0	+82.8	+219.2	+300.0	+86.5	- .56
Percentage of aliens....	20.0	22.0	10.0	14.7	30.0	12.2	2.0	3.3	5.0	+ .62

of population, percentage of foreign-born, and percentage of families owning their homes, computed upon the basis of the 181 mile-square areas of Chicago. Here again the high correlations indicate the tendency of the variable factors to vary with the rate of delinquency in the different local areas.

TABLE II
CORRELATION BETWEEN RATE OF MALE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND RATE OF FAMILY DEPENDENCY (SERIES 1, 2, 3), RATE OF INCREASE OR DECREASE OF POPULATION, PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN-BORN, AND PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES OWNING THEIR HOMES

	Number of Square-Mile Unit Area	Pearson-R	Probable Error
Rate of dependency (Series 1)	181	+ .684	0.0278
Rate of dependency (Series 2)	181	+ .687	0.0278
Rate of dependency (Series 3)	181	+ .650	0.0297
Rate of increase or decrease of population	181	- .569	0.0345
Percentage of foreign-born	172	+ .645	0.0305
Percentage of families owning their homes	181	- .395	0.0422

Because this study is in a primary stage of development, no further interpretation of the findings will be attempted in this paper. The primary purpose of the paper was to suggest a method for the study of delinquency in its relation to community background.

CLIFFORD R. SHAW

CAUSAL RELATIONS IN DELINQUENCY RESEARCH

In attempting to discover factors that may be causally related to antisocial conduct, a fruitful method of procedure is the individual analysis of the subject, both constitutionally and environmentally. The method generally employed by the social and mental diagnostician is that of determining the make-up of the subject, both as an individual and in his relation to his surroundings. This approach known as the case work method, is the chief weapon whereby the social case worker and the psychiatrist attempt to determine causal power of elements ascertained. The material gathered consists generally of both subjective and objective information, qualitative as well as quantitative, although in most case analyses the former preponderates over the latter.

The method is a good one for purposes of diagnosis, particularly when in the hands of a skilled diagnostician, but it does not, in and of itself, in the opinion of the writer, yield measures of causal relations until the data obtained through the case work methods are statistically analyzed. To the extent that the data gathered are objective or are susceptible to objectification is it possible to apply the method of statistics with the intent of discovering and measuring causal inter-connectionisms.

The data that may be obtained on the individual delinquent by the case study method may be either in the form of attributes or variables. Examples of the former would be nativity, marital status of parents, and race. Examples of the latter, the variables, would be those traits that lend themselves to expressions in graduated units of amount such as intelligence, special aptitudes, room space in living quarters and, to a very limited extent, emotional responses.

The data on the individual delinquent, whether attributes, expressed in twofold categories indicating either the presence or absence of the trait in question, or in terms of variables yielding actual magnitudes of the trait, must be sufficiently objective for purposes of comparison with the general population or so-called non-delinquent groups to be amenable to causal relational analysis. For example, the factor, parental disharmony, in all probability a very important item, cannot be evaluated with reference to causal potency before it is sufficiently objectified on some scale of measurement which would make possible comparisons in this familial trait between delinquents and the

general population. It has often been stated that among juvenile delinquents the presence of sexual conflicts is rather common. However, no causal efficacy can be attributed to this factor until we objectify sufficiently by the process of analysis and simplification to make possible comparisons with those that are presumably not delinquent.

It might be of interest to point out some results of comparisons of attributes among delinquents with the general population obtained in a study made on delinquent boys in institutions of New York State. On the basis of comparison, an association between abnormal marital status of parents—death, divorce, or separation—and juvenile delinquency was found. For among delinquent boys 2.3 times as many parental marital abnormalities were found as among the presumably non-delinquent. The coefficient of colligation (an association coefficient found useful in this study) between total abnormal marital relations of parents and juvenile delinquency was found to be $+.30$.

On the same basis of comparison between delinquents and non-delinquents it was found that the death of the mother is more intimately associated with delinquency than the death of the father, although the death of both parents bears a closed relation to boyhood delinquency than the death of either one parent. Grossly considered, there is a relation between former presence in an orphan home and a delinquent career on the same basis of comparison with non-delinquents. However the relation between the factor "mother being obliged to be gainfully employed" singly considered, and boyhood delinquency, is slight if any. There is a slight positive association between size of family and boyhood delinquency on the basis of a comparison of attributes.

If we turn to variables we find on the basis of the gross comparative method that there is a high negative relation between verbal abstract intelligence and delinquency. The association between tested intelligence deficiency and male juvenile delinquency is about $+.60$. In the matter of emotional responses, determined by means of a psycho-neurotic inventory, we find a marked association between boyhood delinquency and irregular emotional patterns. The association coefficient in this relationship is about $+.40$.

An attempt at a refinement of this method of gross comparisons of attributes and variables as between the delinquent and presumably non-delinquent groups was made by the injection of the more refined method of comparison, namely, that of correlation. The method of correlation yields measures indicative of the relation in the magnitudes of any one variable factor considered and the problem under investigation, in our case, boyhood delinquency.

Two conditions must be met to make possible this type of correlational analysis: the factors themselves must be expressed in a series of gradations, and criteria for the evaluation of the constant under consideration need to be evolved.

In our study, two criteria for delinquency were utilized: one, called "extent of the delinquent career," was based simply upon the number of times the subject was brought to court due to conflict with the law; the second criterion, named "severity of the delinquent career," was judged on the basis of the magnitude of punishment in fines and imprisonments meted out for various misdemeanors and felonies during a certain period to a representative portion of offenders in New York State. Thus the average dollar-day sentence for each of the principal felonies and misdemeanors was utilized as a criterion for severity.

Both criteria are, of course, merely socio-legal in nature. When the various constitutional and environmental factors that were expressed in terms of variables were correlated with the criteria for delinquency expressed in unit amounts for the group of approximately 1,600 delinquent boys studied, we found to our disappointment that practically all of the correlations approximated zero. In all likelihood the criteria chosen were not sufficiently accurate measures of the antisocial behavior studied to yield positive relationships with the objective variables correlated.

Thus far we have been considering gross relations with reference to the factors analyzed, expressed either as attributes or variables. The gross comparative method in which an attempt is made at determining causal relations by comparing the frequency of occurrence of certain attributes in the delinquent population with that in the presumably non-delinquent population, or by means of the process of simple correlation, yields results that are very often misleading unless conditioning and qualifying factors are accounted for. There are certain qualifying attributes or variables, such as race, nationality, locality, social status, etc., that affect any relationship that may presumably exist between factors under examination and the phenomenon, delinquency. Unless these disturbing elements are properly accounted for and their influence upon the relationship under analysis measured, erroneous conclusions with reference to causal relations may result.

For example, the problem of the relation of intelligence to delinquency which has engaged the attention of many gifted psychological investigators has been quite erroneously appraised by the failure to recognize qualifying social

factors. We found in our study that because of the powerful effect that social status exerts upon intelligence selection, a large portion of the demonstrated intelligence inferiority among our delinquent boys may readily be attributed to the factor, social status, rather than to the condition, delinquency. The term "social status" is used rather loosely. In most cases the evaluation of this factor was approximated by utilizing an objective scale for the determination of parental occupational level. The coefficient of association $+.60$ between intelligence deficiency and delinquency obtained on the basis of a gross comparison dwindled to $+.12$ when comparisons were made with selected groups of somewhat similar social status. It was also found that the very nature of intelligence organization, such as the relation between abstract intelligence and concrete or mechanical intelligence, was affected by such items as social status and parentage groupings.

However, the relation between psycho-neurotic make-up and delinquency was found not to be materially affected by either social status or nationality which was indicative, at least within the limitations of our analysis, that this relation is pure and fairly intimate. When social status was accounted for by making comparisons with what might be termed an inferior social-status group in the non-delinquent population, the association coefficient of $+.30$ between marital status of parents and boyhood delinquency, obtained on the basis of gross-comparisons, was reduced to $+.16$. A positive association still exists but is certainly not as marked as it appeared to be prior to the consideration of the qualifying factor. An interesting result of this partial relation method whereby selected universes are utilized for comparisons in addition to unselected ones is that the relation between what we term the environmental factor of parental marital status and delinquency is even higher than that of intelligence and delinquency. This might appear surprising to those who have worked with the constitutional factor unconditioned by the social factor.

The intensity of the association between former residence in an orphan home and delinquency was reduced by about 40 per cent. Of course there are many other qualifying elements entering into this orphan-home relation, the discussion of which is prohibited by the time allowed for the paper. With reference to mothers gainfully employed, we found that among the presumably non-delinquent group of inferior social status there were even more mothers gainfully employed than in the delinquent group.

The conditioning factor, locality, came up for consideration when the relation between size of family and delinquency was considered. When comparing the distribution of the number of children in the families of our de-

linquent group with that obtained prior to our study on employed boys, sixteen to eighteen years of age, we found that there was an inverse relation between density of population in a given locality and size of family, the localities of denser population tending to yield larger families than the more sparsely populated districts. It was therefore necessary to eliminate the influence of the locality factor before the relation between size of family and delinquency could be established with the influence of this factor made constant.

The qualifying factors of course do not necessarily limit themselves to the effect of what we may term environmental factors upon a relationship between a constitutional factor and the phenomenon under investigation. They may disturb apparent relationships among constitutional factors themselves. For instance, the relation of physical status to boyhood delinquency, the former being determined by objective measures such as height, weight, and height-weight ratios, is influenced by the factor intelligence, due to the existing positive relation between physical status and mental status. On the basis of such qualifying factors as mental status, social status, race, and parentage we found that in physical status the delinquent boy was equal, if not superior, to the non-delinquent boy when the various disturbing variables are made constant.

This method of partial relations can, of course, be carried out to a considerable extent, limited only by available objective data and norms for selected universes. The variables may be treated through the method of partial correlation.

Now there are, of course, a number of criticisms voiced against the rigorous application of the statistical method to determine causal relations. In the first place, the dependence upon objective data limits the use of the method due to the fact that so much of our information is in terms of qualitative descriptions. However, if we pursue with sufficient seriousness the method of statistics in analyzing causal relations there will be forced upon the gatherers of information a mental attitude conducive to objectification, with a resultant increase in social measuring rods. The use of the case work method as an end, in and of itself, for purposes of causal analyses, without the appropriate statistical treatment of the data procured, should, in the opinion of the writer, be discouraged. For the by-products of this practice result in the attribution of causal potency to conspicuous elements in a given situation with conclusions that are very frequently invalid.

Another criticism that comes to mind is to the effect that the statistical method prevents the appraisal of the subject as a biological or social unit, and

nence results in erroneous views with regard to causal relations. A crude statistical treatment is, of course, guilty of this inadequacy, but a refined methodology, buttressed by a comprehensive vision of multiple causation, may escape this criticism to the extent of the availability of measuring instruments.

I believe we may have sufficient faith in the possibilities of the statistical approach to say in conclusion that with the evolution of sufficient data amenable to correlational analyses, the regression equation expressing the relative contributory weights of constitutional and environmental factors to delinquency will be made possible, ultimately yielding an instrument for the prediction of antisocial behavior, and hence the institution of methods of control.

JOHN SLAWSON

A SOCIOLOGICAL CLINIC FOR THE STUDY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY¹

The clinic and sociological research.—The clinic idea is an innovation in sociology and has developed out of a rather vigorous emphasis on research in recent years. The clinic at Nashville, accordingly, was not founded as dispensary for the diagnosis and treatment of social ills. On the other hand, it was established by the Department of Sociology at Vanderbilt as an outlet for, and an aid to, research.

The clinic is not merely a place to conduct research, but it is an avenue by which the sociologists can gain access to cases. And this is significant when we realize that the sociological pendulum has swung from armchair delineation of problems to the actual collection of raw data, and that at the same time there has been an increased emphasis and reliance on the case-study method in sociology. While the use of cases by sociologists is a big step in advance, heretofore they have had to rely on somebody else's cases, namely, those collected by social workers and psychiatrists. (Witness the sociological use of the Judge Baker Foundation cases.) We have been guilty of the same old borrowing "complex" of years ago, when we took over a few "principles" from biology, natural science, philosophy, ethics, psychology, economics, gave these ideas a "social" significance, and called the net result sociology. And while it is much better to borrow concrete data and actual observations than fictions and hypotheses, the time has come when we must collect our own materials and our own cases. A clinic established by sociologists enables them to find, study, and collect cases and to hunt for certain things that they have reason to believe are important. It is not enough to socialize or "sociologize" psychiatrists and social workers, to indicate the need for a more thoroughgoing sociological emphasis in their study of cases, and to indicate how to collect data in this overlooked increment of cases. On the other hand, it is important that sociologists make their own cases studies and procure the data which they think are significant.

While the present paper outlines the procedure developed for the study of juvenile offenders, the sociological clinic in Nashville has been used, with certain modifications of the approach herein stated, for research into cases of neg-

¹ Established by E. T. Krueger and Walter C. Reckless.

lected and foster children as well as for the investigation of disorganized families and adults. Indeed, we turn into the clinic all those advanced students in sociology whose thesis projects require the collection of cases.

Mobilization of resources.—The Nashville clinic at its present embryonic stage represents mainly a mobilization of resources in the city for the study of cases which fall within the general field of social pathology. It is maintained by the members of the department of sociology of Vanderbilt University, who direct its work and research. While a number of students working for advanced degrees are running cases in the clinic, at present we have assigned three research assistants (advanced students devoting half-time to research) to the task of making case studies of juvenile delinquents. By special arrangement with Vanderbilt Hospital we are able to clear our cases of children for routine medical and psychological examinations. A complete set of record forms, prepared by Dr. Krueger and myself, were donated to the clinic. An interviewing room devoted exclusively to the research of the clinic has been procured, the rent for which was obtained from one of the local civic organizations. Since there are no psychiatrists in the city who work with problem children, we are unable to procure psychiatric examinations for our cases. From the standpoint of an ideally complete case study, independent of the purposes for which it may be used, a psychiatric report would be highly valuable for each case, since it would supplement the data obtained by the sociological interviewer and investigator and would supply an interpretation of, and an emphasis on, the supposedly innate traits of personality. When it is necessary to inquire into the special abilities, affectivity and temperament of children—and we are unable to do this in all cases—we call upon the psychologists at Vanderbilt University and Peabody College for teachers to make these special tests.

The referring agency and administrative control.—Most of the cases studied by our clinic come to us from the juvenile court. While at present we are concentrating on juvenile delinquents, we have from time to time received cases from other social agencies, like the settlements, the charities organization, the Y.M.H.A., for study. An important essential for clinical research of this type is to have administrative control over the case, the study of which, therefore, is not hindered by superior authority. Research does not seem to prosper if one is told what to do and where to report to by inexpert superiors. Our hands are relatively free to conduct the case studies as we see fit.

It is understood that we undertake most of the cases for study purposes only. That is, we do not attempt to do correctional work. In return, however,

we make a report to the court or initiating agency summarizing our findings and suggesting recommendations for treatment on the basis of the data. In a few instances we undertake a case for study and treatment, especially if it is a baffling case, that is, one with which the agency failed. But in such instances we let it be known that we are not "medicine men." However, in these cases undertaken for readjustment it should be noted that treatment can be dealt with as an experiment in adjustment, with certainly less violence to the child than stereotyped prescriptions, uniform for all cases. And when one is really interested in trying a given program of adjustment as suggested by the data to see how it works or why it fails, treatment becomes research.

Restricted intake of cases.—In order to preserve the clinic for research we find it necessary to restrict the intake cases. A heavy load would force us to increase our facilities, which we cannot do, limit the quantity of data we would normally gather when not pressed, and affect the quality of data by necessitating short-cut methods. This year we have limited the intake of juvenile delinquents mainly to boys. And while we are unable to handle the cases of all boys who appear in court, we select those which, on the basis of the court's record, appear to present the most interesting problems for study. With three assistants we expect to study in detail fifty cases in nine months.

The interviewer and investigator combined.—In the larger child-guidance clinics, where specialization has been found necessary, we might say that a case passes through four hands: (1) the social worker, who makes the social investigation and gathers the background data on the child's family and neighborhood; (2) the physician, who performs the physical examination; (3) the psychologist, who gives mental tests; and (4) the psychiatrist, who diagnoses the child's personality through the interview. In the smaller child-guidance clinics the psychiatrist besides must frequently run the "physicals" and "psychologicals," while the duties of the social worker remain the same, namely, as an investigator in the field. In our clinic, although the "physicals" and "psychologicals" constitute a separate service on the case, we make no division between the expert who studies the child himself and a worker who collects the background data. Our research assistants undertake a combined study of both the child's personality (at least in its sociological aspects) and his social environment. They are therefore interviewers and investigators combined. And from the standpoint of research into juvenile delinquency and conduct problems, we find that it is advantageous to have the child and his social setting studied as a whole rather than the child and his physical and mental equipment investigated as a unit or separate units with his family and community frame-

work appended; for the expert, who follows the child into the home, the school-room, the play-ground for observation, not only gets closer to his case than he would if he stayed solely in his interviewing rooms, but also is actually able to check the child's own story, the mother's story, and so on with actual situations.

Flexibility in procedure.—We have attempted to introduce as much flexibility into the procedure of making a case study as possible. Of course, some routinized procedure is apparent. When a case is opened a summary of the court record (or the record of the referring agency) is made and the case cleared through the exchange. The child is interviewed, sent for physical and mental examinations; the mother and other members of the family are interviewed; family and neighborhood observations are made, and so forth. The order here given is not meant to indicate a stereotyped routine. As a matter of fact, a brief superficial interview with the child may begin the case, followed by medical and psychological examinations, or the latter may be delayed until most of the data from interview and observations in the field have been made. The point is that with an elastic procedure one can adapt research to the case rather than the case to research.

The final interview and check-up.—No matter in just what order the data has been collected on a given case, we have found that a final interview with the child is necessary to check on certain points in his previous story in view of the information obtained in the field, and particularly from the mother's story, and to follow up certain clues suggested in the data gathered from sources other than the child himself. The final interview is usually a part of the specific and pointed check-up on all of the data of each case, according to the recommendations made in clinical conference.

Clinical conferences.—After the data from all sources is collected and assembled—before, and therefore not including, the final interview and check-up—the case is presented in conference with those who comprise the clinic. The case is reviewed and the data are subject to criticism in regard to significance and completeness. Points for further study and more detailed observation are noted. And so are the apparent inconsistencies in the data. These call for re-check and correction by further interviews and notations in the field.

The discussion of the cases in these clinical conferences leads to a critique of the case-study method. If I were to summarize these critical discussions I would say that they center about three main points: first, the discussion of what facts are significant: second, the ways and means of procuring them; and third, the reliability of such data. The critique involving the first point

leads to a progressive testing and revision of an outline which serves as a guide in the accumulation of data on each case. The second point brings up the question of the technique of interviewing and of making observations in the field. The third question has to do with the possible distortion of the facts due to the bias of the outline, the personal equation of the interviewer or investigator, faulty technique, and so forth.

Many suggestions for improvement of our procedure and technique have grown out of these clinical conferences. And we have instituted the practice of recording a summary of the discussion at each conference, so that we are accumulating a journal of our experience.

There are really two parts to our outline as it now stands. The first part consists of the rather conceptualized schema covering the significant points to be observed in a case. This represents the guide for the accumulation of the objective facts, such as the medical examination, the I.Q. and other mental traits, the child's habits and behavior, the family and neighborhood situations confronting the child, and so on.

Subjective data.—The second part of the outline consists of guide questions to get at the subjective data, that is, the child's responses (or attitudes) to situations. For example, suppose that on investigation the sociologist finds commercialized vice present in the neighborhood of a delinquent girl. When the search for causative factors in this case takes place, after all the data is collected, how can we determine whether this condition played any direct part in causing the child's delinquency? Questions in the interview can be framed specifically to discover how the girl was affected by this neighborhood condition and how she responded to it, if at all directly. The same applies to situations within the family. Suppose that Johnny became delinquent after his parents were divorced. What direct effect did the family tensions and broken home have on him? They may not have had any immediate consequence, although the break-up may have rendered it increasingly difficult for the mother to control the boy. Thus it is that the second part of our outline is calculated to serve as a guide for getting subjective data from the child in regard to his world situated in the family and neighborhood, which, while objectively it appears to be the same for him as for his brother, is really much different.

The child's world.—The child's own family and community, therefore, are a part of his total world—sometimes a negative part—and may be said to consist of the particular ways in which he is affected by, and responds to, the social situations and relationships contained therein. In other words, his family and community are his real world, for they constitute his social environment as it rests in his mind.

However, the child's total world includes not merely that self-contained area of life within the family and community, but also his ambitions, hopes, aspirations, his imagined projection of himself into various situations, as well as his vicarious and idealized experiences. The second part of our outline is designed not only to procure the subjective data on the child's real world but also on his ideal world.

Parenthetically we might say that most of his troubles, discomforts, disappointments happen in his real world, that is, in his family and community; while he attempts to build over his real world in terms of his ideal world. Consequently, a very suggestive hypothesis, which of course needs to be checked, is, namely, that the behavior, which finally becomes delinquency, results from the effort on the part of the child to recast his real world in terms of his ideal world.

The attempt to penetrate the child's world, both real and ideal, is by no means original with us. Healy, although he did not place great emphasis on the value of subjective data, found many enlightening clues from the child's own story. Shaw (of Chicago) developed a technique for getting boys to write their own stories and found such documents very revealing. Shaw's method leads to a life-history, written by the child himself. But autobiographies of this sort, while extremely interesting and significant, can only be obtained in a very few instances, and even then they contain much irrelevant information and are bound to lack certain data of importance. Through the medium of the interview the particular facts in regard to the child's world can be gathered more readily and efficiently.

Data recorded in concrete terms.—We have insisted that the data, no matter whether collected in the field or from interviews, no matter whether objective or subjective, should be recorded in descriptive language. Interviews are written up in the language of the child or parent. Observations are noted in concrete terms. In other words, we avoid the use of concepts in recording data. For example, if the child is found persistently to do the opposite thing from what its father tells it, conceptually we might make an entry of negativism on the books. If "concepts" are substituted for concrete behavior, no one, except the person who made the case study, can get behind them to the actual raw data. Even he would have to rely on memory. The use of technical language is, to be sure, necessary as a short-cut method when a child-guidance clinic is swarmed with cases waiting diagnosis and recommendations. However, the technically recorded and conceptually abbreviated case is practically worthless from the standpoint of research. On the other hand, concretely recorded data is open to the check of others; for they can see just what facts were observed, question

their reliability or the analysis made of them, and can use these facts to compare with the concrete facts of other cases.

Capturing vocabulary.—A very important part of the effort to record data in concrete terms is the attempt to capture the vocabulary of the person interviewed. That is, when the interview with a child or parent is written up, the individual's own language should be used. The record then becomes more of a primary than a secondary source of data. It becomes much more of a record of language responses, which is the main avenue for procuring subjective data and for discovering the world of the child.

While we are familiar with the various aids which facilitate the recording of data obtained in interviews, such as the use of stenographer, dictaphone, and so forth, we have had to rely on the investigator's unassisted recording. In some instances our investigators have found that, without hindrance to rapport, they were able to make a few notes, using the key phrases of the person interviewed. These notes serve as an aid to the detailed recall of the interview when the investigator comes to write it up. The notes also help capture the vocabulary of the person interviewed. Since most of the details of interview recorded depend upon memory of investigator, it is necessary that each and every interview be written up very soon after its occurrence (soon in hours, not in days). The longer the period between the interview and its recording, the greater the distortion due to lapse of memory.

The intensive approach.—In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the theoretical contention that the larger the mass of detail collected on a case the better the case for purposes of research is open to some question. We have tried the intensive method of approach and have placed competent investigators on single cases for a period of a few months, in the attempt to exhaust every nook and corner in which significant data might be lying undetected. Our feeling in regard to this is that there is a point of diminishing returns where further information on a case does not seem to add a great deal to the total findings. Just where this point of diminishing returns is we cannot definitely say at this time. This problem is an interesting one and we are keeping it in mind for further investigation. We are now experimenting with a less exhaustive approach² and find that it yields a mass of detail sufficient to discover the sig-

² We find that with the less exhaustive plan an investigator, by taking it leisurely and devoting half his time to research, can finish a case in two weeks. The less exhaustive approach, as we now have it, includes a summary of the case from the referring agency and a report from the confidential exchange, a full detailed inter-

nificant causative factors in any given case. Our feeling is, therefore, that after a certain point has been reached the completeness of a case is not to be measured in terms of the amount or bulk of data accumulated, but rather in terms of sufficiency of data to uncover the operation of various factors provoking the behavior problems.

The point of reference.—And finally, we have also discovered that there must be some point in the case itself in reference to which all the accumulated data gain significance. Burgess and Shaw some time ago suggested that this point of reference was the child's conception of his rôle and his conception of himself, and that he got into difficulty when his conception of himself and his rôle did not conform to the part he actually played and to the status he actually possessed in his various group relationships. This is a very intriguing hypothesis, which invites further check. Our experience has led us to broaden this reference point somewhat, so as to include the child's real and ideal world. We feel that the clash between the two, the attempts to recast the former in terms of the latter, gives us a certain control over all the various potential factors which may be discovered by the accumulation of objective data. Thus the child's real world reveals just how his native and acquired traits, his physical condition, his mental equipment operate in shaping his personality, and how the various social situations in the family and community have affected him. I suppose that this is what Sutherland had in mind when he said in effect that feeble-mindedness per se was never a cause of crime, but that feeble-mindedness plus a certain social situation to which the person was called upon to adjust might be a cause of delinquency. In other words, the actual operation of physical, mental, and social factors cannot be discovered by mere listing of the presence or absence of traits and situations, like height, weight, physical condition, intelligence, capacities, habits, interests, family and neighborhood organization. The operation of such factors can be found only by penetrating the child's world to find out what things in his total environment affect him and in what ways he responds to them.

view with the child, medical and psychological (routine) examinations, a detailed interview with the mother (in the home), interview with school teacher, investigation of home and neighborhood, and a final check-up on data. Interviews with brothers or sisters, associates, other adults in close contact with case may be added when necessary.

WALTER C. RECKLESS

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